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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
Della Porta and Vanucci (1999) start their book Corrupt Exchanges with this 
remarkable comment: “Corruption is one of the most acute expressions of triumphant 
democracy’s unresolved problems.” (p.4). Corruption is no doubt a multidimensional 
phenomenon, and this statement fails to do justice to the complex nature of the 
problem at hand.  One should also add that corruption is neither a problem specific to 
our age, nor to triumphant democracy for that matter.1  
   Now that we know that corruption is a widespread and endemic problem, can 
it be rooted out? Theoretically, this may be possible. However, in how far this route of 
action would be desirable is subject to debate. Rooting out corruption completely has 
its own trade-offs. Certainly, corruption imposes sizeable costs on society. On the 
other hand, fighting corruption is also costly. One of the standard tools of the 
economics profession, the cost and benefit analysis, might dictate that fighting 
corruption fails to cover the resources spent and opportunities lost along the way 
after a certain point, i.e. there might be declining marginal returns to scale in fighting 
corruption. Hence, Klitgaard (1988) argues that the optimal level of corruption is not 
zero (pp.24-25).  
 We have already started talking about corruption, but the crucial question is: 
What is corruption actually? How do we define it? Defining corruption precisely is a 
challenge. It is indeed very difficult to reach a definition that is wide enough in its 
coverage, abstains from value judgements, and at the same time serves analytical 
                                               
1
 For a series of examples across time and space, see Bardhan (1997), Friedrich (1989) and Klitgaard 
(1988) for example.  
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purposes. The most widespread definition of corruption among economists is as 
follows: “Corruption is the misuse of public power for private benefit.”2  
Although it sounds rather straightforward,   this definition suffers from a few 
shortcomings. For instance, the term “misuse” implies a deviation from the formal 
duties of a public position. Yet, a legal definition of this term fails to cover informal 
rules, the public’s expectations, codes of conduct etc. Moreover, the definition 
assumes implicitly the presence of a clear distinction between the public and the 
private spheres, which need not always be the case in every single country.  What is 
more, the concept of private benefit is not always easy to lay down clearly in the 
complicated cases whereby what is exchanged is not necessarily cash, but rather 
intangible substances such as power, status, or a future promise. However, it needs 
to be recognised that what is offered here is a working definition that renders a 
coherent analysis of corruption possible. Furthermore, this definition of corruption is 
endorsed by international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank and the 
IMF, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as Transparency 
International.3  
 What must be clear from the definition above is that corruption is a state-
society relationship. At the international level, globalisation has increased 
opportunities for collusive and concealed transactions between foreign private actors 
and host governments. Some examples are multinational companies being engaged 
in buying concessions, monopolies, etc.; kickbacks being offered in handing out 
contracts and/or loans; development aimed projects made unnecessarily expensive 
due to excessive spending resulting from unnecessary travels, and purchase of new 
computers; and numerous fringe benefits for local officials. In general, when the 
discretion that the public servants enjoy is considerable, and the regulations are non-
transparent such that these officials can not easily be held accountable for their 
deeds, corruption becomes more likely. According to Andvig and Fjeldtad (2000), the 
problem common to all of these cases mentioned above is that corruption tends to 
                                               
2
 Senturia, J A., “Corruption, Political” Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 4 (New York: 
Crowell-Collier-Macmillian, 1930-1935). However, similar definitions are common to most economists 
and policy makers.  
3
 Transparency International also attempts to use a somewhat wider definition with the hope of 
tackling corruption among private parties. The actual wording of the definition is as follows: “Corruption 
is the misuse of entrusted power for private benefit”. See Pope(2000). However, this definition has a 
drawback in that it renders the distinction between a simple case of theft from employer and that of 
corruption, where both the public power and private interests are involved. Consequently, the wider 
definition does not add much to the analytical power of the theory.   
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levy hidden costs on public services and blurs the distinction between the public and 
private spheres.  
To clarify the concept of corruption, Tanzi (1995, pp.161-162) defines the 
arm’s length principle, which dictates that personal or other relationships should play 
no role regarding economic decisions. His approach to defining corruption is heavily 
influenced by the Weberian legal-rational paradigm of public office, organised on the 
basis of rational procedures and universal principles, granting no room for personal 
motives.  Corruption is, then, defined as failure to respect the distinction between 
public and private, or alternatively to break the arm’s length principle, hence creating 
fertile ground for the seeds of corruption. However, this notion of public office is not 
immune to criticism, either. First of all, it was stated that public office is a western 
concept which need not find its exact equivalent in other societies. The second point 
regarding Weberian influenced conceptions of corruption is that legal procedures are 
not necessarily rational.4  
The obvious conclusion is that a discussion of the definitions of corruption is 
not actually a fruitful one. Indeed, corruption is a difficult concept to define, yet an 
easy one to recognise. Johnston (1989, pp.92) summarises this point elegantly:  
 
Despite the fact that most people, most of the time, know corruption when they 
see it, defining the concept does raise difficult theoretical and empirical 
questions. We are unlikely ever to arrive at a single definition, which 
accurately identifies all possible cases. Moreover, if a significant proportion of 
the population regard a person, process, or regime as corrupt, or if they 
believe that corruption is inevitable in their daily lives, that is an important 
social and political fact, whatever an analyst might say about the situation. 
 
For the purposes of the present study, the distinction between grand 
corruption and petty corruption needs to be clarified. Grand corruption, also known as 
political corruption, is the type of corruption observed at the highest levels of political 
authority. Grand corruption involves the corruptness of the decision-making 
segments of the society, as in cases where politicians exploit their positions for 
private gain, e.g., by receiving kick backs from the contracts that the state hands out, 
or the embezzlement of large sums from the public resources.5  
                                               
4
 See Andvig and Fjeldstad (2000, pp.65-66).  
5
 For an insightful and hands-on exposition of this topic, see Moody-Stuart (1997).   
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 The definition of petty corruption follows straight from that of grand corruption. 
Also known as bureaucratic corruption, petty corruption is corruption at the public 
administration level, rather than at the decision-making end of politics. This is the 
lower level corruption that a typical citizen experiences in daily life, as in when they 
have to pay bribes in their encounters with public servants either to receive a service, 
or to escape from punishment. The difference between the two forms of corruption 
may not always be evident in real life situations as these could be mutually 
reinforcing in a pyramid of upward extraction. However, on the analytical level, the 
distinction lies in the fact that petty corruption is a deviation from written rules, or 
implicit codes of conduct, whereas the extent of grand corruption exceeds this by far. 
Grand corruption covers abusing, sidestepping, ignoring or tailoring laws and 
regulations to secure private gain.6 
 There are certainly many methodologies that could be employed to analyse 
corruption. Perspectives from political science, psychology, sociology and 
anthropology all provide important insights for analysis. The advantage of putting this 
topic in an economic framework enables us to take a step away from fatalistic and 
moralistic explanations about the phenomenon, and to treat it in a value neutral 
manner. Given the policy implications, it probably would not be an overstatement to 
say that an understanding of the economic treatment of this problem will be central to 
keeping a firm stand on this very slippery ground. For instance, one tends to 
associate corruption somehow with a lack of morals or ethics, or by the breaking of 
the laws in the everyday usage of the term. However, as far as the economic analysis 
is concerned, there are strong differences between the terms “corrupt”, “illegal”, 
“unethical”, and “immoral”, hence they can not be used interchangeably. That is, not 
all illegal transactions are corrupt and vice versa. The same argument holds for 
unethical and immoral transactions, too.7 To tie up this discussion with the words of 
Rose-Ackerman (1999, p.xi): “Cultural differences and morality provide nuance and 
subtlety, but an economic approach is fundamental to understanding where corrupt 
incentives are the greatest and have the biggest impact.” 
 Chapter II of this manuscript presents a predominantly empirical analysis of 
the relationship between corruption and foreign direct investment (FDI). The empirical 
                                               
6
 See Andvig and Fjeldstad (2000, p.19). This point also strengthens the earlier caveat about the 
dangers of relying only on the criteria of deviation from formal legal rules in order to define corruption.  
7
 For an extended discussion on this point, see Bardhan, p.1321.  
Essays in Development and Transition Economics 
 10
work on corruption goes back to the seminal paper of Mauro (1995), which concludes 
that corruption is harmful for growth, and that this channel mainly operates through its 
negative impact on investment.8  There are already a number of studies on the 
impact of corruption on FDI (Habib and Zurawicki, 2001 and 2002; Wei and Wu, 
2001; Smarzynka and Wu, 2000, etc.). By now, it can be stated that corruption has a 
negative impact on foreign direct inflows. To put the study into a big picture, one 
needs to think of the linkages in Figure 1.1. 
 
Figure 1.1 The Link between Corruption, Capital Flows and Financial Crises 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The broad argument can be summarised as follows: The presence of corruption in a 
country distorts the composition of capital flows against foreign direct investment, and 
in favour of more volatile forms of capital flows such as portfolio investments and 
bank loans as depicted by the first arrow in the flow chart in Figure 1.1. The argument 
then follows that such a volatile composition of capital flows that is relatively weak on 
FDI increases the likelihood of currency/financial crises, as depicted by the second 
arrow. This latter link is relatively well-researched (Frankel and Rose, 1996; Radelet 
and Sachs, 1998; Rodrik and Velasco, 1999). Hence, we turn our attention to the 
former link in chapter II.  
 The novelty of the analysis in chapter II is to take an in-depth look into the 
survey data on corruption in order to differentiate between different types of 
                                               
8
 By virtue of being the first empirical treatment of corruption, this paper has also said the final word on 
the long-lasting debate on whether corruption greases the wheel (see Leff (1964) and Huntington 
(1968) for example), or it is sand in the wheels (see Myrdal (1968)).  
Corruption 
A particular composition of capital 
flows (relatively light on FDI) 
Increased likelihood of currency/ 
financial crises 
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corruption. Running a principal components analysis with the data on the available 
seven subcomponents of corruption, two principal components are retained, 
pertaining to the level of corruption (component 1) and to the type of corruption 
(component 2). This approach solves the problem of multicollinearity and allows us to 
distinguish between the grand and petty types of corruption. The chapter concludes 
that between petty and grand corruption, foreign investors are deterred more by the 
latter type of corruption. The chapter also offers theoretical reasoning why this might 
be the case and ends with policy implications.  
 Moving from chapter II to III, we turn our attention away from the specific field 
of corruption, which is but one of the manifestations of institutional failure, and focus 
on the institutions and growth linkages. To explain the basics of this argument, let us 
first start with a definition of institutions. North (1990) defines institutions as the rules 
of the game –both formal rules, informal rules (norms) and their enforcement 
characteristics. That is, institutions define how the game is played. Hence, the 
concept of institutions is an abstract, yet crucial one to explain the differences cross-
country income levels.   
 Neoclassical growth theory in the vein of Solow predicts conditional 
convergence, i.e. conditional on initial starting point, countries are expected to 
converge to their steady state growth levels. However, what we observe empirically is 
the vast differences in per capita income levels across countries. The theory has 
explained the non-convergence of the poor countries to the rich ones with the 
differences in their total factor productivity (TFP). However, this only transformed the 
question to what drives the differences in TFP across nations? Solow’s explanation 
stating that it is the technology that drives these differences, hence the total factor 
productivity has also been known as the Solow residual.   
 Chapter III sets out from the question: What determines the huge per capita 
income differences across nations? A strand of the literature has fruitfully brought 
institutions to the forefront of economic analysis (Knack and Keefer, 1995 and 1997; 
Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001 and 2002). In what 
can be viewed as a critical contribution to the literature, these papers have used 
proxy measures such as security of property rights, contract enforceability etc. to 
measure the institutional setting of a country, and have employed these in reduced 
form regression analyses to investigate the hypothesis that the differences in 
institutional framework explain the differences in per capita income across the world, 
Essays in Development and Transition Economics 
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and hence the non-convergence. In other words, this strand of literature turned 
Solow’s argument in favour of technology on its head and offered an alternative 
explanation, namely that it is the institutions that matter.  
 However, saying that institutions matter is actually not saying much. In order to 
further the envelope in this field of research, we need to take a closer look into how 
institutions matter. Obviously, institutions are not factors of production themselves; 
hence they do not produce anything. Their contribution must work though the factors 
of production by making them more(less) productive.  
 In order to gain further insights into this topic, Chapter III takes Hall and Jones 
(1999) –one of the earliest contributions to the strand of institutions literature- as a 
starting point. Using the same data and econometric methodology, we augment their 
reduced-form regressions so as to include the factors of production, i.e. human and 
physical capital, and the interactions between institutions and these factors of 
production. The results are fascinating. First of all, inserting the factors of production 
into the regression, we notice that the institutions variable –although still significant- 
loses its magnitude drastically. Secondly, once we allow for the interaction between 
institutions and the factors of production, the significance of the institutions term 
vanishes entirely. We call this the moderating effect of institutions (as opposed to a 
direct effect). Finally, the chapter concludes that by doing the exercise described 
above, what was called the Solow residual is purged down to a typical random 
econometric residual.     
 Finally, in the fourth chapter in this manuscript, we turn our attention to the 
subjective measures of well-being, and present an empirical analysis of life 
satisfaction in transition countries. This study is somewhat more unorthodox than the 
previous two essays; however its roots are still grounded in an important debate in 
economic theory. As will be explained in chapter 4, the standard neoclassical theory 
has a strong objectivist touch in its methodology. In other words, it studies individuals’ 
actions, and implicitly assumes that the actions contain all the relevant information 
related to the underlying preferences. Setting aside all subjective experience, this 
type of an approach aims to capture individuals’ well-being, or utility, by inference 
from their observable actions. Chapter 4 explains why this is a methodologically 
problematic approach, and presents the alternative strand of using subjective 
Essays in Development and Transition Economics 
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measures of life satisfaction. This line of research has picked up recently among 
economists in what is called the economics of happiness.9  
 Having recognised that the traditional utility and welfare theories have to make 
a lot of compromises in their assumptions to be able to present a coherent theory, the 
novelty of the economics of happiness research agenda is to set out by asking the 
individuals about their perceived life satisfaction (happiness) instead of trying to infer 
the same information from their consumption patterns. As such, this approach is 
bound to generate a complementary –perhaps even superior- information on well-
being. Possibly, the most noteworthy implication of the discussion above is that 
although the concept of life satisfaction (happiness) is not necessarily one and the 
same with the concept of utility, it could be considered as a valid proxy that would 
yield valuable insights into the topic. By stepping out of the traditional reluctance of 
the economics profession to attempt to measure utility directly, economics of 
happiness also opens one of the fundamental areas of economic theory to empirical 
research.  
 Having clarified the links of chapter 4 with the economic theory, our aim in this 
chapter is to provide a systematic analysis of life satisfaction in transition countries, 
which has not been attempted at this breadth before. Using data from the World 
Values Surveys, we compare and contrast the experience regarding the correlates of 
life satisfaction in transition countries with that in the sample of non-transition 
countries. In other words, we are testing whether the stylised facts that are derived 
from earlier studies in economics of happiness also hold for the transition countries. 
Our a priori expectation is to find some differences, given that the transition process 
from command economy to market capitalism has been a devastating experience for 
the peoples of these countries. In fact, our findings emphasise that there are indeed 
several noteworthy differences in the case of the transition countries. First and 
foremost concerning the individual level correlates of life satisfaction, the most 
important difference appears to be in the field of self-employment. Accordingly, the 
self-employed are notably happier in the transition countries, whereas this pattern is 
reversed in the case of non-transition countries. This is possibly related to the new 
opportunities of entrepreneurship that the transition process has created.   
                                               
9
 The best example for the relevance of this line of research came at the time of the writing of this 
dissertation in the form of an announcement that CesIfo Institute’s annual Distinguished CES Fellow 
prize for 2005 was awarded to Bruno S. Frey, one of the leading figures in this field of research. For 
further references in economics of happiness, see chapter 4.   
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 The next step in this chapter is to enrich the analysis by adding macro level 
variables, such as GDP per capita, inflation, unemployment rate and the Gini 
coefficient as a measure of inequality, to the econometric specification. Among the 
results that stand out is the role of inequality. Inequality seems to be particularly 
disliked in the post-communist societies, which appears not to be the case in the non-
transition countries according to the results of our econometric model. A potential 
explanation for this result is the heritage of the socialist system where equality was 
one of the most pronounced values.  
 The role of reforms in the transition process is also a question of interest, 
especially from a practical policy point of view. This issue is tacked in the relevant 
section by taking a close look at the reforms as measured by the EBRD transition 
indicators. Finally, the paper pools the available data from earlier years of the 
transition period and investigates how happiness has evolved over time for a smaller 
sample of countries where more than two data points were available. Obviously, the 
period in question is too short to discern any strong trends in happiness in the sense 
of time series econometrics, however we were able to detect preliminary evidence in 
the form of a V-shaped curve, whereby the average levels of perceived happiness 
dipped in mid-1990s as opposed to the initial years of transition, and as the evidence 
from late 1990s-early 2000 suggests, they have bounced back, although very few 
countries report average happiness levels above the values reported in early 1990s. 
Finally, the chapter concludes by policy recommendations.  
These three essays were written separately, yet the common theme to all of 
them is an emphasis on the institutional setting. The first essay does this in a narrow 
field of application, namely corruption. The second essay tackles a bigger question, 
namely the linkages between the institutional environment and growth. Finally, the 
common thread between these two essays and the last essay in this manuscript is 
the analysis of the role of reforms in the transition context and relates them to the 
context of happiness. After all, what better research question can one think of for an 
aspiring economist, whose ultimate professional goal should be to help foster 
happiness? On this note, we conclude this section with the words of Jeremy 
Bentham: “Create all the happiness you can create; remove all the misery you are 
able to remove.”10 
                                               
10
 As quoted by Layard (2005, p.111).  
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PART I 
 
Corruption and Foreign Direct 
Investment 
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Chapter 2 
Between Two Evils:  
Grand versus Petty Corruption  
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
It is not uncommon to hear international investors proudly mentioning how corruption 
functions in their countries of operations facilitating how they conduct their 
businesses. For instance, under the Suharto regime in Indonesia, investors would 
just go “top down”, involving a high-ranking Suharto crony and being safe thereafter 
from any further corrupt requests11. As opposed to this, they also tend to complain 
that corruption in some other countries is extremely arduous and time consuming. It 
is this difference that this paper is about. We will recourse both to theoretical 
reasoning, and empirical tests using the data on FDI and corruption to investigate the 
validity of such arguments. 
It is by now a well established empirical regularity that corruption has negative 
consequences for the economy. For instance, it asserts an adverse impact on the 
ratio of investment to GDP, (Mauro 1995 and 1997, Campos, Lien and Pradhan 1999, 
Brunetti, Kisunko and Weder 1997: 23 and 25; Brunetti and Weder 1998; Gymiah-
Brempong 2002). There is equally strong support for the hypothesis that corruption 
lowers the growth rate of GDP, (Mauro 1997; Tanzi and Davoodi 2001; Leite and 
                                               
11
 For detailed case studies on the organisation of grand corruption in Indonesia, see Bhargava and 
Bolongaita (2004).  
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Weidmann 1999: 24; Poirson 1998: 16; Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2004; Méon and 
Sekkat 2003; Gymiah-Brempong 2002). The main channel through which this 
happens is through lowering capital accumulation; hence it is not surprising that 
some studies generate insignificant results once investment is controlled for (Mauro 
1995; Mo 2001). Among further areas of economic activity where corruption has a 
significant adverse are productivity (Lambsdorff 2003a), government services and 
health care, (Gupta, Davoodi and Tiongson 2001) the composition of government 
expenditures, (Mauro 1998 and 1997; Gupta, Davoodi and Alonso-Terme 2002; 
Gupta, de Mello and Sharan 2000) and tax revenues (Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann 
and Zoido-Lobaton 2000; Tanzi and Davoodi 2001).  
The adverse impact of corruption on foreign direct investments (FDI) is also 
well established. Although Alesina and Weder (1999) report an insignificant 
relationship, it must be taken into account that first, the authors use data prior to the 
1995’s considerable increase in FDI and second, they use a variable by ICRG that 
measures the political instability due to corruption. This variable depends not only on 
levels of corruption, but also on the population’s intolerance towards corruption.12 
Other papers clearly support the hypothesis that corruption lowers FDI, (Wei 2000a 
and b, Smarzynska and Wei 2000; Wei and Wu 2001; Habib and Zurawicki 2001 and 
2002). Lambsdorff (2003b) shows that overall capital inflows of a country deteriorate 
due to corruption.  
However, the extent to which the impact of various types of corruption may 
differ has hardly ever been treated empirically so far. Corruption may surface under a 
variety of guises, such as embezzlement of public funds in public utilities, extortion of 
speed money in exchange for getting business permits/licences, commissions to 
parliamentarians to influence the content of the legislation and bribery in public 
contracts. It is plausible to expect that these actions are likely to have separate 
consequences.  
The only difference in types of corruption that has been the subject of research 
lately relates to predictability and opportunism. The World Bank (1997: 34) argued: 
"There are two kinds of corruption. The first is one where you pay the regular price 
and you get what you want. The second is one where you pay what you have agreed 
                                               
12
 Alesina and Weder (1999) also briefly state estimates using different data on corruption. Due to the 
brevity it is difficult to judge on the findings. The data on corruption are more recent while the FDI-data 
refer to 1970-1995, which may have biased the results downwards.  
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to pay and you go home and lie awake every night worrying whether you will get it or 
if somebody is going to blackmail you instead." This idea was implemented in a 
survey by the World Bank and the University of Basel by asking for the predictability 
of corruption (i.e. absence of opportunism) as well as the overall levels of corruption 
prevailing in a country. This survey aimed to measure not only whether the costs of 
corruption are known in advance, but also whether after the (corrupt) payment, the 
service is delivered as promised. World Bank (1997) investigates the impact of these 
two variables on the ratio of investment to GDP in a sample of 39 industrial and 
developing countries. Accordingly, for a given level of corruption, countries with more 
predictable and less opportunistic corruption enjoy higher investment rates. Further 
support for this approach is to be found in the work of Campos, Lien and Pradhan 
(1999), where it is concluded that the nature of corruption also matters in analysing 
its economic consequences. Lambsdorff (2003b: 237) confirms that besides the 
levels of corruption, opportunism –defined as to what extent a briber can be confident 
that the bribee will deliver the promised services once the payment is made- reduces 
a country’s annual capital inflows. 
But, predictability is not the only way to capture different aspects of corruption. 
We argue that for given levels of corruption, it is rather the petty type that has a 
negative impact on investment. This hypothesis will be tested by focusing on the 
impact of corruption on foreign direct investments (FDI), using data on corruption by 
the World Economic Forum, which provide a detailed breakdown of various forms of 
corruption. Section 2.2 provides theoretical reasoning for an impact of the level and 
type of corruption on FDI. Section 2.3 describes the data. Section 2.4 is the first step 
of the empirical investigation of how different types of corruption impact on FDI. In 
this section, we find that corruption in public utilities has the largest deterrent effect 
on FDI, whilst corruption in making laws and legislations and that in judicial decisions 
have the smallest magnitude of impact on FDI. We also present a principal 
component analysis in this section. Section 2.5 presents evidence that that the 
second component captures the type of corruption. Section 2.6 employs both 
components in regression analysis. Controlling for the first component, i.e. the level 
of corruption, we show how the second component also matters for FDI. This result is 
most likely related to the necessity of increasing organizational efforts to engage in 
petty corruption in public utilities and loan application, which, are more contentious 
areas for extortion. In contrast, engagement in grand corruption may be seen as a 
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voluntary decision where investors play an active role in negotiations. This means 
that they are in better control over the outcome. Section 2.7 presents further tests 
related to governance indicators and shows that the results of the analysis are robust 
to their inclusion. Finally, Section 2.8 interprets the results from the point of view of 
their policy implications, and concludes.  
 
2.2  Theoretical Underpinnings 
There are theoretical reasons to expect that international investors are deterred by 
corruption. Corruption has been shown to inspire cumbersome regulation, and to give 
incentives to public servants to create artificial bottlenecks. Red tape undoubtedly 
affects international investors adversely. For instance, Djankov et al. (2000: 47) 
shows the rates of market entry to fall with increasing levels of corruption.  
Akin to a standard adverse selection problem, whereby the wrong type of 
individuals are selected due to informational asymmetry, e.g. as in the case of people 
of ill-health buying health insurance, corruption also leads to the selection of the 
wrong firms, that is, those that are more willing or have better capacity to offer and 
conceal bribes. In a setting where the advantages from “know-how” would be offset 
by the absence thereof with respect to “know-who”, investors would definitely be less 
eager to enter the new market. Furthermore, corruption brings with it the problem of 
enforcement, which among other things requires trust, (Lambsdorff 2002a). However, 
it is not necessarily easy for newcomers to instil the same levels of trust as would be 
readily available at the local level. Further distortions may arise if bribers have the 
leverage to ask public servants to harass their competitors, (Bardhan 1997: 1322). 
Local firms are likely to have an edge over their international competitors in arranging 
such impediments. Due to what may be called ‘local capture’, FDI flows would be 
distorted towards the home market in case of high levels of corruption. Hence, 
especially gross FDI inflows would suffer from corruption crowding out international 
investors. A priori, it is reasonable to expect net FDI inflows to be affected less by 
corruption because local investors may opt for seizing local (corrupt) opportunities 
rather than invest abroad. This hypothesis will be tested in sections 2.4 and 2.6.  
Furthermore, international investors may also be cautious about the security of 
their property rights, which would fare low under kleptocratic rulers. Such a corrupt 
ruler will not be able to make a credible commitment concerning his policies, (Stiglitz 
1998: 8-11; DeLong and Shleifer 1993; Rose-Ackerman 1999: 118; Grossman and 
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Noh 1994; Charap and Harm 2000). Once investments are sunk, they become prey 
to extortion. This comes about mainly because kleptocrats are neither motivated nor 
constrained to honour their commitments, (Ades and Di Tella 1997: 1026; Mauro 
1995). Governments with a reputation for corruption find it difficult to commit to 
effective policies and to convince investors of their achievements. Corruption 
therefore deters investors because it goes along with a lacking respect for law, 
Lambsdorff (2003b).13  
So far, we have discussed the potential impact of corruption in a broad 
perspective. It is yet to be seen, which type of corruption is more detrimental for 
investors. Corruption may infect a variety of different government functions, all of 
which may be of different relevance in the eyes of an international investor. Data on 
corruption in different government functions are available for 1) obtaining export and 
import permits, 2) getting connected to public utilities (e.g., fixed line telephony, or 
power grid), 3) annual tax payments, 4) awarding public contracts, 5) dealing with 
loan applications, 6) influencing the making of laws and policies, regulations, or 
decrees and 7) influencing judicial decisions. Although this list is far from exhaustive, 
it captures the essential areas of interface between the public and the private sector.  
As will be shown subsequently, corruption in access to public utilities, tax 
assessments and loan application presents a rather petty type of corruption. In 
contrast, corruption in public contracts laws and polices and judicial decisions is of a 
rather grand type. Grand and petty corruption differ in their impact on investors in two 
major respects. 
 
Arguments related to the organisation of corruption: Petty corruption is 
typically defined as the everyday, street-level type of corruption that involves small 
payments, speed money and tips to relatively low ranking officials. Needless to say, 
these payments are particularly time consuming, imposing additional costs on 
investors. For instance, Kaufmann and Wei (1999) document that high levels of 
corruption are positively associated with the time managers spend with bureaucrats 
in interpreting rules and regulations. This issue appears particularly relevant for petty 
                                               
13
 Lambsdorff (2003b) reports that an index of law and order obtains the expected sign on a country’s 
capital inflows. Yet, the impact of law and order on FDI was insignificant in this analysis.  
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corruption.14 Extortion may also be classified as petty corruption. Public office holders 
may charge additional amounts over and above the official fee for providing certain 
services. This could be complemented by harassment or further delays unless a 
payment is made. It might be argued that if corruption is organised as a voluntary 
arrangement between a briber and a bribee, it might profit the parties involved whilst 
hampering the third party interests. By contrast, since extortion is beyond the control 
of the investors and does not entail voluntary engagement, it requires further 
organizational safeguards and calculations. As such, a country’s reputation for 
extortion can easily crowd out investment. On the other hand, a reputation for 
collusion might be lesser of an evil for investors, as it signals credible commitment. 
Our argument is along the lines of Shleifer and Vishny (1993), who posit that 
monopolized (grand) corruption should be preferred by investors as opposed to a 
sequence of requests for petty bribes by decentralized units. While grand corruption 
would resemble a one-stop-shop, decentralized bribe takers would individually act as 
monopolists and thus tend to overgraze the market.  
Let us take a look at the Shleifer and Vishny argument from a formal 
theoretical perspective. Consider the objective function of the bureaucrats as a 
simple profit function in the sense of revenues minus costs. The revenues come from 
the price they charge for the entitlements. This price should, of course, be an official 
and transparent fee that covers the bureaucratic costs involved in processing the 
application in an ideal world. This should be public knowledge and investors should 
be able to factor this into their cost calculations in advance. Yet, in the world that is 
not free of corruption, we visualise the revenue of the bureaucrat from this 
transaction as a percentage of the total amount invested. In other words, the 
bureaucrat asks t percent of the total investment in order to provide the investor with 
the required entitlement. She also incurs some costs in this process. The presence of 
these costs has nothing to do with administrative costs, but it rather stems from the 
necessity of obfuscating the payments, i.e. concealing the bribe. This is necessary 
because there is no country in the world, which does not condemn corruption as a 
                                               
14
 Petty corruption might be more frequent and due to its repetitive nature might help the actors avoid 
opportunism, (Pechlivanos 2004). Grand corruption, on the other hand, necessitates more 
sophisticated designs of exchange. For example politicians are engaged in a multitude of different 
activities, commercial or non-commercial. By making use of this multiplicity, they can further their 
commercial (corrupt) interests by concealing them amid the non-commercials ones. Such a long-term 
engagement, or relational contracting, would make opportunism less likely, (Lambsdorff and Teksoz 
2004). 
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criminal activity.15 Assuming that these costs are a positive fraction of the extorted 
bribes, we can write the cost function as follows:  
 
                XtcC i⋅=    where 0<c<1 
 
Hence, the profit function of the bureaucrats can be written as revenues minus costs: 
 
,)1( XtcXctXt iii −=−=∏      (2.1) 
 
where X is the amount invested.  
Let us also assume that the amount invested is inversely proportional to the 
amount of the money extorted away from the investor by bureaucrats to deliver the 
licenses. Let A be the total amount that the investor is prepared to tie to his project. In 
the absence of bribes, A would be the total amount that he would have invested. 
Hence, the actual amount invested can be formalised as: 
)1(
1
 
=
−=
n
i
itAX               (2.2) 
where n is the total number of licences required to start a new investment.  
Now, we will consider two broad scenarios. The first one will be the joint profit 
maximisation of the n departments, which issue the licences. Imagine, for instance, 
the presence of a strong kleptocrat that dictates the price of the bribes to each 
department. The second scenario will be one where each department tries to extort 
the maximum amount in the form of bribes without taking into account the bribes 
charged by other departments. We will analyse the implications of these two 
scenarios in terms of the level of investment. The former scenario is that of a top-
down type of corruption, and this can easily be mapped into grand type of corruption. 
Similarly, the latter scenario is one where there is a disorganised competition for 
bribes. This can be interpreted as a setting where petty corruption prevails.  
 
Scenario 1: Grand Corruption (Joint “Profit” Maximisation of n Departments) 
Inserting (2.2) into (2.1) yields the following profit function:  
                                               
15
 For a discussion related to secrecy associated with corrupt payments and an in-depth look at the 
mechanics of concealing bribes see Lambsdorff (2002) and Lambsdorff and Teksoz (2004).   
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At this stage, we introduce symmetry in the amount of bribes. This comes about 
because of the presence of a central figure, e.g. a kleptocrat that sets the optimal 
level of bribes taking into account the joint profit maximisation nature of the problem. 
Hence, plugging in ti=t in (2.3) 
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This is the objective function to be optimised with respect to level of bribes 
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Solving this optimisation problem for t (level of bribes), and calculating the resulting 
investment and profits leads to an optimal level of bribes in the case of grand 
corruption at the amount of: 
n
t
2
1
=                        (2.6) 
which in turn leads to investment and profit levels of: 
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Scenario 2: Petty Corruption (Decentralised/Disorganised “Profit” Maximisation of n 
Departments) 
In this scenario, there is no longer a kleptocratic figure in the story, hence rather than 
a centralised bribe setter as in scenario 1; in this case, there will be competition for 
bribes. Consequently, each department behaves autonomously and maximises its 
objective function with the presumption that its actions has no impact on the 
decisions taken by other departments.  
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Our starting point is again the objective function defined as equation (2.3). 
However, a slight modification is necessary in equation (2.2) so as to reflect the 
change in the nature of the competition for bribes explained above. In this case: 
ji
n
i
i tntt )1(
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−+=
 
=
 
in the light of which equation (2.2) could be rearranged as follows: 
 
))1(1( ji tntAX −−−=        (2.2’) 
 
What this all means is that in the absence of a central bribe-setter, each 
department attempts to maximise its own bribe revenue. Therefore, it takes other n-1 
departments’ actions into account by including the term tj in its calculations. However, 
in each department’s calculation this variable is assumed to be independent of ti and 
is treated as a constant.  
 
The profit function now becomes:  
 
))1(1()1( jii tntAtc −−−−=∏     (2.3’) 
 
The optimisation process yields the following first order condition:  
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Given the nature of the problem, we introduce symmetry now. Hence, we plug in 
t=ti=tj in equation (2.5’). This reflects the fact that the optimisation problem laid out 
above has been solved n times by n departments and each department arrives at the 
same optimal level of t.  
 
0])1(21[)1( =−−−−=
∂
∏∂
tntAc
ti
 
1
10)]1(1[)1(
+
=

=+−−=
∂
∏∂
n
tntAc
ti
              (2.6’) 
  
Essays in Development and Transition Economics 
 25
From equation (2.6’), it follows that: 
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The results can be summarised in a tabular form as follows:  
Table 2.1: Equilibrium by Scenario and Numerical Illustration 
 Scenario1: Grand Corruption Scenario 2: Petty Corruption 
Bribes: t 1/2n 1/(n+1) 
Investment: X A/2 A/(n+1) 
Profit: ∏  (1-c)A/4n (1-c)A/(n+1)2 
  
Numerical Illustration: c=1/2; A=4800; n=4 
Bribes: t 1/8 1/5 
Investment: X 2400 960 
Profit: ∏  150 96 
 
It may be argued that this exercise is an oversimplification of the actual phenomenon. 
However, it serves the purpose of illustrating our point in a relatively simple setting. 
Evidently, for all n>1, the value of the bribes is lower, moreover total investment and 
profits are higher in scenario 1, namely grand corruption.16 This gives us a testable 
hypothesis for the empirical section of the paper: Other things being equal, foreign 
investors would prefer grand corruption to petty corruption in host countries, where 
they invest.   
 
Fraudulent opportunities stemming from grand corruption: A cobweb of 
investments abroad surrounded with the secrecy of corrupt deals could also generate 
adverse incentives for investors to boost their own income at the expense of 
defrauding their firm or their shareholders. Alesina and Weder (1999) argue that 
corruption may even attract FDI if investors form an ‘inner circle’ to profit from corrupt 
                                               
16
 The model presented here may also be extended by introducing n, namely the number of 
departments, as a choice variable, in which case there would be incentives to limit this number in the 
case of centralised grand corruption, and vice versa in the case of petty corruption. The insights from 
such an exercise are already implicit in the set up presented above.  
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opportunities. 17  Investment decisions, therefore, may take into account the 
differences in opportunities generated by grand and petty corruption. Petty corruption 
tends to be beyond the immediate control of decision makers, whereas the opposite 
holds true for grand corruption. Winston (1979: 840-1) argues that the risk associated 
with corruption increases with the number of transactions, the number of people 
involved, the duration of the transaction and the simplicity and standardization of the 
procedure. Since the risk does not depend on the value of a transaction, Winston 
argues that public servants therefore bias their decision in favour of capital intensive, 
technologically sophisticated and custom-built products and technologies since these 
generate larger kickbacks. The same logic can be applied to the case of fraudulent 
investors. Grand corruption provides an efficient base for such fraudulent behaviour.  
Another reason for investors to be less averse to grand corruption is due to the 
possibility of exchanging political support in return for enforcing corrupt agreements. 
For example, during the tenure of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, many private 
power companies were awarded contracts to sell power to the state Water and 
Power Development Authority. But the government’s main anti-corruption agency 
maintained that kickbacks had been paid to bureaucrats and politicians in securing 
these deals. The new government in place initiated a wholesale renegotiation of the 
old contracts, cutting the electricity unit price by 30 percent. But, the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank (whose loans to private power companies would 
sour in case of a price cut) warned the Pakistani government that unilaterally cutting 
electricity unit rates would seriously lower investor’s confidence. In order to exert 
pressure on the government, multilateral donors postponed loan agreements.  
A related example comes from Indonesia, where, due to charges of corruption, 
the government's utility authority PLN cancelled its contracts to obtain power from 
large power plants built by joint ventures with large foreign companies. In this case, 
relatives of Suharto had been given shares of the operations, raising suspicions of 
kickbacks and inflated prices for electricity. But foreign delegations of export credit 
insurers exerted pressure on the Indonesian government to honor the old contracts. It 
was argued that ”[t]he future investment climate will be shaped by a long-term 
resolution ... that protects the fundamental rights of investors. ... [Default] will impair 
                                               
17
 While we acknowledge the possibility of this mechanism, we contend that it falls short of 
outbalancing the negative overall effect of corruption on FDI, which is empirically well established. 
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Indonesia and our ability to work with you in the future”.18 Such political pressure 
cannot be organized in the frequent cases of petty corruption, rendering them less 
attractive.  
Corruption in public utilities and loan applications, on the other hand, often 
involves extortion as there is a clear official service that is demanded. Payments to 
officials might be made in order to avoid harassment and delay, and in some cases to 
avoid the official fee. Although there are exceptions to the rule, petty corruption 
generally necessitates time consuming negotiations over prices, and frequent 
confrontation with requests as well as additional organizational requirements.  
Public contracts, however, are less likely to involve extortion of the type 
described above. In this type of activity, private firms are free to make their own 
calculus as to whether to pay bribes or not. Corruption in access to public utilities 
often happens after investors have incurred sunk costs, whereas corruption in public 
contracts arises ex ante during the tender, in other words, before investors have 
committed their resources. At the same time, corruption in areas such as public 
contracts, laws and policies and judicial decisions tends to be of the grand type. The 
counterparties deciding on laws, policies and public contracts tend to be higher 
ranking officials. Investors would be directly involved in the negotiation process and 
may grab the opportunities to pocket part of the payment. 
In sum, two types of corruption are of relevance for our analysis: A petty type 
of corruption, which is cumbersome to organize, especially in fields such as public 
utilities and loan applications. The second sort of corruption is the grand, political 
type related to government policymaking and judicial decisions. The latter is much 
easier to organize and offers fraudulent opportunities for investors.  
 
                                               
18
 Citation from the Far Eastern Economic Review, October 21, 1999, "Trouble on the grid.” See also 
the Financial Times, March 10, 2000, "Interim deal in Indonesia power dispute.” 
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2.3  Data Description 
We employ two dependent variables for this study. The first is the gross FDI inflows 
as a percentage of GDP for the period 1995 to 2003. The annual dollar value of FDI 
are from the IMF International Financial Statistics, divided by the 2000 GDP in 
current US dollars from the World Development Indicators database.  The second 
dependent variable is the net FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP for the period 1994 
to 2002. The source for this variable is the World Development Indicators 2004.  
We delete Luxembourg from the sample of countries since it is an obvious 
outlier. Theoretically only positive values are possible for gross FDI data. However, if 
FDI already calculated in previous periods are withdrawn, in some cases negative 
values may arise. The data on FDI are dealt with in logarithmic form. Due to some 
observations that are close to or below zero, we add the constant value 0.01 percent 
of GDP to the gross data prior to taking the logarithm. Similarly, we add one to the 
net FDI data before taking the logarithm.  
Data on subcomponents of corruption for 102 countries in our sample comes 
from the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) Global Competitiveness Report 2003/04. 
These variables are constructed as the average responses for each country (of 
mostly more than 50 business executives per country) from survey questions asking 
the respondents the following questions:  
 
1. In your industry, how commonly would you estimate that firms make 
undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with export and import 
permits? (1 = common, 7 = never occurs) 
2. In your industry, how commonly would you estimate that firms make 
undocumented extra payments or bribes when getting connected to public 
utilities (e.g., telephone or electricity)? (1 = common, 7 = never occurs) 
3. In your industry, how commonly would you estimate that firms make 
undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with annual tax 
payments? (1 = common, 7 = never occurs) 
4. In your industry, how commonly would you estimate that firms make 
undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with public contracts 
(investment projects)? (1 = common, 7 = never occurs) 
5. In your industry, how commonly would you estimate that firms make 
undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with loan applications? 
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(1 = common, 7 = never occurs) 
6. In your industry, how commonly would you estimate that firms make 
undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with influencing laws and 
policies, regulations, or decrees to favour selected business interests? (1 = 
common, 7 = never occurs) 
7. In your industry, how commonly would you estimate that firms make 
undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with getting favourable 
judicial decisions? (1 = common, 7 = never occurs) 
 
We also use further data from the same survey for the absence of Legal Political 
Donations (WEF 2003; “To what extent do legal contributions to political parties have 
a direct influence on specific public policy outcomes? 1 = very close link between 
donations and policy, 7 = little direct influence on policy”), Judicial Independence 
(WEF 2003; “The judiciary in your country is independent from political  influences of 
members of government, citizens, or firms: 1= No heavily influenced, 7= Yes, entirely 
dependent), Public Trust in Politicians (WEF 2003 “Public trust in the financial 
honesty of politicians is 1 = very low, 7 = very high”) and the extent of bureaucratic 
red tape (WEF 2003 “How much time does your firm’s senior management spend 
dealing/negotiating with government officials (as a percentage of work time)? 1 = 0%, 
2 = 1–10%, 3 = 11–20%, 8 = 81–100%”). 
Further explanatory variables used in the study are openness (the sum of 
imports and exports of goods and services relative to GDP; data from the World 
Development Indicators, average for 1996-2002), Population (data for 2001 from the 
World Development Indicators), export of fuels relative to merchandise exports 
(World Development Indicators, average  1994-2003), growth of GDP (World 
Development Indicators, average 1990-1995), the share of Protestants (La Porta et al. 
1999 and CIA Factbook – where the latter provided only qualitative descriptions a 
quantitative estimate has been provided by the authors) and distance to global 
investors (the sum of the distance to Chicago and that to Frankfurt. Data on latitude 
and longitude are from the CIA Factbook and the distances are calculated according 
to spherical trigonometry). 
We also employ a variable concerning the grand-petty corruption distinction 
from the Voice of the People 2004 survey by Transparency International/Gallup. 
World Bank/University of Basel survey for the World Development Report 1997 
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provides us with a variable of opportunism in corrupt deals. Further variables of 
interest employed in this paper are Bureaucratic Quality, and Law and Order from the 
International Country Risk Guide 1998 and Absence of Civil Liberties from the 
Freedom in the World publication of the Freedom House. See data appendix for 
descriptive statistics.  
 
2.4  Data Reduction: Principal Component Analysis 
Table 2.2a and b report the results of the regressions to establish the simple link 
between corruption and FDI. The cross-section regressions model is specified in the 
following way:  
( ) 0 1 2ln 0.001 _i i i iiFDI GDP Absence corruption Xβ β β ε+ = + + + , 
where i is the country subscript. X is a vector of control variables,   i is a vector of 
corresponding coefficients and  i is a random error term. We start with a simple 
specification where further explanatory variables are disregarded. Accordingly, we 
only control for GDP per capita to capture the decreasing returns to scale in wealthy 
countries that drives capital transfers towards developing countries and emerging 
markets. 
Table 2.2.a shows that the absence of corruption in public utilities has the 
strongest positive impact on FDI, whereas the impact of absence of corruption in law 
and policies and in judicial decisions is much lower. This initial reduced form 
evidence is in line with the theoretical arguments presented above. 
It is plausible that net and gross FDI figure may exhibit differences regarding 
their reaction to different types of corruption. In order to do justice to this idea, we run 
the same regressions below this time with the dependent variable as average net FDI 
inflows. The results are reported in Table 2.2.b. The overall pattern is similar in that 
the strongest impact is from absence of corruption in public utilities to FDI, except 
that the magnitudes are generally smaller. Furthermore, the coefficients of absence 
of corruption in public contracts, in laws and policies, and in judicial decisions are not 
only small in magnitude in this regression, but also lose significance even at the 10% 
level.  
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Table 2.2.a Ordinary Least Squares, a) 
Dependent Variable: Average Annual Gross FDI inflows  
relative to GDP, logged, 1995-2003 
Independent 
Variables 
1.  2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7 
2.94*** 3.58*** 3.33*** 2.90*** 2.85*** 2.74*** 2.74*** Constant 
0.55 0.60 0.59 0.56 0.57 0.55 0.55 
-0.01 -0.20* -0.11 0.03 -0.02 0.06 0.08 GDP per head, log.  
0.08 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.07 
0.17**       Absence of 
Corruption, Export 
and Import 
0.07       
 0.35***      Absence of 
Corruption, Public 
Utilities 
 0.09      
  0.26***     Absence of 
Corruption, Tax 
Payments 
  0.08     
   0.11*    Absence of 
Corruption, Public 
Contracts 
   0.07    
    0.19**   Absence of 
Corruption, Loan 
Applications 
    0.08   
     0.091  Absence of 
Corruption, Laws and 
Policies 
     0.06  
      0.04 Absence of 
Corruption, Judicial 
Decisions 
      0.05 
Obs. 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 
R2 0.09 0.19 0.15 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.05 
Adj. R2 0.07 0.17 0.13 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.03 
Jarque-Berab) 0.7 1.3 0.9 0.9 1.3 0.7 0.7 
a) White corrected heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in italics. 
Subscripts */**/*** denote 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance, respectively. 
b) The Jarque Bera statistics measures whether a series is normally distributed by 
taking into account its skewness and kurtosis. The assumption of a normal 
distribution can be rejected clearly for levels above 6.   
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Table 2.2.b Ordinary Least Squares, a) 
Dependent Variable: Average Annual Net FDI inflows  
relative to GDP, logged, 1995-2002 
Independent Variables 1.  2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7 
1.00** 1.79*** 1.53** 0.92* 1.00* 0.77 0.77 Constant 
0.50 0.51 0.50 0.53 0.54 0.50 0.52 
-0.05 -0.26*** -0.18** -0.005 -0.08 0.02 0.04 GDP per head, log.  
0.07 0.08  0.07 0.09 0.07 0.07 
0.16**       Absence of 
Corruption, Export and 
Import 
0.07       
 0.36***      Absence of 
Corruption, Public 
Utilities 
 0.08      
  0.28***     Absence of 
Corruption, Tax 
Payments 
  0.07     
   0.11    Absence of 
Corruption, Public 
Contracts 
   0.07    
    0.21**   Absence of 
Corruption, Loan 
Applications 
    0.08   
     0.09  Absence of 
Corruption, Laws and 
Policies 
     0.07  
      0.05 Absence of 
Corruption, Judicial 
Decisions 
      0.06 
Obs. 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 
R2 0.06 0.17 0.13 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.03 
Adj. R2 0.04 0.15 0.11 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.01 
Jarque-Berab) 0.5 2.2 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.3 
c) White corrected heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in italics. Subscripts 
*/**/*** denote 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance, respectively.  
d) The Jarque-Bera measures whether a series is normally distributed by considering its 
skewness and kurtosis. The assumption of a normal distribution can be clearly rejected 
for levels above 6 
 
Inserting all data on corruption simultaneously to the regression would not yield 
robust results due to severe problems with multicollinearity. However, we can run a 
data reduction exercise by applying principal component analysis to the seven 
indicators to reach interpretable indices. The results are presented in Table 2.3. 
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Although the second component has an Eigenvalue clearly below the Kaiser criterion 
of 1, we believe it represents valuable information and is not just noise. First, the 
overall perceived level of corruption comes out quite strongly in the results mainly 
due to the similar phrasing of all questions. Had questions been asked for differences 
in types of corruption, the second component would most likely to obtain a higher 
Eigenvalue.19 Second, this analysis is replicable for both 2002 or the 2004 data by 
the WEF, that is, the second factor derived here is qualitatively similar across these 
years, emphasising the robustness of the findings.  
 
Table2.4 presents the coefficients for the two components.  
The interpretation of the first component as the overall absence of corruption is a 
straightforward matter, especially given that all the factor loadings have the same 
sign. Component 2 is orthogonal to the first component and relates to the particular 
                                               
19
 In this respect the Kaiser criterion is not invariant to matrix operations, such as substituting 
corruption in public utilities by the difference of this type of corruption to that in government programs. 
Table 2.3: Total Variance Explained, Data on Corruption by the WEF 2003 
 Initial Eigenvalues 
  Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
Component 1 6.333 90.464 90.464 
Component 2 0.325 4.640 95.105 
Table 2.4: Coefficient Matrix, 
Data on Corruption by the WEF 2003 
Extraction method: Principal Component Analysis 
  Component 1 Component 2 
Absence of Corruption, Export and Import 
.972 .059 
Absence of Corruption, Public Utilities 
.930 .306 
Absence of Corruption, Tax Payments 
.965 .100 
Absence of Corruption, Public Contracts 
.958 -.146 
Absence of Corruption, Loan Applications 
.947 .223 
Absence of Corruption, Laws and Policies 
.950 -.273 
Absence of Corruption, Judicial Decisions 
.935 -.269 
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type of corruption. On the one hand, corruption in public contracts, government 
policymaking and judicial decisions share the same negative sign for component 2. 
On the other hand, corruption in exports and imports, public utilities, tax payments 
and loan applications share a positive sign. The strongest difference in factor 
loadings is observed between corruption in government policymaking and corruption 
in public utilities.  
High values of the component 2 indicate the prevalence of corruption in laws 
and policies, in judicial decisions and public contracts. It is plausible to think of these 
as forms of grand corruption. By contrast, low values of the component 2 point at the 
prevalence of corruption in public utilities and loan applications (and to a lesser 
extent in tax payments and in obtaining export and import permits). Hence lower 
values of this component capture petty corruption which necessitates cumbersome 
organizational efforts.  
To illustrate how this component functions, let us think of a hypothetical 
situation where grand corruption is rampant and there is almost no petty corruption. 
The original corruption variable from the survey assigns the value 1 to cases where 
corruption is common and 7 to those where it never occurs. Hence, in the case of 
grand corruption, absence of corruption in public contracts, laws and policies and 
judicial decisions will all receive low values from respondents, say 1, and the rest will 
get high values indicating that corruption never occurs in these fields, say 7. Then, 
the second component will yield:  
 
Component 2 = (.059*7)+(.306*7)+(.100*7)+(-.146*1)+(.223*7)+(-.273*1) 
+ (-.269*1) =4.128 
 
Similarly, in the opposite situation whereby petty corruption is rampant and there is 
no grand corruption, the same component will yield: 
 
Component 2 = (.059*1)+(.306*1)+(.100*1)+(-.146*7)+(.223*1)+(-.273*7) 
+ (-.269*7) = -4.128 
 
In other words, the component 2 gets very high values in settings where grand 
corruption is high and petty corruption is low and very low values when petty 
corruption is high and grand corruption is low. Component 2 is, hence, best 
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interpreted as the relative importance of grand corruption as opposed to petty 
corruption. It must be said, however, that this variable is related exclusively to the 
relative importance of grand versus petty corruption, and disregards the levels of 
corruption. Hence, in the subsequent regression analysis, we will control for the 
absolute level of corruption with the component 1, and the relative importance of the 
type of corruption using component 2.  
Besides making a novel interpretation of the data possible, another sizeable 
benefit derived from this data reduction exercise is that by imposing orthogonality 
condition on the components, we get rid of the multicollinearity problem, which would 
otherwise cast doubt on the validity of our estimates in our subsequent regressions.  
 
2.5  Analysis of the Components  
In order to better understand what these components imply, we run a series of OLS 
regressions in Table 2.5. Accordingly, respondents of the World Economic Forum 
survey perceive South America, Central America and the Caribbean and Eastern 
Europe including countries of the Former Soviet Union to fall prey to grand corruption. 
Particular examples to be mentioned here are Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Peru, Philippines, Slovak Republic and Venezuela. 
On the other hand, petty corruption is perceived to prevail in Africa. The countries 
with the lowest values for component 2 are Bangladesh, Cameroon, Egypt, Gambia, 
Ghana, Morocco, Tunisia and Zambia.  
Columns 3-5 present further evidence in favour of our interpretation that 
component 2 is measures the type of corruption. Using further variables from the 
same data source, column 3 shows that component 2 decreases with public trust in 
politicians, with the absence of legal political donations to influence public decisions 
and with bureaucratic red tape. The negative sign supports our interpretation 
because the case of grand corruption would be associated with legal political 
donations, involve little trust in politicians and not depend on bureaucratic red tape.  
Columns 4 and 5 are intended as further robustness checks of our 
interpretation of the second component using other data on types of corruption. The 
measure of opportunism in corrupt deals has a negative and significant impact on 
component 2, suggesting that grand corruption is relatively predictable.  
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Table 2.5. OLS, a) 
Dependent Variable: Component 2: Type of Corruption 
Independent Variables 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
0.36*** 0.30 1.21** 0.15 1.24 Constant 
0.04 0.35 0.47 0.29 0.75 
 -0.006 0.04 0.10*** -0.02 GDP per head, log.  
 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.09 
-0.19*** -0.18* -0.15*   Dummy variable, Africa 
0.06 0.10 0.09   
0.27*** 0.30*** 0.10   Dummy variable, Eastern 
Europe and Former Soviet 
Union 
0.08 0.09 0.08   
0.69*** 0.70*** 0.44***   Dummy variable, South 
America 0.12 0.12 0.12   
0.44*** 0.45*** 0.20   Dummy variable, Central 
America and Caribbean 0.11 0.12 0.12   
-0.07 -0.07 -0.050   Dummy variable,  
Asia 0.10 0.10 0.08   
   -0.18*** -0.20** Opportunism in corrupt deals 
   0.06 0.08 
    0.65 Grand – petty corruption 
    0.43 
  -0.10**   Absence of Legal Political 
Donations, WEF 2003   0.05   
  -0.08**   Public Trust in Politicians, 
WEF 2003   0.04   
  -0.20**   Bureaucratic Red Tape, 
WEF 2003 
  0.08   
Obs. 101 99 99 55 31 
R2 0.51 0.52 0.64 0.11 0.17 
a) White corrected heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in italics. Subscripts 
*/**/*** denote 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance, respectively.  
 
In a 2004 survey “Voice of the People”, commissioned by the Transparency 
International, Gallup International asked questions on the types of corruption to the 
general public in 54 countries. Using these questions, namely “In your opinion, how 
would you describe the following problem facing your country: Grand or political 
corruption that is corruption at the highest levels of society, by leading political elites, 
major companies, etc?” and “Petty or administrative corruption that is corruption in 
ordinary people s daily lives, such as bribes paid for licenses, traffic violations, etc?” 
we calculate the difference between the two and interpret it as the measure of the 
prevalence of grand corruption over petty corruption. In the light of the caveat that the 
public at large may not necessarily be familiar with grand corruption in action, 
responses might be biased by the freedom of the media in reporting on grand 
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corruption. Nevertheless, this index obtains the expected sign supporting our 
interpretation, although it fails to reach conventional levels of significance possibly 
due to the restricted sample.  
 
2.6  The Type of Corruption and FDI 
Figure 2.1 presents in three-dimensional space the average gross FDI inflows 
relative to GDP , the overall level of corruption (component 1), and the type of 
corruption (component 2). As expected, when the level of corruption is low, its type is 
of little relevance for FDI. However, in the case of high corruption, grand corruption 
might be more desirable than petty corruption as it is associated with higher levels of 
FDI.  
Figure 2.2 presents exactly the same exercise for the case of the net FDI 
inflows figures. The insights from this figure are also similar. In fact, the punch line 
from the first figure, i.e. that in high levels of corruption there is a clear tendency that 
grand corruption as opposed to middle and low-level corruption supports FDI, where 
the type loses relevance, becomes even stronger.    
 
 
Low 
Corruption Medium 
Corruption High 
Corruption 
Petty Type 
Medium Type 
Grand Type 
0
0.5 
1 
1.5 
2
2.5 
3
3.5 
FDI to GDP 
Figure 2.1: Average Gross FDI (IMF-
Data) and Corruption 
Ratio Gross 
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After presenting this visual evidence, we now incorporated the two components into 
the regressions on gross FDI in Table 2.6.a. Our strategy to set up the regressions is 
inspired by the approach of Habib and Zurawicki (2001 and 2002). The regressions 
are set up parsimoniously in order to focus on the impact of the two components on 
FDI.  Both components are significantly, as shown in column 1. By construction, 
absence of corruption (component 1) ranges between 15 and 45 with a standard 
deviation of 7.5. Based on this column, a one-standard deviation increase in the 
absence of corruption increases the logarithm of the ratio of gross FDI to GDP by 
0.33. In other words, it increases gross FDI by one third. Component 2 has a 
standard deviation of 0.4. Increasing component 2 (grand corruption as opposed to 
petty corruption) by one standard deviation20, leads to a surge in the logarithm of the 
ratio of gross FDI to GDP by 0.3, which corresponds to an increase of roughly 35%.  
These basic results remain unaffected by the inclusion of further control 
variables. On the basis of Mauro (1995) results indicating that corruption’s impact on 
growth materialises through the channel of investment, we included two potential 
variables that emanate from growth theory, namely the domestic savings rate and the 
                                               
20
 For example, by decreasing absence of corruption in public utilities by 1.3 (on a scale from 1 to 7) or 
by increasing absence of corruption in government programs by 1.4 (on a scale from 1 to 7). 
Low 
Corruption Medium 
Corruption High 
Corruption 
Petty Type 
Medium Type 
Grand Type 
0.5 
0.7 
0.9 
1.1 
1.3 
1.5 
1.7 
Ratio Net 
FDI to GDP 
Figure 2.2: Average Net FDI (WB-Data) 
and Corruption
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population growth rate. Using data from the World Development Indicators, we tested, 
these variables, yet they were insignificant without affecting other coefficients. Hence, 
the results are not reported in the table. A country’s level of integration to the world 
economy is one of the important factors to explain the FDI it receives. This can be 
proxied by openness, the sum of import and exports relative to GDP. This variable 
obtains the expected positive impact (column 2, Table 2.6.a).21  
FDI statistics tend to be biased towards smaller countries. This is because in 
larger countries, sizeable investment flows take place within the borders, and as such 
are not recorded as FDI. For instance, investments originating from California to New 
York are not classified as FDI, whereas those from Portugal to Spain are. To account 
for this bias we control for the (logarithm of) population. This variable obtains the 
expected sign, yet missing conventional levels of significance, (column 3, Table 
2.6.a). Given that the same result is also replicated in other specifications, we 
exclude this variable from subsequent regressions. 
It is often argued that resource rich countries attract more FDI simply because 
of higher returns to investment. To proxy for this, we include a variable on the export 
of fuels relative to merchandise exports. Indeed, the variable is significant and carries 
the expected sign. In order to control for the possibility that the FDI we observe in our 
period of interest might be motivated by high growth rates preceding the period of 
investment decision, we control for the average GDP growth between 1990 and 1995. 
Yet, the variable is insignificant, as shown in column 3.  
The location of a country is expected to play a key role in investment decisions. 
The distance to major markets is especially crucial if the foreign investors aim to use 
the host country as an export base. We expect that the more distant is a country to 
the USA and Western Europe, the less likely it is to attract incoming FDI. We use 
spherical trigonometry to calculate the distance to major markets, in our case, the 
distance to Chicago, USA and to Frankfurt am Main, Germany. Accordingly, the data 
on distance can take on a maximum value of   =3.14 for distance to one major 
market. Given that we are adding up the distance to Chicago and that to Frankfurt, 
the values are bounded to be below 2   . The highest value in this calculation was 
obtained by New Zealand with 5.0. Other South East Asian countries as well as 
                                               
21
 Openness may capture also a certain fraction of the corruption variable, because corruption tends to 
reduce a country’s openness. The evidence on this link is mixed, however. Ades and Di Tella (1995, 
1997 and 1999) provide supportive evidence, Treisman (2000), Wei (2000a) and Knack and Azfar 
(2003) produce insignificant results.  
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Madagascar (3.7) also take on relatively high values. The lowest value, by contrast, 
belongs to Ireland with 1.1. Table 2.6a, column 4, shows the coefficient for distance 
to global investors to be around -0.2. This suggests that Ireland experiences almost 
twice the gross FDI inflows in comparison to a country in South East Asia, such as 
Indonesia.  
Column 5 controls for opportunism in corrupt deals, as measured by the 1997 
World Bank-University of Basel survey. Based on the earlier discussion, we expect 
international investors to be crowded out by opportunism, as it reduces predictability. 
However, contrary to our expectations, this variable obtains a positive and significant 
coefficient. The upshot of this is that, unlike the results of by Campos, Lien and 
Pradhan (1999) international investors are not concerned with opportunism in corrupt 
deals. Their perception of grand versus petty corruption trumps this variable with 
regards to the analysis of FDI decisions. This variable is excluded from subsequent 
regressions since data is available only for a much smaller sample.  
Column 6 employs the weighted least squares technique. This is because FDI 
are subject to random shocks. For instance, if a small country suddenly discovers a 
wealth of natural resources, consequently FDI could soar well beyond its GDP. The 
same shock would have only a negligible impact on a large industrial country. 
Assuming that this type of measurement error depends on a country’s size, the 
(logarithm) of a country’s total population could be used as an appropriate weight in 
the regressions. The results reported earlier are once again confirmed using this 
specification.  
Column 7 is intended as a further check on the robustness of the main findings 
of this study. The reason we employ the instrumental variables technique is not 
related to reverse causality; based on earlier literature, reverse causality, i.e. impact 
of FDI on levels of corruption does not seem plausible. However, we use the two- 
stage least squares technique in order to mitigate measurement errors. Needless to 
say, perceptions data on corruption also includes some noise, and as such is subject 
to margins of error. In this case, the instruments help avoid generating biased 
coefficients. Further benefits from using instruments are related to the problem of 
omitted variable bias. This problem would infect our results if there are some omitted 
variables from the regressions that are correlated with both corruption and FDI 
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inflows simultaneously. Again, the two-stage least squares technique addresses 
these issues– provided that the instruments are  not correlated to omitted variables22. 
 
Table2.6.a Ordinary Least Squares and Weighted Least Squares, a) 
Dependent Variable: Average Annual Gross FDI inflows 
relative to GDP, 1995-2003 
Independent Variables 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. WLS 7. TSLSb) 
3.24*** 3.08*** 3.59*** 3.56*** 4.13*** 4.11*** 3.56*** Constant 
0.59 0.49 0.58 0.56 0.63 0.67 0.56 
-0.14 -0.14 -0.20** -0.20** -0.30** -0.33*** -0.20** GDP per head, log.  
0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.10 0.09 
0.04*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.06*** 0.04*** Component 1: 
Absence of Corruption 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 
0.46*** 0.50*** 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.69*** 0.54*** 0.49*** Component 2: Grand 
Type of Corruption 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.20 0.12 0.14 
 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.07*** Openness, % of GDP 
 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 
  0.001     Population, log, 2001 
   
0.04 
    
  0.004* 0.004* -0.001 0.002 0.004* Export of Fuels, rel. to 
merchandise exports, 
1994-2003    0.002 0.002 0002 0.001 0.002 
  0.007     Growth of GDP, 1990-
95   0.01     
  -0.12** -0.11** -0.18*** -0.11 -0.11* Distance to Global 
Investors   0.06 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.05 
    0.19**   Opportunism in corrupt 
deals 
    
0.08 
  
Obs. 95 95 94 94 54 94 94 
R2 0.18 0.45 0.50 0.50 0.59 0.94 0.49 
Adj. R2 0.15 0.43 0.45 0.46 0.52 0.93 0.46 
Jarque-Bera 1.0 3.6 4.3 4.1 1.2 2.5 4.3 
a) White corrected heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in italics. Subscripts 
*/**/*** denote 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance, respectively.  
b) Instruments used in column 7 are the share of Protestants, the extent of public trust in 
politicians, and absence of illegal political donations. 
 
The share of Protestants is by now a widely accepted instrument for the level of 
corruption, i.e component 1. The underlying argument is that Protestantism being a 
less hierarchical religion, its followers are not embedded in networks that seek to 
maximise their individual interests at the expense of society at large, (Treisman 2000, 
Paldam 2001, Lambsdorff 2002b). The literature has not suggested any instruments 
for the type of corruption, i.e. component 2. Hence, finding valid instruments for the 
                                               
22
 In order to check the validity of our instruments, we have run the Hansen-Sargan tests of 
overidentifying restrictions with the null hypothesis that the excluded instruments are valid instruments, 
meaning that they are uncorrelated with the error term and correctly excluded from the regression. We 
clearly fail to reject this hypothesis, suggesting that the instruments are valid.  
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component 2 represents a challenge. Mo (2001) suggests the use of continental 
dummies as instruments for corruption. Given their significant impact on component 2, 
as shown in Table 2.5, we have experimented using them as instruments for the type 
of corruption. However, we could not reject the hypothesis that they would not have a 
direct impact on the dependent variable. Hence, we suggest using the absence of 
illegal political donations and public trust in politicians as instruments instead. These 
variables have no effect on the dependent variable, and they are correlated with the 
factor 2. Given that both sets of variables are based on perceptions, it is plausible to 
expect that if the perceived prevalence of illegal political donations is high and the 
public trust in politicians is low, then perceptions of the grand type of corruption will 
be relatively high compared to petty corruption. Both sets of variables are expected to 
be measured with some imprecision. However, if the measurement errors are 
random, this would not constitute a problem for our estimations, In sum, the results 
survive instrumental variable technique assuming that an investor’s reluctance when 
it comes to investing abroad is due to the host countries’ petty type of corruption, and 
not to other unobserved factors.23 
In Table 2.6.b, we repeat essentially the same exercise with the net FDI 
inflows data. Running the parsimonious regression in column 1, we observe that both 
components are again significant at 1% level of confidence. Along the lines argued 
above, a one-standard deviation in the first component leads to an increase of the 
logarithm of the ratio of net FDI inflows to GDP by 0.36. This corresponds to a 43%-
increase of the net FDI inflows. Similarly, a one-standard deviation increase in the 
second component would increase the logged net FDI Inflows to GDP ratio by 0.19, 
which translates to a 21%-increase in the net FDI Inflows to GDP ratio.   
The conclusions to be derived from this table are by and large similar to those 
from the previous one. However, there is one crucial difference in that the export of 
fuels variable loses much of its power when it comes to explaining the net FDI inflows. 
The coefficient has dropped considerably and tends to lose significance. This can be 
easily related to income from fuels seeking investment opportunities abroad and thus 
lowering the net FDI inflows.  
                                               
23
 We also tested for a sample selection bias by checking whether poor countries, which tend to be 
underrepresented in cross-section analysis, perform differently. We observed that component 1 
obtained a lower coefficient for this sample of countries while component 2 was stronger. Overall, the 
differences were small and did not suggest problems with sample selection.  
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Furthermore, the bureaucratic red tape variable, which was negative, yet not 
significant in Table 2.6.a is this time positive but still insignificant, leading us to 
strengthen our belief that it does not contain any useful information for explaining FDI 
flows. 
 
Table 2.6.b Ordinary Least Squares and Weighted Least Squares, a) 
Dependent Variable: Average Annual Gross FDI inflows 
relative to GDP, 1994-2003 
Independent Variables 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. WLS 7. TSLSb) 
1.48*** 1.32*** 1.60*** 1.17 2.10*** 1.96*** 1.41*** Constant 
0.52 0.43 0.53 0.95 0.56 0.61 0.53 
-0.21** -0.22*** -.25*** -0.23** -0.33*** -0.32*** -0.25*** GDP per head, log.  
0.09 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.08 
0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03** 0.05*** 0.05*** Component 1: 
Absence of Corruption, 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
0.47*** 0.50*** 0.49*** 0.53*** 0.63*** 0.61*** 0.55*** Component 2: Grand, 
Predictable Type of 
Corruption,  0.14 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.12 0.12 
 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** Openness, % of GDP 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  -0.02     Population, log, 2001 
 
  0.04     
  0.004* 0.004 -0.000 0.003 0.005* Export of Fuels, rel. to 
merchandise exports, 
1994-2003    0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
  0.01     Growth of GDP, 1990-
95   0.01     
  -0.10 -0.09* -0.17*** -0.17** -0.09* Distance to Global 
Investors   0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.05 
   0.080    Bureaucratic Red 
Tape, WEF 2003    0.16    
    0.16*   Opportunism in corrupt 
deals 
    0.08   
Obs. 95 95 90 90 51 89 83 
R2 0.16 0.40 0.52 0.52 0.65 0.62 0.53 
Adj. R2 0.13 0.37 0.47 0.47 0.59 0.59 0.49 
Jarque-Bera 1.4 0.3 2.4 2.4 0.8 1.8 2.1 
a) White corrected heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in italics. Subscripts 
*/**/*** denote 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance, respectively. 
b) Instruments used in column 7 are the share of Protestants, the extent of public trust in 
politicians, and absence of illegal political donations. 
 
2.7  Robustness Checks Using Governance Indicators  
Earlier research reveals that corruption goes hand in hand with low bureaucratic 
quality and absence of law and order, (Lambsdorff 2003a and 2003b). In order to test 
whether the inclusion of further governance indicators affects our findings, we use 
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data from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)24 and from Freedom House 
on civil liberties. High values of ICRG and low values of civil liberties indicate 
favourable government conditions. Law and order variable employs a scale from 0 to 
6; bureaucratic quality from 0 to 4; and Civil Liberties from 7 to 1. 
Bureaucratic quality signals the presence of an administration that is 
autonomous from political pressure, i.e. that it uses established mechanisms for 
recruitment and training, and that government services are characterized by strength 
and expertise. If such characteristics are missing, public servants may have a free 
hand to create artificial bottlenecks so as to increase their corrupt income. Once 
corruption becomes embedded in the system, then bureaucracy will be less 
concerned with expertise and open to political pressures. As a result, corruption can 
go along with bureaucratic inefficiency.  
Law and order (an index formerly called “rule of law” by ICRG) indicates that a 
country has sound and established political institutions, a strong judicial system and 
provisions for orderly succession of power. It goes without saying that the presence 
of corruption violates these principles. If judicial decisions and legislation are for sale, 
then a country cannot develop a tradition of law and order. An orderly succession of 
power will be substituted with a system where power can be bought. The resulting 
insecurity of property rights will then alienate potential investors.  
Civil liberties comprise the freedom of expression and belief, personal 
autonomy as well as basic human and economic rights. A government that limits 
economic rights and civil liberties introduces distortions to the functioning of markets, 
inducing the search for illegal ways to circumvent regulation. This creates 
opportunities for corruption. 
Another governance indicator considered here is judicial independence, a 
variable that comes from the WEF survey. Corrupt rulers are free in exploiting 
investors if their power is not checked by law. An independent judiciary restricts a 
corrupt ruler’s potential to extract bribes. It bars random changing of the laws in the 
books and their discretionary application. In short, the presence of an independent 
judiciary contributes to making political commitments credible. As a result, investors 
feel more confident concerning their property and form the belief that they will not be 
exploited after having sunk their investments.  
                                               
24
 The data used are International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), May 1998, The PRS Group, East 
Syracuse, NY, USA. 
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Table 2.7.a Ordinary Least Squares, a) 
Dependent Variable: Average Annual Gross FDI inflows 
relative to GDP, 1995-2003 
Independent Variables 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
3.54*** 3.58*** 3.92*** 4.57*** 3.59*** Constant 
0.60 0.59 0.74 0.74 0.59 
-0.20** -0.24** -0.26** -0.27** -0.22** GDP per head, log.  
0.09 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10 
0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03** 0.03* Component 1: Absence of 
Corruption 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
0.52*** 0.57*** 0.53*** 0.45*** 0.64*** Component 2: Grand Type 
of Corruption  0.12 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.18 
0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** Openness, % of GDP 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.005* 0.005** 0.005** 0.006** 0.005** Export of Fuels, rel. to 
merchandise exports, 
1994-2003  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
-0.10* -0.09* -0.11** -0.08* -0.10* Distance to Global 
Investors 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
 0.07    Law and Order (ICRG), 
1998  0.06    
  0.09   Bureaucratic Quality 
(ICRG), 1998 
  0.09   
   -0.12**  Absence of Civil Liberties, 
Freedom House, 
2000/2001    
0.06 
 
    0.09 Judicial Independence, 
WEF 2003 
    0.07 
Obs. 86 86 86 86 86 
R2 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.51 0.48 
Adj. R2 0.43 0.44 0.43 0.47 0.44 
Jarque-Bera 3.7 3.0 3.0 1.4 3.5 
a) White corrected heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in italics. 
Subscripts */**/*** denote 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance, respectively. 
 
We proceed by adding governance variables separately to our regressions. We 
restrict the sample to those countries where data is available for all regressions, so 
as to allow for a comparison of coefficients. As usual, we start with the gross FDI 
data as dependent variable shown in Table 2.6a. Accordingly, law and order has no 
significant impact on FDI. The bureaucratic red tape variable takes on the expected 
sign, but misses conventional levels of significance. This suggests that international 
investors are not crowded out by bureaucratic red tape, nor is the negative impact of 
corruption related to this governance indicator. This finding is surprising, but repeats 
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earlier results from Lambsdorff (2003b). Bureaucratic red tape might be a relatively 
more arduous obstacle for small domestic firms. Large-scale foreign investors are 
likely to be better connected, profit from diplomatic support of their home countries 
and be able to engage high-ranking politicians to accelerate administrative 
procedures. Thus, multinational firms might substitute low bureaucratic quality with 
the quality of political connections, (Lambsdorff 2003b).  
Civil Liberties obtain the expected sign and significance level. Reassuringly, 
including this variable does not alter the impact of corruption. This suggests that civil 
liberties are by themselves important to investors, but less so due to investors’ 
concern about corruption. Judicial Independence is not significant, as shown in 
column 5. Its inclusion reduces the impact of corruption only slightly.25 This shows 
that international investors are somewhat sensitive to a tradition of checks and 
balances. Their dislike of corruption is most likely based on fears that corrupt rulers 
do not honour sunk investments. These fears are aggravated when the judiciary 
violates the arm’s length principle with the political elite. The potential explanation for 
this result is that such rulers face fewer restrictions to prevent extortion.  
Table 2.7.b presents the same set of regressions this time with the net FDI 
inflows as the dependent variable. The main difference compared to Table 2.7.a, 
where the dependent variable is the gross FDI inflows, is that the ICRG’s Law and 
Order index retains a positive and significant coefficient in column 2. This difference 
displays a further justification for investigating the behaviour of net and gross FDI 
inflows separately. Having said that, the impact of corruption in component 1 and 2 is 
not altered qualitatively even in the presence of a significant law and order variable. If 
anything, the magnitude of component 2, depicting the type of corruption, increases 
compared to column 1. Similar to the results from the previous table, bureaucratic 
quality and judicial independence variables obtain the expected positive sign, yet fail 
to attain significance in conventional levels. Furthermore, absence of civil liberties 
enters the regression with the expected negative and significant coefficient. All 
across the board, both components 1 and 2 remain significant with the expected sign, 
leading us to conclude for their robustness to the inclusion of further institutional 
variables.   
 
                                               
25
 If we were to exclude corruption from the list of independent variables, judicial independence would 
become significant (regression not reported). 
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Table 2.7.b Ordinary Least Squares a) 
Dependent Variable: Average Annual Net FDI inflows 
relative to GDP, 1994-2003 
Independent Variables 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
1.55*** 1.35** 1.66** 2.65*** 1.63*** Constant 
0.51 0.53 0.66 0.57 0.50 
-0.25*** -0.28*** -0.29** -0.33*** -0.27** GDP per head, log.  
0.09 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.09 
0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04** 0.04*** 0.03** Component 1: Absence of 
Corruption 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
0.50*** 0.61*** 0.56*** 0.46*** 0.62*** Component 2: Grand Type 
of Corruption  0.12 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.15 
0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** Openness, % of GDP 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.004* 0.005** 0.005* 0.006** 0.005** Export of Fuels, rel. to 
merchandise exports, 
1994-2003  
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
-0.09* -0.07 -0.09 -0.07 -0.09* Distance to Global 
Investors 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
 0.11**    Law and Order (ICRG), 
1998  0.05    
  0.08   Bureaucratic Quality 
(ICRG), 1998   0.09   
   -0.12**  Absence of Civil Liberties, 
Freedom House, 
2000/2001 
   0.05  
    0.09 Judicial Independence, 
WEF 2003 
    0.07 
Obs. 90 82 82 90 90 
R2 0.51 0.56 0.54 0.55 0.52 
Adj. R2 0.48 0.52 0.49 0.51 0.48 
Jarque-Bera 2.4 1.6 2.0 0.8 2.5 
a) White corrected heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in italics. Subscripts 
*/**/*** denote 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance, respectively. 
 
These findings further our understanding of the calculus of investors. Investors prefer 
the grand corruption to petty corruption, but still demand restrictions on the same 
actors that they bribe. High ranking officials should be reasonably restricted in their 
legal and illegal actions. Investors want them to be limited in their ability to extort 
randomly from those who have already sunk their resources in investments. In this 
context, the presence of an independent judiciary and prevalence of civil liberties 
could effectively contribute to this.  
Following the same line of reasoning, it can be stipulated that investors need 
certain safeguards to make sure that the bribe takers will actually deliver their 
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promises. An independent judiciary and free media could under certain conditions 
provide investors with a guarantee that office holders will stick to their promises after 
receiving a corrupt payment. Stating that an independent judiciary might contribute to 
the enforcement of corrupt deals might sound counterintuitive at first glance. 
However, the aforementioned argument should be interpreted in line with the 
teachings of new institutional economics, especially concerning the private 
arrangements to contract enforcement issues. There is no doubt that courts would 
reject the legal enforcement of corrupt deals. However, similar to the media, they are 
sometimes used as a forum to denounce the non-delivery of a corrupt service. In 
other words, if it is common knowledge that the courts would tend to take allegations 
of corruption seriously and investigate them independently, then whistleblowing tends 
to appear as a feasible threat to ensure the private enforcement of corrupt deals. 
Denunciation is likely to lead to serious reputational consequences for both parties, 
and more often than not to asymmetric penalties. For some case studies and a 
theoretical treatment of this issue see Lambsdorff (2002: 227; 237) and Lambsdorff 
and Teksoz (2004).  
 
2.8  Conclusion  
In line with the most recent research on the empirics of corruption, we conclude in 
this study that corruption deters foreign direct investment. The natural policy advice 
from such a result is that anti-corruption efforts must be strengthened in order to 
abolish the hurdles in front of foreign direct investments. However, the present study 
takes a step further, and investigates the impact of corruption in different fields of 
economic activity. Although the highly collinear nature of the data prevents us from 
using them simultaneously in the regressions, the strong result for public utilities 
emerging from Tables 2.2 a and b suggests priorities for anti-corruption. Hence, a 
further policy recommendation of our findings relates to public utilities: Reducing 
corruption in public utilities could clearly help attract international investors. 
We have presented evidence that given the choice between petty and grand 
corruption, investors prefer the grand type of corruption, but even in that case, they 
demand that those politicians who take bribes should be restricted in their actions by 
an independent judiciary and civil liberties.  
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One policy recommendation can, however, not by any stretch of imagination, 
be derived from this paper: There is no reason to turn a blind eye to grand corruption. 
International investors might –as a result of economic reasoning- prefer grand 
corruption as the lesser of two evils because it goes along with less organizational 
intricacies. Yet, one cannot overemphasise that the choice is made between two evils. 
In other words, the results of this study apply in the context of presence of corruption. 
We are in fact asking the question: For given levels of corruption, what type of 
corruption matters most for FDI inflows? Hence, our answer applies only in this 
context.  
Furthermore, investors might also prefer grand corruption as an opportunity for 
defrauding their own firm. We have no reason to believe that such fraudulent 
investments would also profit society. Quite to the contrary, government programs 
might promote useless white-elephant projects once infected by grand corruption. 
Empirical evidence reveals that corruption distorts public budgets away from 
education, and towards military spending, (Mauro 1998; Gupta, de Mello and Sharan 
2000). This evidence is likely to relate to a grand type of corruption. Finally, as the 
saying goes, "The fish rots from the head down". The bad example set by the elite 
may trickle down, inducing also higher levels of petty corruption. In this sense, our 
results reveal that international investors do not yet contribute to sanctioning regimes 
characterized by grand corruption. Given the adverse welfare consequences and 
potential long term negative spillover effects of grand corruption, both types of 
corruption should be sanctioned.  
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Appendix 
A2.1: Description of the Data Used in the Study 
Variable name Source Definition Descriptive 
statistics 
Corruption in 
Import/Export Permits 
World Economic Forum’s (WEF) 
Global Competitiveness Report 
2003/04 
In your industry, how commonly would you estimate that firms 
make undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with 
export and import permits? (1 = common, 7 = never occurs) 
 
Mean= 4.65 
Standard 
deviation=1.16 
Corruption in Access to 
Public Utilities 
World Economic Forum’s (WEF) 
Global Competitiveness Report 
2003/04 
In your industry, how commonly would you estimate that firms 
make undocumented extra payments or bribes when getting 
connected to public utilities (eg, telephone or electricity)? (1 = 
common, 7 = never occurs) 
 
Mean=4.98 
Standard 
deviation=1.22 
Corruption in Tax 
Payments 
World Economic Forum’s (WEF) 
Global Competitiveness Report 
2003/04 
In your industry, how commonly would you estimate that firms 
make undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with 
annual tax payments? (1 = common, 7 = never occurs) 
 
Mean=4.76 
Standard 
deviation=1.24 
Corruption in Investment 
Contracts 
World Economic Forum’s (WEF) 
Global Competitiveness Report 
2003/04 
In your industry, how commonly would you estimate that firms 
make undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with 
public contracts (investment projects)? (1 = common, 7 = 
never occurs) 
 
Mean=3.90 
Standard 
deviation=1.18 
Corruption in Loan 
Applications  
World Economic Forum’s (WEF) 
Global Competitiveness Report 
2003/04 
In your industry, how commonly would you estimate that firms 
make undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with 
loan applications? (1 = common, 7 = never occurs) 
 
Mean=4.87 
Standard 
deviation=1.07 
Corruption in Legislation World Economic Forum’s (WEF) 
Global Competitiveness Report 
2003/04 
In your industry, how commonly would you estimate that firms 
make undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with 
influencing laws and policies, regulations, or decrees to favor 
selected business interests? (1 = common, 7 = never occurs) 
Mean=4.15 
Standard 
deviation=1.12 
Corruption in Judiciary World Economic Forum’s (WEF) 
Global Competitiveness Report 
2003/04 
In your industry, how commonly would you estimate that firms 
make undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with 
getting favorable judicial decisions? (1 = common, 7 = never)  
Mean=4.15 
St.Dev.=1.38 
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Corruption World Economic Forum’s (WEF) 
Global Competitiveness Report 
2003/04 
Average of the seven subcomponents outlined above Mean=4.53 
Standard 
deviation=1.14 
Component 1: Absence 
of Corruption 
World Economic Forum’s (WEF) 
Global Competitiveness Report 
2003/04 
Retained first component after principal component analysis 
applied to the seven components of corruption detailed above. 
The first component depicts the absence of corruption 
Mean=30.20 
Standard 
deviation=7.56 
Component 2: Grand 
Type of Corruption 
World Economic Forum’s (WEF) 
Global Competitiveness Report 
2003/04 
Retained second component after principal component analysis 
applied to the seven components of corruption detailed above. 
The second component describes the type of corruption with 
high values related to the grand type.  
Mean=0.46 
Standard 
deviation=0.40 
Grand-Petty Corruption Gallup/Transparency International 
Survey, Voice of the People 2004 
Difference between separate questions on perceptions of grand 
and petty corruption considered as (i) not a problem at all; (ii) 
not a particularly big problem; (iii) a fairly big problem); (iv) a 
very big problem. The difference is interpreted as a crude 
measure of the prevalence of grand over petty corruption. 
Mean=0.16 
Standard 
deviation=0.13 
Opportunism in corrupt 
deals 
World Bank/University of Basel 
Survey for World Development 
Report 1997 
If a firm pays the required 'additional payment' the service is 
usually also delivered as agreed. 
1=Always; 6=Never 
Mean=3.17 
Standard 
deviation=0.69 
Net FDI Inflows World Development Indicators Net FDI Inflows as a percentage of GDP for the period 1994 to 
2002. Notice that the dependent variable in the regressions is a 
logistic transformation of 1 plus this variable to avoid values 
around zero.  
Mean=3.52 
Standard 
deviation=2.98 
Gross FDI Inflows International Financial Statistics, 
International Monetary Fund 
Gross FDI Inflows as a percentage of GDP for the period 1995 
to 2003. Notice that the dependent variable in the regressions is 
a logistic transformation of 10 plus this variable to avoid values 
below zero. 
Mean=1.59 
Standard 
deviation=0.38 
Fuel Exports  World Development Indicators  Export of fuels relative to merchandise exports, average 1994-
2003 
Mean=10.81 
Standard 
deviation=20.61 
Growth of GDP 1990-
1995 
World Development Indicators  Growth rate of GDP, average 1990-1995 Mean=2.28 
Std.dev.=4.31 
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Openness (% of GDP) World Development Indicators The sum of exports and imports of goods and services relative 
to the GDP, average 1996-2002  
Mean=80.12 
Standard 
deviation=47.30 
Population World Development Indicators Population, 2001, logged Mean=2.73 
Standard 
deviation=1.51 
Absence of legal political 
donations 
World Economic Forum’s (WEF) 
Global Competitiveness Report 
2003/04 
To what extent do legal contributions to political parties have a 
direct influence on specific public policy outcomes? 
1= very close link between donations and policy;  
7= little direct influence on policy 
Mean=3.82 
Standard 
deviation=0.85 
Absence of illegal 
political donations 
World Economic Forum’s (WEF) 
Global Competitiveness Report 
2003/04 
Prevalence of illegal political donations is 1= very low, 7= very 
high. 
Mean=3.54 
Standard 
deviation=1.21 
Public trust in politicians World Economic Forum’s (WEF) 
Global Competitiveness Report 
2003/04 
Public trust in the financial honesty of politicians is 1= very low, 
7= very high.  
Mean=2.72 
Standard 
deviation=1.23 
Bureaucratic Red Tape World Economic Forum’s (WEF) 
Global Competitiveness Report 
2003/04 
How much time does your firm’s senior management spend 
dealing/negotiating with government officials (as a percentage 
of work time)? 
1=0%; 2=1-10%; 3=11-20%;[…];8= 81-100% 
Mean=2.75 
Standard 
deviation=0.46 
Law and Order International Country Risk Guide 
1998 
Expert assessments on law and order tradition in a country on a 
scale from 0 to 6 with higher values indicating more favourable 
conditions 
Mean=4.31 
Standard 
deviation=1.31 
Bureaucratic Quality International Country Risk Guide 
1998 
Expert assessments on the quality of bureaucracy in a country 
on a scale from 0 to 4 with higher values indicating more 
favourable conditions 
Mean=2.49 
Standard 
deviation=1.13 
Absence of Civil 
Liberties 
Freedom House, Freedom in the 
World, 2000/2001 
Expert assessments of civil liberties in a country on a scale 
from 1 to 7 with lower values indicating more favourable 
conditions.  
Mean=3.02 
Standard 
deviation=1.45 
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Judicial Independence World Economic Forum’s (WEF) 
Global Competitiveness Report 
2003/04 
The judiciary in your country is independent from political 
influences of members of government, citizens or firms 
1= No, heavily influenced; [..]; 7= Yes, entirely independent 
Mean=3.92 
Standard 
deviation=1.46 
Distance to Global 
Investors 
Based on latitude and longitude 
data from CIA Factbook 
Sum of the distance to Chicago and to Frankfurt, calculated 
using a spherical trigonometry formula.  
Mean=2.23 
Standard 
deviation=0.99 
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A 2.2 Principal Components Used in the Study 
 Country WEF 2003,* Component 1: 
Absence of Corruption 
WEF 2003,∗ Component 2: 
Type of Corruption 
1 Angola 21.50 0.62 
2 Argentina 22.99 1.24 
3 Australia 42.79 0.34 
4 Austria 40.59 0.21 
5 Bangladesh 15.78 -0.46 
6 Belgium 36.98 0.45 
7 Bolivia 22.52 1.50 
8 Botswana 35.74 0.16 
9 Brazil 28.99 0.62 
10 Bulgaria 33.77 0.53 
11 Cameroon 20.46 -0.16 
12 Canada 37.36 0.40 
13 Chile 37.19 0.97 
14 China,P.R.: Mainland 31.01 0.15 
15 China,P.R.:Hong Kong 40.98 0.19 
16 Colombia 30.72 0.99 
17 Costa Rica 30.03 0.57 
18 Croatia 28.24 0.56 
19 Czech Republic 29.94 0.81 
20 Denmark 44.79 0.16 
21 Dominican Republic 25.46 0.95 
22 Ecuador 24.26 1.18 
23 Egypt 28.91 -0.30 
24 El Salvador 34.25 1.23 
25 Estonia 36.13 0.65 
26 Finland 43.93 0.16 
27 France 37.93 0.54 
28 Gambia, The 29.76 -0.16 
29 Germany 41.63 0.24 
30 Ghana 25.96 -0.17 
31 Greece 30.21 0.69 
32 Guatemala 22.82 1.50 
33 Haiti 17.70 0.50 
34 Honduras 19.70 0.63 
35 Hungary 34.61 0.66 
36 Iceland 44.70 0.14 
37 India 25.18 0.25 
38 Indonesia 24.15 0.00 
39 Ireland 36.89 0.72 
40 Israel 40.50 0.28 
41 Italy 30.70 0.70 
42 Jamaica 26.70 0.41 
43 Japan 36.70 0.65 
44 Jordan 36.80 0.32 
45 Kenya 20.83 0.43 
46 Korea 33.65 0.42 
47 Latvia 30.61 0.55 
48 Lithuania 33.28 0.90 
49 Luxembourg 40.50 0.29 
50 Macedonia, FYR 22.81 0.38 
                                               
∗
 Data source: The Global Competitiveness Report 2003-2004, New York: Oxford University Press for 
the World Economic Forum. The values are based on a principal component analysis carried out by 
the author.  
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51 Madagascar 20.74 0.55 
52 Malawi 32.43 0.23 
53 Malaysia 33.36 0.31 
54 Mali 18.75 0.16 
55 Malta 38.12 0.50 
56 Mauritius 29.83 0.42 
57 Mexico 31.10 0.73 
58 Morocco 24.23 -0.02 
59 Mozambique 22.81 0.62 
60 Namibia 29.46 0.26 
61 Netherlands 40.88 0.30 
62 New Zealand 44.03 0.14 
63 Nicaragua 24.93 1.02 
64 Nigeria 19.38 0.01 
65 Norway 39.74 0.18 
66 Pakistan 26.16 0.22 
67 Panama 25.48 0.88 
68 Paraguay 22.17 0.78 
69 Peru 29.78 1.57 
70 Philippines 20.98 1.15 
71 Poland 28.81 0.58 
72 Portugal 37.16 0.39 
73 Romania 20.54 0.62 
74 Russia 24.82 0.47 
75 Senegal 24.14 0.36 
76 Singapore 43.65 0.16 
77 Slovak Republic 28.99 1.48 
78 Slovenia 36.03 0.48 
79 South Africa 31.65 0.17 
80 Spain 37.66 0.67 
81 Sri Lanka 24.33 0.20 
82 Sweden 42.79 0.21 
83 Switzerland 42.22 0.33 
84 Tanzania 26.44 0.11 
85 Thailand 32.30 0.58 
86 Trinidad and Tobago 28.40 0.32 
87 Tunisia 33.94 -0.07 
88 Turkey 25.47 0.44 
89 Uganda 20.91 0.09 
90 Ukraine 23.09 0.42 
91 United Kingdom 41.36 0.20 
92 United States 38.42 0.45 
93 Uruguay 36.60 0.47 
94 Venezuela, Rep. Bol. 23.73 1.18 
95 Vietnam 27.46 0.04 
96 Zambia 25.39 -0.02 
97 Zimbabwe 23.78 0.30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Essays in Development and Transition Economics 
 57
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART II 
 
Institutions and Growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Essays in Development and Transition Economics 
 58
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
How do Institutions Lead Some 
Countries to Produce So Much More 
Output than Others? 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Development accounting exercises have established that the large per capita income 
differences across countries are only partially explained by variations in production 
inputs.26 Of these large (up to 36 fold) differences, about half is attributed to the 
residual that Abramowitz termed “the economists measure of ignorance.” To capture 
the determinants of the sizable differences in residuals in turn, a voluminous 
empirical literature has emphasized the role of institutions. Cross-country regressions 
have shown that institutions are highly correlated with income per capita; and that 
institutions can explain up to 30 fold per capita income differences between 
developed and developing countries.27  Previous empirical approaches to estimating 
explanatory power of institutions for per capita income rely on reduced forms, 
regressing output solely on institutions.  This method highlights the effect of 
institutions in a dramatic fashion, but sheds little light on the exact mechanics by 
which institutions actually affect output.  Given the parsimonious set-up of the 
regressions, this approach may also substantially overestimate the effect of 
institutions on output.  The purpose of this paper is to add detail to the popular 
reduced form estimations and examine different hypotheses regarding the exact 
mechanics by which institutions affect income per capita.  
                                               
26
 See Caselli (2003) for a recent survey of development accounting.   
27
 See Knack and Keefer (1995 and 1997), Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
(2001 and 2002), Easterly and Levine (2002). 
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Institutions do not physically produce output.  Hence, their effect must be 
indirect, operating either through their impact on factor accumulation or on the level 
of productivity.  Hall and Jones (1999) suggest that just under half of the impact of 
institutions on output is through its effect on factor accumulation, while the rest is due 
to the impact of institutions on productivity.  Their econometric specification implies, 
however, that the effect of institutions on productivity is independent of endowments 
or accumulation.  In other words, the elasticity of output with respect to institutions is 
constant across countries and unaffected by a country’s level of human or physical 
capital.   
In this paper we combine the approaches of Hall and Jones (1999, HJ 
henceforth) and Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992, MRW henceforth) in order to 
explain cross country per capita income levels. Specifically, we examine whether 
specifications in which institutions are the sole determinant of output levels (as in HJ) 
can be improved upon by taking into account the effect of institutions on factor 
productivity. Our hypothesis is that the main contribution of institutional quality to 
development is through its impact on the accumulation of human and physical capital.  
To explore our hypothesis we introduce factors of production into HJ’s 
specification and institutions to the MRW setup. We find that the inclusion of a 
measure of institutions into the MRW specification does yield a significant coefficient 
on institutions and reduces the residual significantly. The estimates on human capital 
and physical capital do not change significantly.  
 Augmenting HJ’s specification with physical factors of production reduces the 
effect of institutions on output by a whole order of magnitude. Institutions retain only 
about 15% of their explanatory power to account for cross country income levels as 
compared to the HJ results. This highlights that at least some part of the contribution 
of institutions to output might be institution-induced increases in physical factors of 
production. 
Next we analyze exactly how institutions affect output via factor accumulation. 
Both HJ and MRW, assume that the elasticities of output with respect to inputs are 
constant across countries. Our hypothesis suggests, however, that the quality of 
institutions affects factor productivities and output shares. A test of the hypothesis 
shows that once we allow for the factor elasticities to vary across countries, the direct 
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effect of institutions on output vanishes entirely and only the moderating effect of 
institutions prevails.   
Institutions thus truly moderate the effect of human and physical capital on 
output. Interestingly enough, while better institutions increase the contribution of 
capital to output, the result is reversed for the case of human capital. Our results 
imply that while human capital and institutions by themselves contribute positively to 
output, institutions matter more for development in low human capital countries. 
Conversely, the better institutions are the less human capital matters in explaining 
differences in per capita income. These results indicate that, while physical capital 
and institutional quality are complements, human capital and institutions are 
substitutes in the development process.  
Finally, we investigate the residual associated with each approach to 
measuring the effects of institutions on economic performance. Development 
accounting exercises have shown that a high correlation exists between the residual 
and per capita output. Due to this high correlation it seems natural to label the 
residual “productivity” or disembodied technology. Our results indicate, however, that 
by introducing institutions into the augmented Solow development accounting 
framework, and allowing institutions to affect the productivity of factors largely 
eliminates any correlation of the residual with output. This returns the residual to a 
true econometric residual consisting simply of white noise.  
 
3.2. Literature Review  
As mentioned above, the literature on institutions and growth is mainly built on 
parsimonious regressions, where income per capita is regressed on proxies for 
institutions. The proxies in question are based on subjective data, namely variables 
constructed from surveys and expert assessments.28 The question of explaining the 
vast income differences between the richest and poorest countries has generated 
somewhat a dichotomous result. According to one strand of thought, geography is 
the key to explain these income differences.29 The gist of this type of an argument is 
to assert that geography has a direct impact on productivity.  
                                               
28
  Before Knack and Keefer (1995 and 1997), secure property rights/good institutions were proxied by 
the Gastil Index of political and civil liberties, and frequency of revolutions, coups, and political 
assassinations. However, results from such regressions were less than satisfactory in their 
explanatory power.   
29
 See Sachs (2001 and 2003) for example.  
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At the opposite end of the spectrum is the institutions hypothesis, one of the 
forerunners of which is Douglass North (1990). Based on empirical evidence that 
poor countries are not catching up –contrary to the convergence hypothesis of 
neoclassical growth theory, Keefer and Knack (1995 and 1997) provided early 
empirical analyses concluding that institutions are powerful determinants of whether 
or not a country will catch up. Accordingly, there is stronger support for the 
conditional convergence hypothesis, once institutions are controlled for. One of the 
novelties of these two papers was to introduce better measures of the institutional 
framework countries: Variables such as contract enforceability, rule of law, risk of 
expropriation, coming from sources such as International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
and Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI) proved to be good proxies for the 
institutional setting.  
Hall and Jones (1999) and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) are two 
studies, which perhaps made the biggest impact in terms of promoting the 
institutional hypothesis in the mainstream debate. HJ focuses on what they call social 
infrastructure, which is a hybrid between the earlier Keefer and Knack indices and 
the Sachs-Warner index of trade openness, whereas AJR base their analyses on the 
risk of expropriation.  
The main issue to be addressed in this strand of the literature is certainly that 
of causality. Hall and Jones employ a two-stage least squares strategy using various 
correlates of Western European influence to instrument for the social infrastructure 
variable. Furthermore, their results are robust to the inclusion of geography variables 
(distance from the equator, and continental dummies), religious affiliation, logarithm 
of population, a measure of the density of economic activity, a dummy for 
capitalist/mixed capitalist economies and the index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization. 
As a result, their coefficient on the institutions variable is not affected and especially 
the geography variable has a small and insignificant coefficient. Their contention is 
that the correlation between the distance from the equator and economic 
performance owes much to the fact that the former was de facto acting as a proxy for 
the missing institutions variable.  
AJR also have a sound econometric strategy to identify causality, using settler 
mortality rates at the beginning of the colonization period to instrument for institutions 
of today with the assumption that institutional change is gradual over time. Their 
reasoning is that wherever colonizers found suitable conditions to settle, they erected 
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good institutions securing property rights and the rule of law. As the argument goes, 
early institutions had a strong impact on the current ones, which, turn, determine 
current economic performance. AJR results are also robust to alternative 
specifications for the institutions variable, as well as controlling for geographical 
variables. A genius strategy as it may be as regards causality, a main drawback of 
their approach is that their sample size is only 64, and their instrumental variable is 
only available for 80 countries.  
Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2002) offer a systematic horse race between 
possible explanations of output levels, i.e. institutions, geography and integration. 
Their results suggest that the impact of institutions trumps all other explanations. 
Once they are controlled for, geography, for instance, has at best weak and small 
direct effects. These results are robust to the use of different institutions variables, 
functional specifications, and sample sizes.  
The evidence presented so far should suffice to make the point that institutions 
have been highlighted as the primary determinants of economic performance, 
measured by income/output levels. Ascertaining this much is definitely an important 
step, however the insights are still limited from these parsimonious approaches. 
There is still a lot to be done in this field, given that the literature treats institutions as 
black boxes so far. Understanding how institutions work to make countries more 
(less) productive is a crucial target. It is a modest first step towards this aim that we 
turn to now.  
 
3.3. Institutions and Output Levels 
 
3.3.1. Development Accounting in the Absence of Institutions 
Most work on cross-country income differences is based on the Solow model. 
Following Hall and Jones (1999), let’s assume output in country i is produced 
according to 
αα −
=
1
iiii HKAY      (3.1) 
where K denotes the stock of physical capital, H is the stock of efficiency units of 
labor, and A is a measure of labour-augmenting productivity. Defining all  
magnitudes in per capita terms, y=Y/L, k=K/L, and h=H/L, we can rewrite output per 
capita as 
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iiii hkAy log)1(logloglog αα −−+=     (3.2) 
which highlights that per capita output depends on factor inputs and on the level of 
productivity.   
HJ analyse the power of factor inputs extensively to examine if additional 
factors, such as institutions, are required in order to understand any remaining, 
unexplained, cross-country income differences.  In line with most previous work, their 
accounting exercise assumes the elasticity of output with respect to each input to be 
the same for all countries, and takes it to be equal to the value of the capital share in 
the US, that is, 3/1=α .  HJ then replicate the well known observation that 
differences in inputs explain only a small fraction of cross-country differences in 
output. The Solow residual, obtained when we rewrite (3.2) as 
iiii hkyA log)1(logloglog αα −−−=   (3.3) 
is in fact the main source of differences in per capita output across countries.  Its 
correlation with per capita income is extremely high, as can be seen from Table 3.1, 
and differences in the residual explain almost 70 per cent of income differences 
across countries. 
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3.3.2. The Role of Institutions in Development Accounting 
The high correlation between the residual and per capita income has led to the 
interpretation that A is a measure of the level of technology in a country. Together 
with the results from the growth accounting exercise described above, this implies 
that richer countries are richer because the use inputs more efficiently. This answer 
is far from satisfactory. Inspired by the work of North (1990), HJ hypothesize that a 
major determinant of aggregate productive efficiency in a country is the quality of its 
institutions.  
 Hall and Jones define an institutions measure, which they call social 
infrastructure, as a weighted average of five measures of government anti-diversion 
and a measure of openness to international trade (see the data appendix for details 
on the construction of this variable). The correlation between the Solow residual and 
institutional quality –as measured by the HJ variable- is 0.60. Moreover, Hall and 
Jones maintain that institutions are in fact the fundamental determinant of a country’s 
long-run economic performance, as they determine both productivity and factor 
accumulation.  
They argue that the econometric specification that identifies the impact of 
institutions on income takes the form  
εγγ ++= ii Iy 10log        (3.4) 
where I is a measure of the quality of institutions or social infrastructure, which differs 
across countries, and ε  is a random error term. HJ estimate equation (3.3) and find 
that institutions can account for over 30-fold differences in per capita output. 
 
3.3.3. Data on Institutional Quality and the Endogeneity Problem 
Hall and Jones (1999) were not the first to examine the effects of institutions on 
economic performance. Keefer and Knack (1995 and 1997) provided early empirical 
analyses on the growth effects of institutions. Defining and measuring institutions is, 
however, not a straightforward matter, and the particular definition used may indeed 
influence the results. One of the novelties of the two papers by Keefer and Knack 
was to introduce better measures of the institutional framework countries. They 
suggested using subjective data, variables constructed from surveys and expert 
assessments such as International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and Business 
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Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI).30 Variables such as contract enforceability, 
rule of law, or risk of expropriation, proved to be good proxies for the institutional 
setting.  
The two most influential studies documenting the importance of institutions in 
explaining cross-country income difference, Hall and Jones (1999) and Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson (2001), have used alternative measures of institutional quality. 
HJ focus on a hybrid between the earlier Keefer and Knack indices and the Sachs-
Warner index of trade openness, whereas Acemoglu et al. measure institutions by 
the risk of expropriation.  
A crucial concern when seeking to assess the effect of institutions on 
economic performance is that a country’s level of development also impacts the 
quality of institutions, i.e. the reverse causality problems emerge in empirical studies. 
Major efforts have hence been made to search for good instruments to control for 
endogeneity. 
Hall and Jones employ various correlates of Western European influence to 
instrument for the social infrastructure variable. Furthermore, their results are robust 
to the inclusion of geography variables (distance from the equator, and continental 
dummies), religious affiliation, logarithm of population, a measure of the density of 
economic activity, a dummy for capitalist/mixed capitalist economies and the index of 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization. The coefficient on the institutions variable is barely 
affected by the use of difference instruments. Acemoglu et al. use settler mortality 
rates at the beginning of the colonization period to instrument for institutions of today 
with the assumption that institutional change is gradual over time. Their argument is 
that wherever colonizers found suitable conditions to settle, they created good 
institutions which secured property rights and the rule of law. Early institutions then 
determined current ones, which, turn, determine current economic performance.  
The results in these papers have been confirmed by a number of subsequent 
studies,31  and the overall evidence is that institutions play an overwhelming role in 
explaining differences in economic performance across countries. However, the 
insights from these parsimonious approaches are still limited. The literature has so 
                                               
30
  Before Knack and Keefer (1995 and 1997), secure property rights/good institutions were proxied by 
the Gastil Index of political and civil liberties, and frequency of revolutions, coups, and political 
assassinations. However, results from such regressions were less than satisfactory in their 
explanatory power.   
31
 See, amongst others, Kaufman et al. (1999), Easterly and Levine (2002), Grigorian and Martinez 
(2002) and Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2002). 
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far treated institutions as black boxes. Nevertheless, it is imperative to understand 
how institutions work to make countries more (less) productive, and how they impact 
upon and interact on factor accumulation. We attempt to address this question in the 
next section.   
 
3.4. The Effect of Institutions versus Factor Accumulation 
 
3.4.1 Combined Models of Institutions and Factors 
The approach of HJ and Acemoglu et al. (2001) contrasts sharply with the more 
traditional methods used to identify the determinants of cross country per capita 
income, as in MRW, who regress output per capita on factor inputs. Rather than 
using the value of the capital share in the US to account for the contributions of the 
various factors, MRW estimate the elasticities of the production function 
econometrically. In particular, they assume that output in country i is produced 
according to 
βαβα −−
=
1
iiii LHAKY       (3.5) 
where L denotes the number of workers, and H the stock of human capital. Given our 
definition of output per worker above and taking logs, we can re-express the above 
production function as 
iii hkAy loglogloglog βα ++=     (3.6) 
The MRW approach is more general than the development accounting exercise  
in HJ, as it does not ex ante impose an elasticity of output, nor does it assume 
constant returns to accumulating factors. However, the crucial assumption in MRW is 
that all countries are share identical productivities,32 an assumption which does not 
seem to be supported by the results in HJ.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
32
 In their specification of the output levels regression equation, MRW also assume that all countries 
are in their steady state, and write the level of output as a function of investment shares, which in turn 
determine the steady state levels of human and physical capital. Our formulation is more general, and 
simply uses factor endowments as the determinants of income levels.  
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Table 3.1 
Institutions in the Augmented Solow Model 
 
Dependent variable: log output per worker 
 
HJ MRW  Combined 
model 1  
Combined  
model 2 
Institutions 5.142*** 
.343 
 1.089*** 
.235 
.698** 
.249 
Log HK 
(enrolment rate) 
 .110 
.072 
.099 
.069 
 
HK (human capital stock) 
   .141 
.087 
Log K 
 .603*** 
.040 
.525*** 
.048 
.562*** 
.037 
N 127 111 111 127 
R-squared 0.58 0.91 0.92 0.91 
Root MSE 0.70 .328 .31 .33 
Correl (A, Y/L) 0.89 0.30 0.27 0.31 
Correl (A, Institutions) 0.60 0.25 0.01 0.00 
Notes: MRW specification without steady state assumptions.  Specifications in columns 2 to 
4 are two-stage least squares regressions, where institutions are instrumented for as in HJ 
1999. Robust standard errors reported in italics. See the appendix for the first stage 
regression and the OLS counterparts of the regressions reported here. Subscripts ***/**/* 
denote 1%/5%/10% significance levels. 
 
The first question we want to address is whether large differences in the residual 
remain, once we allow for the output elasticities to be determined by the data. MRW 
and HJ use somewhat different data, with the former using per capita income for 
1985 and secondary school enrolment rates as a measure of human capital, and the 
latter output per worker in 1988 and the stock of human capital. In order to render 
comparable results, we use the HJ output data in all specifications. Human Capital 
data are either the original MRW or HJ, again to generate comparable results.  
Table 3.1 juxtaposes the basic empirical results. The first column reports the 
results of HJ, where institutions alone determine output levels. The second column 
presents a regression of output per capita on factor inputs, a general version of MRW. 
In their paper33 MRW obtain a somewhat lower elasticity of output with respect to 
physical capital and a higher one for human capita, 0.48 and 0.23 respectively. 
However, the MRW estimates are within the 10% confidence interval implied by the 
estimates in column 2.  
                                               
33
 The coefficients we report are implied by the growth regressions in MRW, which take into account 
that economies may not be at their steady states. 
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  The last two rows of Table 3.1 report the correlation of the residual with 
output per capita and institutions for the two approaches. In the HJ set up, this is the 
Solow residual obtained from equation (3), for the MRW specification, it is the 
residual resulting from the regression equation. The augmented Solow model 
provides a very good fit for the data. In particular, the correlation between the 
residual and output levels drops from 0.89 to 0.30, indicating that the estimates for 
the elasticities of output give a much better picture than imposing 3/1=α . 
Nevertheless, the resulting residual is still highly correlated with institutions (0.25). 
The natural extension would be to combine the two insights and estimate a 
production function that includes both inputs and institutions. Suppose that output is 
produced according to  
βαβα −−
=
1
iiiii LHKAY      (3.7) 
with the level of productivity, iA , being a function of institutions. In particular, we 
stipulate that  
iI
i AeA
δ
=         (3.8) 
Output per capita is then a function of factor inputs, institutions and a residual, taken 
to be the level of technology, and we can express it as   
εδβα ++++= iiii IhkAy loglogloglog    (3.9) 
The third and fourth columns in Table 3.1 report the results of the combined model 
(9), using the secondary school enrolment rate as used by MRW, and the stock of 
human capital as calculated by HJ. Following HJ, we introduce institutions into the 
regressions without taking logarithms.  
The results from the regressions are surprisingly good.  All factors have the 
expected sign, and the estimates are quite robust across specifications. In particular, 
the coefficient on institutions is positive and significant, suggesting that HJ could also 
have included factors of production, or that MRW could have included institutional 
differences to derive more accurate estimates of the contributions of physical inputs 
to explain per capita income differences in a cross section of countries.  
Once capital and labour are included in the regression, the estimate for the 
effect of institutions on growth, although still positive and significant, drops by a 
whole order of magnitude.  Institutions can now account for only between 15% and 
20% of the variation in per capita incomes, in contrast to Hall and Jones. At the same 
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time, the inclusion of institutions shows that the elasticities of output with respect to 
human and physical capital barely change as compared to the basic MRW 
specification in column 1.  These elasticities are somewhat lower in the specification 
with institutions. 
Neither combined model represents a significant improvement over the 
specification of MRW in terms of theR2. To assess the effectiveness of our 
specification, we examine how the combined models fare in terms of the Solow 
residual. The last two columns of Table 3.1 show that the inclusion of institutions has 
an important effect: the correlation between the residual and output falls by 10 per 
cent (column 3), while the correlation between the residual and institutions entirely 
disappears. These correlations are also depicted in Figures 3.2 and 3.3.  
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Figure 3.3
 
Our specification thus purges the residual of its institutional component, rendering it a 
true statistical residual due to measurement errors or violations of the structural 
assumptions in the Solow growth accounting framework (such as constant returns to 
scale).   
 
3.4.2. The Direct and Indirect Effects of Institutions 
The regressions in Table 3.1 imply that both institutions and factor accumulation 
matter for output levels. However, institutions by themselves do not produce 
anything; their effect should actually be captured by the catalytic effect institutions 
have on the factors of production. In this section we seek to understand how much of 
the variation in output is accounted for by the direct (and abstract) impact of 
institutions, as opposed to the indirect effect of institutions that works through factors 
inputs.  
Table 3.2 reports the direct and indirect effects of institutions by regressing 
inputs on institutions. The indirect effects were obtained by running the regression  
x=   0+  1Institutions+  , where x is either k, h, or A. The direct effect of institutions is 
the coefficient   (9), normalized such that the sum of coefficients is 5.142.  
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In row 1 we assess the contribution of inputs under the assumption that 3/1=α . The 
contributions of inputs together with the residual, A, sum up to 5.142, which is the 
total contribution of institutions as measured by the coefficient in Table 3.1.  
 
Table 3.2 
Direct and Indirect Contributions of Institutions to Per Capita Income 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
 
L
Klogα  
L
H *logβ  Log A Institutions Contribution of Factors** 
HJ 2.416 0.896 1.830  3.312 
MRW 3.478 0.767 0.897  4.245 
Combined Model 1 3.745 0.325  1.072 4.070 
Combined Model 2 4.222 0.196  0.724 4.418 
*H refers to MRW and HJ human capital variables, respectively, logged when necessary. 
** Combined contribution of human and physical capital, refers to the sum of columns 1 and 2. 
Coefficients in all intermediate regressions had significance levels of over 1%.  
 
In the HJ specification in row 1, factors of production contribute about 64% to output, 
whereas the contribution of the Solow residual, A, accounts for the remaining 36% of 
the variation in output levels across countries. That is, factor accumulation plays a 
limited role, accounting for less than two thirds of output differences, and institutions 
seem to mainly affect aggregate productivity. 
The rest of the table repeats this exercise for the MRW augmented Solow 
model and of our combined models. The second line uses the production elasticities 
obtained by MRW, namely 48,0=α  and ß=0.23. With these elasticities, the role of 
factor accumulation becomes much more important: 82 per cent of the effect of 
institutions occurs through human and physical capital accumulation. Similar results 
are obtained when we use the elasticities obtained from the combined model. Again, 
the main role of institutions is to encourage factor accumulation, with the direct effect 
accounting for between 14 and 21 per cent of the overall impact.  
The other major difference between the growth accounting exercise and the 
results using estimated elasticities concerns the relative importance of physical and 
human capital accumulation.  Imputing the value of α , results in a contribution of 
institutions through human capital which is almost a third of the total contribution of 
factors. This is a somewhat surprising result, especially since many of the 
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components of institutional quality, such as enforcement of property rights, are more 
likely to benefit the owners of physical than of human capital. The augmented Solow 
model (with or without institutions) features a much more important effect through 
physical capital, with only a small effect occurring through human capital 
accumulation (between 4 and 18 per cent of the total contribution of factors).    
 
3.4.3. The Interaction between Institutions and Factors of Production 
Our discussion above implies that physical and human capital react rather differently 
to improvements in institutional quality. A reason for this could be that the elasticity of 
output with respect to factor endowments, and hence factor returns, depend on a 
country’s institutional quality. That is, given the level of technology, the effect of a 
given stock of (physical or human) capital on output depends on how good the 
country’s institutions are. 
While MRW assume the level of technology to be common across countries 
and allow the output elasticities to be determined by the data, HJ impute the 
elasticities and allow technology to vary across countries. What both approaches 
have in common is the assumption that factor shares are constant across countries. 
Yet, the data cast doubt on this assumption. A number of recent papers document 
the extensive differences in factor shares across countries and over time (see Gollin, 
2002, Harrison, 2002, and Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 2003). Such evidence raises the 
question of whether allowing the output elasticities to vary across countries can 
improve our understanding of income differences.  If we assume that the elasticity of 
output with respect to the various inputs differs systematically across countries, we 
must propose a mechanism by which such differences arise.  Here we stipulate that 
institutions crucially affect the productivity of factors and their shares in output.  
In order to estimate the extent to which differences in output elasticities are 
driven by institutional differences, we further modify the production function used by 
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil, and assume that output in country i is produced according 
to 
iiii
iiiii LHKAY
βαβα −−
=
1
     (3.10) 
We propose that both the level of aggregate productivity and the elasticities of output 
with respect to the two inputs depend on the quality of institutions, I. As before, 
productivity is given by iIi AeA δ= .  Concerning the elasticities, we assume a simple 
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linear formulation, whereby  ii Ia αα +=  and ii Ib ββ += . We can then write output 
per capita as  
iiiiiiii hIhkIkIy logloglogloglog 543210 γγγγγγ +++++=   (3.11) 
with institutions affecting output through 1γ , 3γ  and 5γ , which capture both the direct 
effect of institutions on total factor productivity (TFP), which is constant across 
countries, as well as the effect of institutions on the input elasticities.  
 Table 3.3 reports the results of the estimation. Two surprising results emerge. 
Our results have two implications. First, the coefficient 1γ  is insignificant in both 
specifications. Institutions seem to have no effect on total factor productivity, which 
contrasts with the results in Table 3.1. Rather, they affect the elasticity of output with 
respect to inputs.  The alternative interpretation is that the HJ specification loses its 
validity once the effect of institutions on factor inputs and factor shares has been 
included.  The second result is no less surprising: better institutions seem to increase 
the productivity of physical capital, but reduce that of human capital. Institutions 
increase the elasticity of output with respect to physical capital and labour, and 
reduce the elasticity with respect to human capital. Human capital and institutions by 
themselves have a positive impact, however institutions matter more for growth in 
low human capital countries.   The reverse way of thinking about this relationship is 
that the more human capital a country has, the less important institutions are. 
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Table 3.3 
Institutional Effects on Labour and Capital Productivities 
Dependent Variable: Output per Worker  
(Two Stage Least Squares) 
 
 Augmented 
model 1 
Augmented  
model 2 
Institutions 
 
-.036 
1.679 
-1.376 
1.705 
Log K 
 
.438*** 
.095 
.367*** 
.089 
Institutions*Log K 
 
.206 
.200 
.471** 
.210 
Log HK (Enrolment rate) 
 
.300* 
.161  
Institutions*Log HK 
 
-.514 
.396  
HK (Human capital stock) 
  
.776** 
.310 
Institutions*HK 
 
 
-1.297** 
.517 
N 111 127 
R-squared 0.93 0.91 
Root MSE .31 .33 
Correl (A, Y/L) 0.27 0.30 
Correl (A, Institutions) 0.00 0.00 
Notes: HJ and MRW specifications instrumented for institutions as in HJ 1999.  
Subscripts ***/**/* denote 1%/5%/10% significance levels. Robust standard errors 
reported in italics. OLS counterparts reported in the appendix. 
 
Our results suggest that institutions and physical capital are complements. On the 
other hand, institutions and human capital are substitutes, in the sense that, given 
the stock of capital, a certain level of output can be produced with either a 
combination of good institutions and low human capital, or else with poor institutions 
but a highly educated labour force. 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
In this paper we examine the mechanics by which institutions may affect per capita 
output.  The inclusion of human and physical capital reduces the power of institutions 
by themselves by a whole order of magnitude.  In addition, our results further 
emphasise that institutions are not a factor of production, and do not by themselves 
produce output. Rather, most of their impact seems to work through the productivity 
of factor inputs.   
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The question of explaining away the Solow residual has long haunted the 
economics profession. Only by taking the right steps in this direction can we claim –
at least- to proceed towards minimizing the measure of our ignorance. The literature 
on institutions and growth has so far been vastly successful in pointing its finger in 
the right direction. That is, to bring the institutions into the forefront of economic 
discussion. By now, we know that institutions matter. However, progress beyond this 
point has been modest. In terms of policy proposals, for instance, knowing that 
institutions matter suggests that improving institutions are likely to result in higher per 
capita income.  Yet, in the absence of the knowledge of how exactly institutions affect 
income levels, what has been achieved so far is but to gain some modest ground 
against our ignorance.  
Broadly stating the present research agenda as such, this paper’s contribution 
has been to add some detail to the analysis of institutions, relying mainly on the fact 
that institutions are not a factor of production. Given that they do not produce 
anything, their effect must be through moderating factors of production. They should 
be setting the stage for physical and human capital to be more (less) productive. 
Here, we emphasize the direct versus indirect effects of institutions, and point out 
that most of the influence of institutions is indirect through the factors (up to 82%) 
dwarfing the direct effect of institutions. Our contribution in merging the HJ and MRW 
approaches has been to estimate the factor shares econometrically in the spirit of 
MRW using the set-up of HJ. Once, the estimated factor shares are taken into 
account, contrary to HJ, we posit that the impact of institutions functions through 
factor accumulation, and not through a direct effect on total factor productivity. 
Despite the success of such an empirical strategy, consequent economic 
insights are far from complete.  Institutions act on all factors of production, including 
technology in a mysteriously unspecified manner.  The MRW approach is deeply 
rooted in a theory that does not speak to institutions and the HJ approach is 
illustrative with its exclusive focus on institutions, but lacks a theory of how 
institutions actually influence per capita output. In particular, neither of the two 
approaches addresses the issue of what exactly is the interaction between 
institutions and factor productivity.  
We provide here a preliminary exploration of how institutions may directly 
affect per capita output. Our results indicate that the largest impact of institutions is 
through its effect on the factor productivity. While institutions have uniformly positive 
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effects on the productivity of physical capital, our regressions indicate that institutions 
and human capital are substitutes. This can be interpreted as saying that institutions 
matter most for countries with low levels of human capital and least for those with 
high levels of educational attainment. 
Two main implications emerge from the present study. First, the results 
provide evidence for an overinvestment in human capital in some countries, raising 
the question of whether traditional justifications for public provision of education, 
based on a high social return to education, are still valid. Second, they indicate that –
in contrast to the HJ approach- that improving institutions is not sufficient to generate 
increases in income levels. Since the main role of institutions is to increase the 
productivity of capital, improving institutions in countries with a very low level of 
investment will have only a small impact on output. 
The logical next step in this research agenda would, hence, be to inquire 
further into the interactions between institutions and factors of production. An 
interesting question that deserves further research is whether the impact of 
institutions varies according to countries, or whether one can identify different types 
of institutions that have different impacts on the levels of productivity. This would also 
help identify further policy recommendations that go beyond saying that 
improvements in institutional setting will lead to productivity increases.   
Finally, our analysis has been static. Yet, the results have important potential 
dynamic consequences, which should also not be ignored. If better institutions 
increase the productivity of capital, they will create investment incentives, and hence 
foster future output. In fact this could be a possible explanation for the strong 
correlation between physical capital and institutions found in the data. 
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Appendix 
A 3.1 Description of the Data 
 
A 3.1.1 The Institutions Variable: 
For the sake of comparability between our results and those of Hall and Jones 
(1999), we follow their approach in defining the institutions variable. HJ call their 
institutions variable Social Infrastructure, and define it in two steps. Inspired by the 
earlier work of Knack and Keefer (1995), they first form an index of government anti-
diversion (GADP) using the International Country Risk Guide, published by Political 
Risk Services covering 130 countries. The GADP index consists of the simple 
average of the following five categories: (i) Law and order, (ii) bureaucratic quality, 
(iii) corruption, (iv) risk of expropriation, and (v) government repudiation of contracts. 
This index is measured on a scale of 0 to 1, and assigns a higher value to better 
institutional quality.  
The second element of the social infrastructure variable is openness to 
international trade. This is captured by the Sachs and Warner (1995) index, which 
assigns each country a score between 0 and 1 depending on the fraction of years in 
the period 1950-1994 a country has been open. Accordingly, a country is classified 
as open if it simultaneously satisfies all of the following five criteria: (i) Non-tariff 
barriers should be less than 40%; (ii) average tariff rates should be less than 40%; 
(iii) black market premium should have been less than 20% during the decade of 
1970s and 1980s; (iv) the country should not be a socialist one according to the 
Kornai (1992) classification; (v) the government should not monopolize exports. 
Finally, the social infrastructure index is the unweighted average of these two 
components.  
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A 3.1.2 Output and Factors of Production: 
Measurement of human capital is a very difficult undertaking, to say the least. All the 
proxies used in the literature so far come with their own trade-offs. For an in-depth 
discussion of the measurement of human capital, see Wößmann (2003). In this paper, 
we have been conservative in following the lead of MRW and HJ, which also has the 
added benefit that our results are directly comparable to the articles mentioned 
above. MRW use the proportion of the working-age population enrolled in secondary 
schools, averaged for the period 1960-1985. In order to construct their human capital 
proxy, they multiply the secondary school enrolment ratios by the fraction of the 
working population that is of the right age to attend secondary school. On the other 
hand, Hall and Jones (1999) use the Barro-Lee (1993) data set for human capital, 
which measures the average educational attainment for the population aged 25 and 
over for the year 1985. 
Data on the basic performance measure in this study, namely the level of 
output per worker, was constructed by Hall and Jones on the basis of national 
income and labor force data from the Penn World Tables Mark 5.6, revision of 
Summers and Heston (1991). All data from this source refers to the year 1998. As 
data on hours per worker was not available for most countries, number of workers 
was employed as labor input in productivity calculations. Furthermore, Hall and 
Jones (1999) correct their GDP measure by subtracting the value added in mining 
industry, which includes natural resources such as oil and gas. Through this 
correction, they secure that the results are not driven by resource-rich countries. 
Physical capital stock was calculated using the perpetual inventory method.  
 
A 3.1.3 The Instrumental Variables: 
In the choice of instrumental variables, Hall and Jones (1999) rely on various 
measures depicting the extent of Western European influence. These measures are: 
Distance from the Equator, normalized to a scale of 0 to 1; the fraction of population, 
speaking one of the five major Western European languages, namely English, 
French, German, Portuguese and Spanish, as mother tongue; the fraction of 
population, speaking English as mother tongue; and finally the logarithm of predicted 
trade share of a country, based on a gravity model using the country’s population and 
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main geographical features.  The data on languages were taken from Hunter (1992) 
and Gunnemark (1991), whereas the trade shares variable was constructed by 
Frankel and Romer (1996).  See Hall and Jones (1999) for a lengthy discussion of 
the justification of using these instruments. Although tests of overidentifying 
restrictions provide statistical support for the use of these instruments, we have also 
experimented with the log of settler mortality, suggested by Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson (2001), which did not change the results qualitatively.  
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A 3.2 Descriptive Statistics and Auxiliary Regressions 
Table A 3.2.1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Variance Min Max 
logYL 134 8.81 1.07 1.14 6.92 10.48 
logKL 127 9.23 1.56 2.43 5.77 11.59 
Human Capital 
(HJ) 
152 1.73 0.60 0.36 1 3.37 
Enrolment Rate 
(MRW) 
117 5.57 3.52 12.38 0.40 12.10 
Social 
Infrastructure 
130 0.47 0.25 0.06 0.11 1 
Fraction of English 
Speakers in 
Population 
152 0.09 0.27 0.07 0 1 
Fraction of W. 
European Lang. 
Speakers in Pop. 
152 0.27 0.40 0.16 0 1.064 
Log Trade Shares  150 2.99 0.80 0.64 0.83 5.63 
Distance from 
Equator 
152 0.26 0.18 0.03 0 0.71 
 
 
Table A 3.2.2 
First Stage Regressions 
Dependent  Variable: Institutions (Social Infrastructure as defined by HJ) 
Distance from Equator .708*** 
.098 
Log Trade Shares (Frankel and Romer) .058** 
.023 
Fraction of English Speakers in Population .118 
.085 
Fraction of W. European Lang. Speakers in Pop. .130*** 
.045 
Number of Observations 127 
R-Squared 0.41 
Root Mean Squared Error 0.20 
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Table A 3.2.3 
Institutions in the Augmented Solow Model (OLS) 
 
HJ Enrolment rate  (MRW) Human Capital stock (HJ) 
Institutions 3.289* 
.197 
.732* 
.165 
.697* 
.154 
Log HK 
 .121*** 
.061 
 
HK 
  .104 
.080 
Log K 
 .509* 
.042 
.546* 
.035 
N 127 111 127 
R-squared 0.58 0.92 0.91 
Root MSE .70 .30 .32 
Notes: MRW specification without steady state assumptions. Subscripts ***/**/* denote 1%/5%/10% 
significance levels. Robust standard errors reported in italics.  
 
Table A.3.2.4 
Institutional Effects on Labour and Capital Productivities (OLS) 
 
 Augmented 
model 1 
Augmented  
model 2 
Institutions 
 
-1.22 
1.12 
-1.153 
1.099 
Log K 
 
.406*** 
.080 
.455*** 
.067 
Institutions*Log K 
 
.252* 
.132 
.264** 
.135 
Log HK (Enrolment rate) 
 
.266** 
.127  
Institutions*Log HK 
 
-.340 
.231  
HK (Human capital stock) 
  
.273 
.205 
Institutions*HK 
 
 
-.403 
.293 
N 111 127 
R-squared 0.93 0.91 
Root MSE .30 .33 
Notes: MRW specification without steady state assumptions. Subscripts ***/**/* denote 1%/5%/10% 
significance levels. Robust standard errors reported in italics. 
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PART III 
 
Economics of Happiness 
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Chapter 4 
Does Transition Make You Happy?: 
An Ordered Probit Model of Life 
Satisfaction 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
More than fifteen years after the fall of the Berlin wall 1989, many individuals in 
central and eastern Europe and the CIS are still struggling to adapt to the changes 
that have taken place over that period. In most transition countries, the worst is now 
over: the “transition recessions” of the early- and mid-1990s are past and the region 
as a whole34 has been growing strongly for several years, out-performing the world 
economy (see EBRD, 2004). Reforms are also proceeding steadily in most countries, 
bringing substantial benefits in the form of higher, long-term economic growth.35 But 
the problems brought by transition are far from being resolved. In many countries, 
these include high unemployment, widespread poverty and a severe drop in living 
standards for some of the more vulnerable sections of society. This paper takes a 
somewhat unorthodox approach to examine the effects of transition on different 
segments of society. Instead of “hard” data on income, unemployment, wages etc., 
we use a subjective, self-determined assessment of life satisfaction as the measure 
of an individual’s welfare or utility. This is then correlated with socio-economic 
                                               
34
 The region comprises of the new European Union members of central eastern Europe and the Baltic 
states (CEB), south-eastern Europe (SEE) and the CIS. 
35
 For a review of the recent literature on the relationship between reforms and growth in transition, 
and a presentation of some new evidence, see Falcetti et al. (2005). 
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characteristics such as gender, age, income group and labour market status, as well 
as with macroeconomic and reform variables. The individual-level data are drawn 
from the World Values Survey (WVS), a large, multi-country survey that covers a 
wide range of countries around the world. This data set allows a comparison between 
transition and non-transition countries, highlighting the extent to which the former are 
different from the latter.  
Research on the “economics of happiness” is becoming increasingly common 
among economists. The beginnings of this literature could be traced back to the early 
contributions of Easterlin (1974). However, there has been a dramatic recent 
increase in the volume of recent studies in this field. Clark and Oswald (1996) study 
workers’ life satisfaction finding a strong negative association between life 
satisfaction and comparison income (of peers). Oswald (1997) investigates the 
impact of increasing economic growth on happiness of individuals. Surprisingly, 
increases in per capita income adds very little to individuals’ happiness, whereas the 
being unemployment reduces it substantially. Ng (1997) and Kahnemann, Wakker 
and Sarin (1997) present a theoretically motivated defence for the use of the concept 
of experienced utility, and shows the usefulness of this concept in economic 
applications.  
Research on economics of happiness is based on subjective data on well-
being. The limitations of self-reported data on well-being and the problems with 
comparing answers across individuals, and across countries, are well known. But 
economists increasingly recognise that valuable information can be gleaned from 
individuals’ responses to questions about their general welfare. To date, however, 
few papers have adopted this approach in a transition context. Grün and Klasen 
(2005) examine developments in a range of indicators, including subjective ones, 
during the transition to assess overall changes in welfare throughout the period. This 
type of analysis may be particularly fruitful for transition countries, where accurate 
objective data are often hard to find because of weaknesses in national statistical 
agencies and the failure to account for the large informal economy. Subjective data 
can, therefore, give an alternative, complementary perspective on welfare 
measurement in the region and the effects – both positive and negative – of transition.  
 This paper attempts to answer several questions. The first question is, do the 
socio-economic patterns in life satisfaction observed in non-transition countries also 
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hold in the transition region? The answer is that they do to some extent, but with 
important differences. In this regard, two results from the transition sample stand out. 
The first is that the self-employed are happier than those in full-time employment. 
This is consistent with the evidence of Dutz et al. (2004) that entrepreneurship is a 
high-reward strategy for the minority in transition countries who have adopted this 
approach. The second result of interest is that, while satisfaction shows a U-shape 
pattern when graphed against age (in common with other studies), the decline 
continues into the fifties, whereas the minimum point is usually reached much earlier 
in non-transition countries. 
Figure 4.1
Real GDP Growth (Transition Countries)
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Source: EBRD. The chart displays the average real GDP growth of the 20 transition countries covered 
in the empirical analysis in this paper. 
As seen in Figure 4.1, after an initial dip, the real GDP growth has been fairly stable 
on the average in spite of the Russian Crisis of 1998. However, throughout the period, 
the inequality has also risen dramatically from very low initial levels. 36  The 
information presented here is only one facet of the transition experience. We posit 
that we can gain valuable supplementary insights by looking at the other side of the 
coin and investigating the subjective measures of happiness in transition countries to 
complete the picture.  
                                               
36
 For a detailed analysis of inequality in the transition context and a comparison of inequality between 
pre- and post-transition periods, see Grün and Klasen (2001).  
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Hence, the second question we investigate is whether satisfaction is 
correlated with external macroeconomic variables such as growth and inflation. 
Helliwell (2002) and Oswald (2003) adopt similar approaches to ours. In the transition 
context, relevant questions are whether the state of reforms and the degree of 
inequality are important. Our results show a positive relation between reforms, as 
measured by the well-known EBRD transition indicators, and satisfaction. However, 
the size and statistical significance of this result is dependent on the specification 
used and the inclusion of other macroeconomic variables such as GDP per capita.  
Interestingly, a high degree of inequality in transition countries is associated 
with lower life satisfaction. This is a fascinating result in that it is exactly reversed in 
the non-transition sample. People living in countries with a tradition of market 
capitalism tend to see inequality as less of a problem than those living in transition 
countries. The fact that inequality is positively associated with happiness leads one to 
believe that in the spirit of market capitalism, inequality brings with it economic 
opportunities as well. On the other hand, the emergence of exactly the opposite 
result in the transition sample might have to do with the heritage of communism 
where the values such as equality were emphasised. Given that the transition period 
investigated here is no longer than a decade, it is plausible that although the 
environment in which economic actors perform has changed drastically, their mindset 
has still remnants of the former system.   
Finally, the paper contrasts the results from the most recent wave of the WVS 
with two previous waves, based on a smaller sample of transition countries. A V-
shaped pattern through time is apparent in the majority of countries: that is, average 
life satisfaction tended to fall during the early years of transition, but  returned close 
to the pre-transition level after about a ten-year period, and even above this level in a 
couple of cases. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 contains a brief overview of 
some of the key recent literature on the economics of happiness. Section 4.3 
evaluates the subjective measures of life satisfaction and draws the link between the 
present paper and the economic theory. Section 4.4 describes the WVS and 
presents some summary tables from the latest wave. Section 4.5 presents the 
econometric results, based on ordered probit analysis, on the correlates of life 
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satisfaction. Section 4.6 extends the analysis to three different waves of the survey, 
and finally section 4.7 concludes the paper. 
 
4.2 Literature Review: Happiness and Transition: What do we know? 
An exciting development in social sciences in recent years is the growing interaction 
between economics and psychology. One of the most visible signs of this 
phenomenon is the dramatic increase in interest, especially among economists, in 
the analysis of subjective measures of well-being.37 This literature, commonly known 
as the “economics of happiness”, has already led to several authoritative surveys in 
economics journals, as well as a book by two of the leading authors in the area, Frey 
and Stutzer (2002a).38 Studying the literature on economics of happiness suggests 
that surveys of individuals’ feelings about their well-being can elicit useful information, 
that such responses contain supplementary information to analyse human behaviour, 
and that they can be compared in a broad sense of the term across individuals, 
countries and time. It would be naïve to state that such comparisons are necessary 
and sufficient conditions for an understanding of individual’s well-being, however it 
should also be clear that by providing supplementary information on well being, the 
subjective data furthers substantially our understanding of the topic under 
investigation.  
Several robust patterns have emerged from a wide number of empirical 
studies around the world. For example, it is generally found that happiness is 
positively correlated with education and income, and negatively with unemployment 
and ill-health. Such results are not surprising. More unexpected, perhaps, is the fact 
that overall well-being in industrialised economies does not appear to have increased 
much or at all over the past decades, despite the enormous increase in real incomes 
and living standards (see Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004; Layard, 2005; Easterlin, 
                                               
37
 The issue has also attracted considerable media interest recently. See, for example, the special 
edition of Time magazine entitled “The Science of Happiness”, January 17, 2005, and an article by 
Larry Elliott entitled “Happiness may be in the mind but the state still has a role to play” in The 
Guardian, February 28, 2005. 
38
 Other recent surveys include Oswald (1997), Frey and Stutzer (2002b), and Layard (2005). There is 
extensive literature on the subject in psychology journals; Diener and Seligman (2004) is a useful 
overview. Other inter-disciplinary initiatives worth noting in this area include an internet site on 
happiness research, organised and managed by the sociologist Ruut Veenhoven 
(http://www2.eur.nl/fsw/research/happiness/), and a journal called the Journal of Happiness Studies. 
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1995). This apparent puzzle is generally explained by adaptation theories, namely, 
that people become used to new circumstances and adjust their notions of well-being 
accordingly, and by the fact that people are often more concerned with their relative 
status (compared to those around them) rather than with some absolute measure of 
income or consumption. These are highly relevant considerations when analysing 
transition economies, where the upheavals have been huge and adaptation is likely 
to take some time, and where people may have inherited a strong aversion to 
inequality, (Grün and Klasen, 2001). 
 We make no attempt here to survey the broad literature; instead we 
concentrate on those papers devoted wholly or in part to analysing happiness in 
transition economies. This literature is rather sparse. Frey and Stutzer (2002b) note 
that “there is still a lack of data on subjective well-being in developing and transition 
countries” (p. 431). Graham (2004) makes the same point, noting that when such 
studies exist, they tend to focus on individual countries only. This is an important gap 
that needs to be filled, as there are at least two reasons why this type of analysis is 
particularly relevant for the region.  
First, the transition process has involved a major upheaval for most people, 
and therefore one would expect to see this reflected in happiness scores, particularly 
in the early years of transition. Similarly, measures of happiness would be expected 
to increase over time as circumstances have improved and people have become 
used to the new regime. These hypotheses can be tested if one has access to 
subjective data on transition countries at different stages of transition.  
Second, objective, reliable data in transition economies are often hard to find. 
In most countries of the region, there is a large informal economy and statistical 
coverage of the newly emerging private sector is sometimes patchy. Subjective 
measures of well-being can, therefore, provide a useful complement to conventional 
economic data, and can help identify those groups or regions most affected by 
transition. 
One fact emerges clearly from cross-country surveys of subjective well-being: 
transition economies consistently appear at or near the bottom of the list. In 
Veenhoven’s world database of happiness, there is a summary table on average 
happiness in 68 nations during the 1990s, where happiness is defined as how much 
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people enjoy their life as a whole. The bottom five countries are (in descending order) 
Russia, Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine and Moldova, all in the former Soviet Union 
(FSU). Other transition countries such as Belarus, Bulgaria and the Kyrgyz Republic 
also score poorly. A similar pattern is apparent in Table 2.2 of Frey and Stutzer 
(2002a), with former Soviet Union countries doing badly on happiness scores and 
central European transition countries scoring higher but still below not only the 
richest OECD countries but also most of those in Asia or central and south 
America.39  
Helliwell (2002) uses the first three waves of the World Values Survey to 
estimate a general happiness equation for all countries (similar to the approach we 
adopt below). He aggregates the transition countries into two groups – eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union. Interestingly, one experiment shows that 
subjective well-being was very low in both 1990 and the mid-1990s in the FSU, while 
in eastern Europe it started off even lower than in the FSU, but rose significantly in 
the intervening period. 
 Very few papers focus solely on a range of transition countries.40 Hayo and 
Seifert (2002) analyse a subjective measure of economic well-being in ten eastern 
European countries in the early 1990s. This measure has a reasonably strong 
correlation with life satisfaction in the first wave of the survey in 1991 (the only year 
when both questions were asked). It is also correlated with GDP per capita, with the 
correlation rising over time, suggesting that objective data have become more 
accurate over time. 
A number of other papers analyse the correlates of happiness in a specific 
country. Namazie and Sanfey (2001) focus on one of the poorest transition countries 
– the Kyrgyz Republic – using a household survey carried out in 1993. While some of 
the results are similar to those in empirical studies of more advanced countries, 
several are different. In particular, satisfaction appears to decline steadily with age, at 
least until the early sixties, in contrast to the U-shape pattern (with a mid-point 
somewhere around 40) commonly found in more advanced countries.41 Also, there is 
                                               
39
 One possible explanation for the low scores in some countries is the fact that many young, 
educated people with entrepreneurial skills have emigrated during the transition, and it is those people 
who, on average, tend to report higher satisfaction scores. 
40
 Grün and Klasen (2005) is an exception in this respect. 
41
 See, for example, Clark et al. (1996). 
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no correlation between happiness and education in transition countries, possibly (the 
authors speculate) because skills and education acquired under the old regime are of 
little use in the new circumstances. 
Several papers examine happiness in Russia. For example, Veenhoven 
(2001) and Graham et al. (2004), both find high levels of unhappiness on average 
among Russians. Similar to Namazie and Sanfey (2001), Graham et al. also fail to 
find a significant impact of education on happiness in most specifications, while a U-
shape does emerge with respect to age, but with a minimum around 47 years. 
Interestingly, however, the panel nature of the data allows the authors to identify 
tentatively a two-way causal effect between income and happiness. Senik (2002) 
identifies an important positive contribution to happiness by the relevant “reference” 
income. Another interesting finding is that the self-employed in Russia tend to be 
happier than employees, in contrast to evidence from Latin America (see Graham, 
2004). However, this finding is not replicated in Lelkes’s (2002) findings for 
Hungary.42 
 To sum up, there is a growing literature in the field of economics of happiness, 
yet more often than not the geographical coverage of these works is at best patchy. 
There are still too few papers focused on the systematic analysis of transition 
countries–possibly with the exception of Grün and Klasen (2005). While on the one 
hand a case-by-case in depth look at this issue, e.g. happiness in Russia, is certainly 
an instructive exercise, on the other hand, it lacks comparative rigour. Our 
contribution to this field aims to fill this gap insofar as the transition countries are 
concerned. We are, of course, constrained by the data availability concerns. 
However, at the time of the writing of the present paper, we have used the data with 
the largest coverage of transition countries (19) with the longest time span possible 
(from early 1990s to 2002 without compromising from the data comparability 
concerns, that is using the data coming from the same source.  
 Furthermore, the present study also benefits from the possibility of comparing 
and contrasting individuals’ experiences in the transition countries with those of the 
non-transition countries. As such, the present paper aims to shed light into the 
                                               
42
 The author has pointed out to us that a possible reason for this finding is a data problem, whereby 
many employees declare themselves as “self-employed” purely for tax purposes. Also, the well-being 
of the self-employed in Hungary appears, from the same research, to have increased over time. 
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similarities and differences between these two samples to arrive at a better 
understanding of the costs and opportunities related to the transition process from a 
command economy to market capitalism.  
 
4.3 Subjective Data on Life Satisfaction and Its Potential Uses  
4.3.1 In Defence of the Subjective Measures of Life Satisfaction:  
Given that there is a tendency among academics to take survey results with a grain 
of salt, the obvious question to ask at this stage is whether these subjective 
measures are any good. Do these responses tell us anything worthy of 
consideration? Are they informative about individuals’ life satisfaction, or are they 
simply noise?  
Layard (2005) gives compelling reasons as to why these data should be taken 
seriously. The reasons for scepticism about the validity of these data could be 
summarised under following headings:  
 
• Can people say with any confidence whether they are happy or not? In other 
words, given that happiness is an abstract concept for many, do people know 
when they are happy?  
Layard (2005, pp.12-13) introduces a simple, but effective reasoning to approach this 
issue. Unlike many other questions people tend to face in surveys of social and/or 
attitudinal nature, the response rate is very high in questions related to happiness in 
comparison to the response rate of an average survey question.  Hence, it is fair to 
conclude that the sheer scarcity of the "don’t know" answers in surveys is telling 
evidence that people do know how satisfied they are with their lives and how happy 
they are in any given moment.  
  
• Does everyone answering the questionnaires use the words in a similar way?  
If not, the replies to the specific questions on happiness cannot withstand the scrutiny 
of being crosschecked. Yet, there seems to be evidence to the contrary. First of all, in 
some cases friends and colleagues of a survey respondent have been asked 
separately about the happiness of the person in question. Similarly, in many cases, 
the interviewers are also asked to give a rating about the composure of the 
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respondent. These two aforementioned measures tend to correlate well with the 
survey questions on happiness. There is even more good news: People tend to 
answer similarly about their own happiness be it an interview, or a survey that they 
are asked to fill out on their own. Therefore, one of the main concerns, namely the 
impact of the survey environment on the accuracy of the replies, is reasonably 
addressed in this point, (Diener and Suh 1999; Layard 2005, p.14).   
 
• Semantic issues related to the concept of happiness 
There are several ways to ask about people’s happiness level. Veenhoven (2000) 
investigates this issue and reports that among the three possible ways of ranking 
countries based on how happy they are, how satisfied they are and how they would 
rate their lives using a scale from worst to the best possible life, the ranking stays the 
same in broad terms. This is the first piece of evidence that proves the point that all 
three measures actually relate to the very same concept.  
 
• Does the fact that the surveys are carried out in different languages play a role 
on the validity of the data?  
Sceptics might argue that given that the household surveys are translated to 
respondents’ mother tongues, there might be some discrepancies between 
languages concerning the meaning attached to the concepts of happiness and life 
satisfaction. Another way to put this question is to ask whether happiness/life 
satisfaction means the same thing in all languages. Fortunately, there is evidence 
leading us to believe that the answer to this question is likely to be affirmative. Two 
examples should suffice to illustrate the point. Shao (1993) investigates whether 
there are multi-linguistic differences in life satisfaction scores among a group of 
American and Chinese students. Chinese students in the sample are asked a 
question on happiness both in their mother tongue and in English with a two-week 
time lapse in between. Given the dissimilarity of the two languages, the results are 
reassuring: Their average reported happiness levels are almost exactly the same in 
both questions and the answers are highly correlated. The level of correlation is 
reported to be identical to the correlation between answering the same question 
twice in Chinese with a three-week time span in between.   
A further reassuring example comes from Layard (2005, p.34), where he draws 
attention to Switzerland, which is a remarkable case from the point of view of 
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linguistic differences. The majority of the population in Switzerland speaks French, 
German, or Italian. Nevertheless, people from these three different linguistic groups 
give similar answers to the happiness question. Furthermore, these groups 
consistently record higher levels of life satisfaction as opposed to people from the 
neighbouring countries speaking the same language. Hence, Layard argues that the 
happiness question reflects the way of life, and certainly not the impact of the 
language.   
 
4.3.2 The Link to the Standard Economic Theory  
Before proceeding to introduce the data used in the study in more detail, we will 
elaborate in this section on the links between economic theory and the present study 
so as to emphasise its value added. With this aim in mind, we should focus on the 
links between the model of life satisfaction we are proposing here with the standard 
economic theory of utility.  
The two approaches to utility would be to attempt to measure it cardinally, or 
ordinally. Initially, classical economists (or the Utilitarians) viewed the concept of 
utility as something that had content, and thus something that can be measured. The 
key influence to this line of thinking was Bentham (1789) and Edgeworth (1881). The 
latter went so far as to introduce the idea of a hedonometer to measure utility. The 
basic idea was to maximise a utility function of the cardinal form, yet the 
measurement issue was never resolved clearly.     
However, the theory has taken a shift towards the ordinal utility concept since 
1930s in what is now called the new welfare economics. The leading figure of this 
revolutionary movement was Lionel Robbins (1932), whose critique was based on 
the idea that inter-personal utility comparisons are without content, and thus should 
be abandoned. He was convinced that utility could not be measured in a cardinal 
sense, but could be inferred from individuals’ choices.  
In response to Robbins’s critique, the welfare economics limited itself to the 
weak axiom of revealed preferences, which allowed it only to examine ordinal 
relations based on observed choices. The underlying idea is very simple. Assume 
that individuals’ true preferences are at the foundation of everything. Yet, these 
cannot be observed directly. What one can observe, however, are people’s choices. 
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Therefore, on the basis of observed behaviour, the economist could state that if good 
X is preferred to good Y, then the individual should be at least as well of under X as 
under Y. In other words, one can call this the theory of revealed preferences. 
Revealed preferences provide the theoretician with a useful concept in that these 
preferences can then be mapped into graphical representations in the form of 
individuals’ indifference curves.  
This way of approaching the problem made interpersonal comparisons of 
utility impossible, and diminished the set of acceptable welfare criteria to one, namely 
the Pareto criterion, since it does not rely on interpersonal comparisons. The Pareto 
criterion is an ultimate simplification of real life situations, because in many case it is 
not straightforward to assign Pareto superiority to each and every resource allocation 
scheme, as some people are better off under X, and others under Y. In other words, 
reliance on the Pareto criterion has a fundamental problem. The presence of this 
fundamental problem was further emphasised by Sen (1982, 1984 and 1999) as well 
as the Impossibility Theorems of Kenneth Arrow, according to which a perfect 
aggregation from individual preferences to societal choice functions is impossible 
without violating the underlying assumptions of rationality and fairness.43  
From a practical point of view, however, economists have always been willing 
to make inter-personal comparisons and to assume cardinal utility functions. These 
are typically defined as a function of income and consumption in standard economic 
practice. Consequently, a crude measure such as GDP per capita is often treated as 
a measure of welfare. Grün and Klasen (2001 and 2003) convincingly argue that the 
treatment of measures like real per capita income as valid measures of welfare 
comparisons requires a set of very strict assumptions. Such an approach would 
require every individual to have identical and unchanging cardinal utility functions and 
that income (or consumption) to enter this utility function linearly. An improvement 
over this approach is to relax the linear utility function in favour of a concave one, yet 
at the cost of requiring every individual to earn the per capita income and to consume 
                                               
43
 Arrow’s theorem has two versions and its most famous application is to voting schemes. In one 
version, fairness of a voting mechanism is guaranteed by the assumptions of universality, non-
dictatorships, non-imposition, monotonicity of preferences and independence of irrelevant alternatives. 
In the second version, Pareto efficiency is assumed instead of the assumption of monotonicity. In both 
cases, it is impossible to come up with a societal choice function/preference ordering satisfying all 
these conditions simultaneously. For details, See Arrow (1950 and 1951). 
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the mean commodity bundle.44 Alternatively, the Samuelson approach would take an 
individualistic methodology arriving at social welfare by aggregation from the 
individual welfare, which is, in turn, based on the revealed preferences approach 
described earlier. However, this approach is also based on restrictive assumptions in 
that among others it requires individuals’ preferences to be complete, convex and 
monotonically increasing.45  
The point of the flourishing economics of happiness research in the context 
described above is to attempt to measure utility directly rather than equating utility to 
income or consumption. This certainly does not solve what has been called a 
fundamental problem in the discussion above. However, this strand of research is 
likely to yield supplementary –maybe even superior- information about well-being 
than a strict reliance on incomes. Furthermore, in the approach that is taken in this 
paper, by using an ordered probit model of life satisfaction, we are also relaxing the 
assumption of full cardinal comparability, which is inherent to an approach that relies 
on income as the welfare measure.46   
Based on the discussion outlined above, one could also read the present 
paper as an empirical inquiry related to the concept of utility. To do this, it suffices to 
treat our dependent variable –life satisfaction/happiness- as a proxy for an indirect 
utility function, and the ordered probit model employed could, in this case, yield what 
should be included in a utility function –on the basis of stated (subjective) as opposed 
to revealed preferences.47  
Before concluding the theoretical discussion, a final remark on the potential 
uses of the research in economics of happiness would be well-placed. Layard (2005, 
p.132) suggests that the results of this research agenda could well be applied in a 
modified cost-benefit analysis whereby the extent to which money matters for 
particular groups is taken into account and corresponding weights are given to the 
amounts of compensations. Similarly, particular weights could be attached to 
                                               
44
 This approach is explained in detail in Sen (1984).  
45
 For further details, see Samuelson (1947), for a critical overview see Grün and Klasen (2001).  
46
 It must be noted in passing that this approach advocated in the economics of happiness research 
agenda is in stark contrast to Friedman (1953) critique, which is seen as a manifesto of the positivist 
methodology of economics. Accordingly, economists should study how people behave, not what they 
say. For a discussion of the shortcomings of this approach and an in-depth discussion of what 
economics can learn from the happiness research, see Frey and Stutzer (2002a, pp.171-184). 
47
 Our theoretical interpretation is in accordance with Kahnemann et al. (1997), which can be seen as 
a strong axiomatic defence of the concept of experienced utility and its use in economics.   
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changes affecting the well-being of the most miserable groups in the society. 
Following this train of thought, one could easily discern the potential benefits from 
research on happiness, which could lead to substantive modifications in well-known 
economic concepts such as the Coasean bargaining, commons problem, contract 
theory etc. These are areas which will not be pursued for the purposes of this paper.  
 
4.4 The Data Used in the Study  
All of the micro data used in the present paper comes from the integrated data set of 
World Values Survey and European Values Survey (WVS-EVS, or WVS for short).48 
These surveys are a major multi-country effort to gain insight into people’s basic 
values and attitudes across a broad range of issues, including politics and economics, 
family and religious values, gender issues and environmental awareness. The WVS 
has been implemented in four waves so far: (i) 1981-84, (ii) 1990-93, (iii) 1995-97, 
and (iv) 1999-2002. The first wave covered only 24 societies.49 The sample grew with 
the second wave which covered 43 societies. The third and the fourth waves covered 
62 and 82 societies respectively. Thus, the latest wave of the WVS covers countries 
that together account for about 85 per cent of the world’s population. This section 
and the following section focus on wave four only, which includes 19 transition 
countries (see Annex), while section 5 considers evidence from the earlier waves. 
For our purposes, the key question from the WVS is the following, to which 
respondents were asked to mark their answers on a scale from 1 (most dissatisfied) 
to 10 (most satisfied):  
“All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?”50 
WVS also includes a question on life satisfaction. However, in the light of the 
discussion presented in section 4.3.1., we choose to base all our analysis using this 
                                               
48
 European and World Values Surveys are carried out by two separate groups of researchers, and 
are integrated in a data file for research purposes to ensure cross-national and across-time 
comparisons.  
49
 The common units of analysis in this dataset are countries. However, societies in this context are 
introduced as a broader concept, since occasionally some samples, which are regionally rather than 
nationally representative are also surveyed. For example, Andalucia, Basque Country, Galicia, and 
Valencia as well as a national representative sample for Spain were surveyed in wave three. For our 
practical purposes, only sovereign countries were included in the econometric analyses.   
50
 Our choice of dependent variable is justified both by the fact that this variable is the most widely 
used dependent variable in the economics of happiness literature, and also by the discussion above, 
where we refer to consistency all across the board between different ways of collecting data on life 
satisfaction.  
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question as a dependent variable. This approach is further supported by 
Blanchflower and Oswald (2004), which argues that the estimated life satisfaction 
and happiness equations have almost identical form. Hence, our results could be 
generalised in this context, and the terms happiness and life satisfaction will be used 
interchangeably for the purposes of the present study.   
The answers vary widely both within and across countries. Figure 4.2 
considers the cross-country variation. It shows the mean score, by country, of the 
responses and compares it with a measure of objective well-being, namely GDP per 
capita (in current international dollars) adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP). 
Since the fourth wave of the WVS-EVS was carried out over a three-year interval 
between 1999 and 2002, we tracked the exact timing of the survey implementation 
for each country, and assumed a one-year lag in GDP per capita figures in relation to 
the time of the survey. That is, if the survey was implemented in country X in 2001, 
then we compare it with the GDP per capita (PPP-adjusted) of country X in 2000.  
The evidence in Figure 4.2 shows the expected positive relationship between 
GDP per capita and self-reported satisfaction; though the link between the two 
appears to tail off at higher levels of GDP per capita. In fact, a simple quadratic trend 
fits the relation quite well, with a significant correlation of 0.74 between the two series. 
Interestingly, most transition countries fall below this trend, with only Croatia, the 
Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic (three of the most advanced countries in 
the region) lying above the trend.51 That is, people in most transition countries tend to 
report lower levels of satisfaction than would be predicted by a quadratic regression 
of satisfaction on GDP per capita. This is the first bit of evidence from the latest wave 
of the WVS of the difficulties faced by individuals in the region. 
                                               
51
 With the exception of Serbia and Montenegro, which has been treated as two separate entities by 
the WVS. However, comparable macroeconomic data on GDP per capita for this country were not 
available at this level of disaggregation.     
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Source: WVS and World Development Indicators. 
 
Table 4.1 contains a more detailed examination of where transition countries stand in 
relation to other countries. The table shows that four countries in the region – 
Moldova, Ukraine, Russia and Belarus – are in the bottom decile in terms of 
satisfaction scores. Two of the Baltic states – Latvia and Lithuania – are in the next-
to-bottom category, along with Albania, FYR Macedonia and Romania. In general, 
the new EU members score much better, with Slovenia (the richest country in the 
region in terms of GDP per capita) in the 70-80 decile and the Czech Republic in the 
60-70 category. Slovenia’s score of 7.23 puts it above France (7.01) and not far off 
from Great Britain and Germany (7.40 and 7.42 respectively) in terms of life 
satisfaction.  
Another way of comparing subjective measures of satisfaction with objective 
economic circumstances is to compare the responses to the question above with 
cumulative growth over the transition period (see Figure 4.3). People’s assessments 
of their well-being are often influenced by their economic situation relative to what it 
used to be, rather than by the absolute standard of living. Indeed, this is one of the 
reasons why the link between GDP and happiness is much weaker once countries 
manage to rise to a point of reasonable prosperity. All transition countries suffered 
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deep recessions in the early years of transition, though the duration and extent of the 
decline in real output varied widely from one country to the next. As Figure 4.3 shows, 
there is indeed a positive correlation between two variables: life satisfaction (on the 
y-axis), and an index of real GDP that takes the value of 100 for all countries in 1989 
(on the x-axis). The correlation coefficient between the two variables is 0.54. The fact 
that this correlation is somewhat weaker than the correlation in Figure 4.2 and that 
there is considerable variation across countries suggests that many other factors are 
possibly driving the responses to this question. The next section, therefore, uses 
econometric techniques to investigate more deeply the correlates of life satisfaction. 
Table 4.1: Average life satisfaction scores and percentiles by country 
Lowest percentiles Country Life satisfaction 
Moldova 4.56 
Ukraine  4.56 
Russia 4.65 
0-10 
Belarus 4.81 
FYR Macedonia 5.12 
Albania 5.17 
Lithuania 5.20 
Romania 5.23 
10-20 
Latvia 5.27 
Bulgaria 5.50 
Serbia 5.62 20-30 
Montenegro 5.64 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 5.77 
Hungary 5.80 
Estonia 5.93 
30-40 
Slovak Republic 6.03 
40-50 Poland 6.20 
50-60 Croatia 6.68 
60-70 Czech Republic 7.06 
70-80 Slovenia 7.23 
Note: The table shows the average satisfaction score by country, and the corresponding decile into 
which each country falls. Source: WVS Wave 4. 
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Source: WVS and EBRD. 
 
4.5 Econometric Specification and Results 
So far, this paper has looked at aggregate satisfaction scores across countries and 
their relationship with GDP. However, in order to derive a better understanding of 
what drives people’s responses to this question, we estimate a series of 
microeconometric equations. Our hypothesis is that self-reported satisfaction scores 
are a function both of individual-specific and economy-wide variables. We, therefore, 
estimate the following equation: 
Sij = f(Xij, Zj,  ij),        (4.1) 
where Sij is a vector of satisfaction scores (on a scale of 1 to 10) of individual i in 
country j, Xij is a matrix of explanatory variables that vary across individual and 
country, Zj is a matrix of macroeconomic variables that vary by country only, and  ij is 
a vector of idiosyncratic errors.  
In line with much of the previous literature, we include the following 
microeconomic variables (all of which are taken from the WVS): gender, marital 
status, income group, employment status, education, and age variables. Marital 
status is divided into married, living together, divorced, separated, widowed, and 
single. Income group is divided into three dummy variables: lower income, middle 
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income and higher income groups. 52  The breakdown of the employment status 
variable is as follows: full-time (30 hours a week and more), part-time (less than 30 
hours a week), self-employed, retired, housewife, student, unemployed and other. 
The education variable is split into: inadequately completed elementary education, 
completed (compulsory) primary education, incomplete secondary education 
(technical, vocational type), complete secondary school (technical, vocational type), 
incomplete secondary school (university preparatory type), complete secondary 
school (university preparatory type), some university education without degree, and 
finally university education with degree.  
 The macroeconomic variables in equation (1) include GDP per capita (PPP-
adjusted), the unemployment rate, the inflation rate and the Gini coefficient, which 
captures the impact of income inequality on satisfaction. In addition, the state of 
reform may also be relevant for happiness in transition countries. We, therefore, 
include the average transition score for each country, as measured by the EBRD 
transition indicators.53 It is unclear a priori what the sign of this variable may be. On 
the one hand, progress in transition is generally associated with better economic 
performance, and hence a higher degree of satisfaction. On the other hand, transition 
is a time of upheaval and disruption, and it is possible that people in countries that 
lag behind in transition are (other things being equal) happier for that reason. We 
also experiment by dividing this variable into initial-phase reforms, which capture 
progress in price liberalisation, foreign exchange and trade liberalisation and small-
scale privatisation, and second-phase reforms, which include large-scale privatisation, 
governance and enterprise restructuring, competition policy, infrastructure, banking 
and interest rate liberalisation, and non-bank financial institutions (see the data 
Annex for more details).  
                                               
52
 Although the survey included questions on the actual household income, we have opted against 
using them for the simple reason that these were not adjusted for the purchasing power parity. In other 
words, the value of having 1 US dollar was not the same across countries. We have used another 
question which was asking the respondents to choose between lower, middle and higher income 
groups, which implicitly assumes that the income distribution, price levels and all the other relevant 
factors were taken into account in the respondents’ answers.   
53
 The transition indicators range from 1 (little or no progress in reform) to 4+ (standards of an 
advanced industrialised economy). When calculating averages, pluses and minuses are converted to 
numerical equivalents by adding or subtracting 0.33 (e.g., 2+ becomes 2.33 and 3- is 2.67). See the 
EBRD Transition Report, various issues, for a full description of the methodology underlying these 
scores. 
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 Up to now, we have for convenience treated our dependent variable – life 
satisfaction – as a cardinal measure when taking within-country averages and 
comparing across countries. However, there is no presumption that the difference 
between a score of 4 and 5, for example, is the same as that between 5 and 6. 
Therefore, in line with most of the recent literature, we treat this variable in our 
estimation procedure as ordinal and estimate equation (1) by an ordered probit 
model, rather than by ordinary least squares. In the discussion that follows, a positive 
(and statistically significant) coefficient on an explanatory variable indicates a positive 
association with life satisfaction, in the sense that it increases the probability of being 
in the highest category (satisfaction = 10) and decreases the probability of recording 
the lowest score (satisfaction = 1).54  
 Table 4.2 presents the results of the ordered probit regressions55 for the whole 
sample, the transition countries sample and the non-transition countries sample, 
respectively in columns one to three. Our initial approach is to capture country-
specific fixed effects by adding country dummies, rather than including the 
macroeconomic variables discussed above. We also include employment status, 
marital status, education, income group, age and age squared, all of which have 
been shown elsewhere to be important determinants of life satisfaction.  
 Turning first to column 1 of Table 4.2, which includes both transition and non-
transition countries, many of the results parallel those of other cross-country studies. 
For example, most categories of employment status are associated with lower values 
of satisfaction relative to full-time employment (the omitted category in the 
regression). Unemployment has a particularly negative effect on satisfaction; other 
things being equal, being unemployed rather than full-time employed raises the 
probability of recording the lowest level of satisfaction by approximately three 
percentage points. Satisfaction tends to rise with educational status, particularly at 
high levels of education, and with income, while being married is associated with 
more satisfaction than other types of living arrangements. Finally, the data exhibit the 
                                               
54
 The effect on the probability of being in the intermediate categories cannot be determined solely by 
looking at the value of the coefficient. 
55
 Ordered probit was selected as the appropriate strategy for the regressions not only because of the 
nature of the dependent variable, but also due to theoretical considerations related relaxing the full 
cardinal comparability assumption in comparisons of well-being as discussed in section 4.3.2. 
However, as a robustness check we have rerun all the regressions systematically with OLS. Overall 
the same conclusions hold, and in some cases the results highlighted in the text are strengthened 
using OLS regressions.  
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familiar U-shape pattern with regard to age, with a minimum point at around age 46, 
and show males are less happy than females, a finding that appears in several other 
studies.56 The country dummies for transition countries (not reported in the table) are 
almost all negative and statistically significant relative to the reference country, 
Germany. 
Columns 2 and 3 report the results from the same regression model for 
transition and non-transition countries respectively. A quick glance at the results 
shows a large number of similarities between the two sub-groups, but also some 
important differences. It is the latter that are of most interest here. Turning first to 
employment status highlights one of the most interesting results: self-employment in 
transition countries is positively (and statistically significant at 10 per cent) associated 
with satisfaction, whereas the sign is reversed in the non-transition case. There is 
evidence from previous research that, for those willing to take the risk, self-
employment is a successful coping strategy in transition (see, for example, EBRD, 
2000, Chapter 5, and Dutz et al., 2004).57 The results in column 2 are an interesting 
complement to this earlier research, and highlight the importance of further 
developing entrepreneurship in the transition context. 
 A second interesting contrast between the two samples concerns the effects 
of education. In both cases, education is positively correlated with higher life 
satisfaction, but in the transition sample this effect becomes particularly significant at 
higher levels of education. In the transition context, many skills acquired under the 
old regime became redundant once transition started, but the value of having a 
relatively high degree of education may have increased in the more difficult 
environment. This may help to explain why there is little difference in the satisfaction 
scores at low levels of education but a positive effect at higher levels. 
 A third result of interest concerns the effects of age. In both cases, we find the 
usual U-shape effect, but the minimum age, after which the curve slopes upwards, 
comes significantly later in life for those in the transition sample (52.2) as opposed to 
those elsewhere (44.8).58 In general, older people in transition countries have found it 
                                               
56
 Clark (1997), for example, finds that women are significantly happier than men in the workplace. 
57
 The self-employed may also find it easier to conceal part or all of their employment income, and this 
may also help to explain their relatively high scores on satisfaction. 
58
 We have experimented with replacing the quadratic age term by dummies for age intervals (20-29, 
30-39, etc.) and the same broad conclusions hold. 
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harder to cope with the changes brought by transition, perhaps because they have 
lost jobs and have little hope of finding new ones, and this may lie behind this 
difference. However, the significance of the results related to the age variable should 
not be taken too literally. A word of caution is due at this stage, since sample 
selection issues are likely to play a role here. Given that the unhappy people tend to 
die earlier (for instance through means like suicide), only relatively happier and old 
people are left in the sample. Although this would bias our estimates of the age 
variable, there is no reason to expect this bias to differ systematically in the non-
transition case. Hence, it should be emphasised that even in the presence of a 
potential sample selection bias –affecting both samples equally-, the turning point in 
the transition sample comes much later.  
Finally, the effect of gender is different in the two sub-samples. While males 
continue to be less happy than females in the non-transition case, the correlation is 
much weaker in the transition sample, and statistically significant only at the 10 per 
cent level.59 Nevertheless, we have explored whether the results in the transition 
region change significantly when the sample is split between males and females. By 
and large, the main conclusions hold.60 
The pattern that emerges from the estimates of the country dummies included 
in the regressions requires further explanation. First of all, when the regressions are 
run for the whole sample in column 1 of Table 4.2, all the dummies for the transition 
countries are negative and significant at 1% level with the single exception of 
Slovenia, which is negative, but only significant at 10%. In other words, living in 
transition countries (as opposed to Germany, the reference category) reduces the 
probability of reporting the highest happiness levels. In the second column of the 
same table, we restrict the sample to transition countries only and run the 
regressions again with fixed effects, yet this time the reference category is the 
Russian Federation. The results are more varied in this case. The dummies for the 
majority of transition countries in our sample are positive and significant at 1% level 
                                               
59
 Part of the explanation for this result is that, in many transition countries, the relative status of 
women appears to have worsened during transition. Klasen (1993) is an early contribution to this 
literature where women are identified as the relative losers of transition. Our results are not 
necessarily in contradiction to Klasen’s interpretation. In our regressions, women appear over and 
over as the happier gender in both the overall sample and the non-transition countries sample. Yet, 
when it comes to the transition sample, the male dummy loses its significance, meaning that in our 
regressions women are losers relative to their counterparts elsewhere in the world.  
60
 These results are reported in the appendix. 
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with the exception of Belarus and FYR Macedonia, which are both positive, yet 
significant at 5% level. This means that living in transition countries other than the 
Russian Federation increases the probability of reporting the highest satisfaction 
levels (with respect to living in the aforementioned reference country). However, this 
result does not hold for the case of Ukraine. The dummy for Ukraine is still negative 
(as was in column 1), but no longer significant at the conventional levels.  
 
Table 4.2: Satisfaction equations (WVS wave four) 
  
(1): Whole 
sample   
(2): Transition 
countries   
(3): Non-transition 
countries   
Employment status       
Part-time  -0.038 *** 0.037   -0.057 *** 
  0.015   0.033   0.016   
Self-employed -0.023 * 0.075 ** -0.045 *** 
  0.014   0.035   0.015   
Retired  -0.035 ** -0.031   0.025   
  0.016   0.029   0.020   
Housewife  0.037 *** 0.024   0.019   
  0.014   0.036   0.016   
Student  -0.015   0.077 * -0.035 * 
  0.017   0.040   0.018   
Unemployed  -0.264 *** -0.266 *** -0.266 *** 
  0.015   0.027   0.018   
Other  -0.076 *** 0.033   -0.117 *** 
  0.027   0.065   0.029   
Education          
Completed primary  0.041 *** 0.021   0.061 *** 
  0.016   0.041   0.017   
Incomplete secondary 
(technical) 0.082 *** 0.090 ** 0.108 *** 
  0.018   0.045   0.020   
Completed secondary 
(technical) 0.075 *** 0.116 *** 0.091 *** 
  0.016   0.042   0.018   
Incomplete secondary 
(uniprep) 0.040 ** 0.071   0.062 *** 
  0.018   0.046   0.020   
Completed secondary 
(uniprep) 0.100 *** 0.157 *** 0.094 *** 
  0.016   0.041   0.018   
University. w/o degree 0.132 *** 0.272 *** 0.127 *** 
  0.019   0.053   0.020   
   University w/ degree  0.157 *** 0.321 *** 0.116 *** 
  0.017   0.043   0.019   
Marital status          
Live together -0.082 *** -0.152   -0.082 *** 
  0.025   0.125   0.026   
Divorced -0.234 *** -0.261 *** -0.216 *** 
  0.018   0.030   0.024   
Separated  -0.320 *** -0.274 *** -0.330 *** 
  0.033   0.079   0.037   
Widowed -0.227 *** -0.200 *** -0.213 *** 
  0.018   0.029   0.023   
Single -0.148 *** -0.129 *** -0.147 *** 
  0.012   0.026   0.013   
Div, sep or wid -0.264 *** -   -0.316 *** 
  0.098   -   0.098   
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Table 4.2: Satisfaction equations (WVS wave four) 
  
(1): Whole 
sample   
(2): Transition 
countries   
(3): Non-transition 
countries   
Income group          
Middle income 0.199 *** 0.191 *** 0.199 *** 
  0.009   0.019   0.011   
Higher income 0.395 *** 0.455 *** 0.367 *** 
  0.010   0.021   0.012   
Age -0.030 *** -0.040 *** -0.026 *** 
  0.002   0.003   0.002   
Age–squared (x103) 0.317 *** 0.385 *** 0.289 *** 
  0.018   0.036   0.020   
Male dummy -0.058 *** -0.028  * -0.077 *** 
  0.008   0.015   0.010   
Number of observations 80,677   20,256   60,421   
Pseudo-R2 0.055   0.042   0.051   
Minimum age 46.9   52.2   44.8   
Notes: Ordered probit regressions with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and country fixed 
effects. Omitted country variable is Germany for columns 1 and 3, and Russia for column 2. For other 
omitted dummy variables (reference categories), see data annex. Source: WVS.  
 
So far, we have restricted ourselves to analysing the individual-specific correlates of 
satisfaction, while country-specific differences have been absorbed in the country 
dummy variables. We now investigate whether important effects are coming through 
from macroeconomic variables, and we include these in the regression in place of the 
country dummies. Table 4.3 reports the results, again for the whole sample, the 
transition and the non-transition countries respectively, with four macro variables: 
GDP growth; the unemployment rate; end-year inflation; and the Gini coefficient (to 
capture income inequality).61   
 Turning first to the full sample, per capita GDP has the expected positive 
impact on the probability of happiness. Somewhat surprisingly, the Gini coefficient 
also has a positive sign, contradicting the a priori expectation that people dislike 
inequality. Neither unemployment nor inflation has a statistically significant impact on 
happiness. Interestingly, the effects of gender and education are now much weaker 
relative to the previous results. 
 
                                               
61
 A technical problem arises when variables on the right-hand side of the equation are at a higher 
level of aggregation than the left-hand side variable, namely, that the standard errors are biased 
downwards, and hence the degree of statistical significance may be exaggerated. Intuitively, this is 
because these variables have a small number of independent observations relative to the size of the 
sample. We control for this by a “clustering” option that relaxes the assumption that the errors are 
independent across observations, replacing it with the assumption of independence across clusters. 
This leads to wider standard errors and more valid statistical inference. The method was suggested by 
Rogers (1993) as a generalisation of Huber (1967).  
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Table 4.3: Satisfaction equations with macroeconomic variables 
 (1): Whole sample  
(2): Transition 
countries  
(3): Non-transition 
countries   
GDP per capita (x103) 0.038 *** 0.089 *** 0.029 *** 
  0.005   0.013   0.005   
Unemployment -0.003   0.001   -0.003   
  0.006   0.004   0.006   
Inflation (x103) -0.011   0.052 *** -3.286 *** 
  0.027   0.017   1.263   
Gini coefficient 0.018 *** -0.012 ** 0.023 *** 
  0.007   0.005   0.006   
Employment status          
Part-time  -0.055 * 0.019   -0.076 * 
  0.033   0.045   0.032   
Self-employed 0.025   0.067   -0.054 ** 
  0.052   0.044   0.024   
Retired  -0.133 *** -0.062 ** -0.014 ** 
  0.039   0.028   0.035   
Housewife  0.028   0.082   -0.075   
  0.063   0.055   0.064   
Student  0.006   0.126 *** -0.050   
  0.043   0.043   0.037   
Unemployed  -0.273 *** -0.276 *** -0.287 *** 
  0.053   0.049   0.059   
Other  -0.049   -0.042   -0.160 ** 
  0.056   0.091   0.069   
Education          
Complete primary  0.052   0.022   0.111 ** 
  0.044   0.062   0.054   
Incomplete secondary 
(technical) 0.055   0.015   0.167 *** 
  0.065   0.099   0.062   
Complete. secondary 
(technical) -0.016   0.081   0.101 ** 
  0.071   0.081   0.051   
Incomplete secondary 
(uniprep) -0.005   -0.019   0.168 ** 
  0.093   0.101   0.073   
Complete secondary 
(uniprep) 0.003   0.069   0.102 * 
  0.066   0.087   0.057   
University w/o degree 0.135 ** 0.238 ** 0.182 * 
  0.061   0.104   0.063   
    University w/ degree  0.054   0.260 *** 0.112 * 
  0.062   0.081   0.060   
Marital status          
Live together 0.280 * 0.144 *** 0.172   
  0.166   0.053   0.141   
Divorced -0.262 *** -0.271 *** -0.119 *** 
  0.054   0.034   0.045   
Separated  -0.215 *** -0.265 * -0.222 * 
  0.061   0.155   0.059   
Widowed -0.237 *** -0.222 *** -0.144 *** 
  0.044   0.037   0.045   
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Table 4.3: Satisfaction equations with macroeconomic variables 
 (1): Whole sample  
(2): Transition 
countries  
(3): Non-transition 
countries   
Single -0.104 *** -0.091 *** -0.139 *** 
  0.033   0.026   0.037   
Income group          
Middle income 0.201 *** 0.194 *** 0.189 *** 
  0.028   0.053   0.035   
Higher income 0.376 *** 0.423 *** 0.333 *** 
  0.057   0.078   0.075   
Age -0.027 *** -0.037 *** -0.025 *** 
  0.004   0.005   0.005   
Age –squared (x103) 0.294 *** 0.346 *** 0.306 *** 
  0.045   0.057   0.057   
Male dummy -0.041   -0.018   -0.101 ** 
  0.032   0.030   0.019   
Number of observations 47,936   14,394   33,542   
Pseudo-R2 0.034   0.036   0.03   
Minimum age 45.7   53.8   41.1   
Note: See Table 4.2 and the data annex for variable description and reference categories. All 
regressions are carried out using a “clustering” option to control for downward bias of standard errors 
in the presence of macroeconomic variables. Sources: WVS and World Development Indicators. 
 
In the transition sub-sample (column 2), several results are worth highlighting. One 
surprising result is the positive (and statistically significant) association between 
inflation and satisfaction. It is difficult to think of a good rationale for this, as the 
evidence from advanced countries is that inflation is generally disliked and has a 
negative effect on happiness.62 It is possible that inflation is correlated with wealth-
distribution effects that, in net terms, have a positive effect on transition. Or low 
inflation may be associated with fiscal austerity and cutbacks in essential services. In 
other words, inflation might appear a lesser evil compared to the alternative of 
curbing it, which could be costly , especially in terms of unemployment, in the short 
term.  
A second point is the strong negative effect of inequality on satisfaction (in 
contrast to the positive association in the non-transition case), suggesting a lingering 
dislike of inequality that was characteristic of socialist systems.63 Finally, the positive 
                                               
62
 See, for example, di Tella et al. (2001). 
63
 Senik (2004) investigates this issue for Russia, using five years of panel data, and finds no relation 
between regional Gini coefficients and life satisfaction. A positive relation between the two variables, 
using British household panel data, is found in Clark (2004), which also provides a brief survey of 
other investigations into this question. In the context of transition, the Gini coefficient might also be 
partially capturing effects of the stark fall in income. In fact, when changes in income are controlled for, 
the Gini coefficient continues to be negative in transition, but loses its significance. This is expected, 
since the two variables are closely correlated. The positive and significant sign on this coefficient 
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coefficient on self-employment found earlier remains in this case, but the statistical 
significance falls just short of conventional (10 per cent) levels. 
Table 4.4 presents a further set of results based on the transition sample only. 
We now include not only the macro variables from the previous table, but also a 
reform indicator – the EBRD transition indicator described earlier. Column 1 suggests 
that this variable adds little to the explanatory power of the equation; the variable has 
a positive sign but is highly insignificant. However, this variable has a very close 
correlation (0.70) with GDP per capita, and it is likely that significant multicollinearity 
is present. Column 2 shows some evidence in this direction. Once we leave GDP per 
capita out of the regression, the EBRD Reform variable immediately assumes a 
positive sign and a significance level at 1 per cent. Other things being equal, the 
results of column 2 suggest that living in a country with an advanced level of 
transition (EBRD = 3.52, similar to Czech Republic) rather than a low-transition 
country (EBRD = 1.5, Belarus) has a substantial effect on the probability of recording 
the highest level of satisfaction.  
To explore this issue further, we experiment in columns 3 and 4 by introducing 
initial- and second-phase reforms separately with GDP per capita. The results 
provide some support for the positive role of initial-phase reforms, as this variable is 
positive and statistically significant (at 10 per cent), in the presence of GDP per 
capita in the regression. Second-phase reforms have a negative sign but the 
coefficient is not statistically significant. Finally, in column 5, we introduce all of the 
aforementioned variables simultaneously, and the same conclusions hold.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
survives in the non-transition sample, however. To investigate into the reasons of this requires further 
research. For the purposes of this study, suffice it to say that the impact of inequality is systematically 
different in transition countries compared to non-transition countries.  
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Table 4.4: Satisfaction equations with macroeconomic and reform variables 
Transition Sample 
   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   
GDP per capita (x103) 0.085 *** -   0.081 *** 0.090 *** 0.094 *** 
  0.015   -   0.012   0.016   0.011   
Unemployment 0.000   -0.012   -0.004   0.001   -0.013   
  0.005   0.009   0.006   0.004   0.010   
Inflation (x103) 0.053   0.036   0.057 *** 0.052 *** 0.063 *** 
  0.016   0.023   0.016   0.017   0.016   
Gini coefficient -0.012 ** -0.013 ** -0.010 ** -0.012 ** -0.006 *** 
  0.005   0.006   0.005   0.005   0.005   
EBRD Reform 0.038   0.357 *** -   -   -   
  0.083   0.094   -   -   -   
EBRD1-Initial Phase Reform -   -   0.081 * -   0.227 * 
  -   -   0.048   -   0.129   
EBRD2-Second Phase Reform -   -   -   -0.004   -0.239   
  -   -       0.112   0.191   
Employment status                
Part-time  0.019   -0.038   0.020   0.019   0.023   
  0.045   0.052   0.045   0.045   0.046   
Self-employed 0.068   0.022   0.066   0.067   0.059   
  0.043   0.057   0.043   0.043   0.040   
Retired  -0.064 ** -0.084 *** -0.067 ** -0.062 ** -0.067 ** 
  0.029   0.026   0.027   0.030   0.029   
Housewife  0.078   0.002   0.068   0.082   0.054   
  0.058   0.075   0.056   0.057   0.051   
Student  0.123 *** 0.073 ** 0.116 *** 0.126 *** 0.108 ** 
  0.043   0.043   0.042   0.043   0.042   
Unemployed  -0.279 *** -0.331 *** -0.286 *** -0.276 *** -0.288 *** 
  0.050   0.043   0.049   0.050   0.049   
Other  -0.047   -0.074   -0.050   -0.042   -0.032   
  0.090   0.092   0.091   0.090   0.085   
Education                
Completed primary  0.025   0.096 * 0.036   0.022   0.052   
  0.058   0.051   0.059   0.060   0.065   
Incomplete secondary 
(technical) 0.012   0.020   0.022   0.016   0.072   
  0.095   0.090   0.095   0.094   0.091   
Completed secondary 
(technical) 0.085   0.132 * 0.093   0.080   0.093   
  0.076   0.080   0.077   0.076   0.070   
Incomplete secondary 
(uniprep) -0.008   0.085   0.012   -0.020   0.018   
  0.092   0.119   0.096   0.091   0.090   
Completed secondary 
(uniprep) 0.072   0.102   0.083   0.069   0.103   
  0.083   0.075   0.082   0.086   0.086   
University. w/o degree 0.239 ** 0.252 ** 0.243 ** 0.238 ** 0.250 ** 
  0.104   0.102   0.103   0.104   0.102   
    University w/ degree  0.264 *** 0.285 *** 0.275 *** 0.260 *** 0.288 *** 
  0.077   0.075   0.076   0.078   0.074   
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Table 4.4: Satisfaction equations with macroeconomic and reform variables 
Transition Sample 
   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   
Marital status                
Live together 0.131 ** -0.161   0.106   0.145 *** 0.099   
  0.062   0.135   0.067   0.056   0.068   
Divorced -0.271 *** -0.248 *** -0.268 *** -0.271 *** -0.257 *** 
  0.034   0.046   0.034   0.034   0.036   
Separated  -0.267 * -0.260 * -0.266 * -0.265 * -0.258 * 
  0.155   0.152   0.154   0.154   0.153   
Widowed -0.222 *** -0.220 *** -0.221 *** -0.222 *** -0.218 *** 
  0.037   0.042   0.038   0.037   0.037   
Single -0.091 *** -0.059 ** -0.092 *** -0.091 *** -0.096 *** 
  0.025   0.028   0.026   0.026   0.028   
Income group                
Middle income 0.193 *** 0.191 *** 0.192 *** 0.194 ** 0.197 *** 
  0.053   0.054   0.052   0.052   0.051   
Higher income 0.420 *** 0.403 *** 0.415 *** 0.423 *** 0.418 *** 
  0.079   0.083   0.078   0.079   0.080   
Age -0.037 *** -0.036 *** -0.038 *** -0.037 *** -0.039 *** 
  0.005   0.006   0.005   0.005   0.005   
Age -squared (x103) 0.347 *** 0.336 *** 0.352 *** 0.346 *** 0.361 *** 
  0.058   0.064   0.058   0.057   0.058   
Male dummy -0.019   -0.020   -0.020   -0.02   -0.02   
  0.030   0.033   0.030   0.03   0.03   
Number of observations 14,394   14,394   14,394   14,394   14,394   
Pseudo-R2 0.036   0.030   0.036   0.036   0.037   
Minimum age 53.8   53.9   53.8   53.8   53.6   
Note: See the notes to Table 4.2 and the data appendix for description of the variables. Sources: WVS, 
World Development Indicators, and EBRD (2004). 
 
4.6 Happiness through Time 
As noted earlier, the WVS was first carried out in the period 1981-84, and the 
analysis in this paper so far has focused on the fourth wave of the survey (1999-
2002). It would be of great interest to be able to compare our results for this latest 
wave with those based on earlier years, and indeed to carry out one large regression 
with both country and time dummies. This section explores this approach. 
Unfortunately, the sample of countries available is significantly smaller than when we 
focus on the fourth wave only. Furthermore, the first wave contains very few 
observations on the current transition countries. Hence, we focus on waves two 
through four in the remainder of this paper.64   
                                               
64
 Wave 2 of the survey was carried out in the early 1990s, hence right after the beginning of the 
transition period. Ideally, the benchmark should be a pre-transition data, which was untenable. Hence, 
Essays in Development and Transition Economics 
 112
 Table 4.5: Life Satisfaction through Time 
 
Wave 2 
(1990-93) 
Wave 3 
(1995-97) 
Wave 4 
(1999-2002) 
Bulgaria 5.03 4.66 5.50 
Belarus 5.52 4.35 4.81 
Estonia 6.00 5.00 5.93 
Latvia 5.70 4.90 5.27 
Lithuania 6.01 4.99 5.20 
Poland 6.64 6.42 6.20 
Russia 5.37 4.45 4.65 
Slovenia 6.29 6.46 7.23 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  - 5.46 5.77 
Croatia  - 6.18 6.68 
Czech Republic 6.37  - 7.06 
Hungary 6.03  - 5.80 
Romania 5.88  - 5.23 
Slovak Republic 6.15  - 6.03 
Ukraine  - 3.95 4.56 
Serbia  - 5.56 5.62 
Montenegro  - 6.21 5.64 
Albania  -  - 5.17 
Azerbaijan  - 5.39  - 
Armenia  - 4.32  - 
Georgia  - 4.65  - 
FYR Macedonia  -  - 4.56 
Moldova  - 3.73  - 
Notes: The table shows the average satisfaction score by country for each available wave of the WVS. 
Source: WVS (waves 2-4). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
we might be comparing the transition countries with an already lowered baseline. However, if one 
assumes that the pre-transition levels of happiness were higher on the average than the wave 2 
results reported here, the conclusions are only strengthened with a few caveats in the cases of 
Bulgaria and Slovenia, whose average scores in wave 4 are higher than those in wave 2.   
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Table 4.5 below shows the average transition score by country for each wave for 
which data are available. By focusing on those countries where three waves are 
available, there is clear evidence of a V-shape pattern of satisfaction through time 
(see also Figure 4.4, where we plot the pattern for countries with three data points 
available). That is, most countries saw a decline in their average score between 
waves two and three, but a recovery between waves three and four. In two cases 
(Bulgaria and Slovenia), the average score in wave four is above that recorded in 
wave two. 
 
 
Source: WVS (waves 2-4). 
 
Table 4.6 reports the results of a multi-wave two-way fixed effects regression, using 
countries for which data from waves two, three and four are available. Besides the 
country dummies, time dummies for waves three and four (with wave two being the 
reference category) are also included in this regression. Interestingly, these dummies 
are negative and significant in both the transition and non-transition sample, as well 
as in the overall sample. However, the wave three dummy is more negative than 
wave four in the transition case, in contrast to the non-transition sample where it is 
less negative. This suggests that there may be some convergence in scores, with 
Figure 4.4: 
Average Satisfaction Levels over Time 
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satisfaction levels in transition countries moving closer to those in non-transition 
countries. Other results are largely in line with those discussed earlier (from wave 
four only). In particular, the positive and statistically significant coefficient on self-
employment in transition holds for this multi-wave analysis, whereas it is negative 
and significant in the non-transition case. 
Table 4.6: Satisfaction equations with two way fixed effects 
  
(1): Whole 
sample 
 
(2): 
Transition 
countries  
(3): Non-
transition 
countries   
Wave 3 dummy -0.127 *** -0.308 *** -0.062 *** 
  0.011   0.023   0.013   
Wave 4 dummy -0.096 *** -0.167 *** -0.087 *** 
  0.012   0.024   0.013   
Employment status 
         
Part-time  -0.024 ** 0.049 ** -0.058 *** 
  0.011   0.020   0.013   
Self-employed -0.007   0.049 ** -0.031 *** 
  0.011   0.023   0.012   
Retired  -0.051 *** -0.039 * -0.001   
  0.012   0.021   0.016   
Housewife  0.051 *** 0.021   0.031 ** 
  0.011   0.024   0.012   
Student  -0.002   0.095 *** -0.030 ** 
  0.013   0.028   0.014   
Unemployed  -0.247 *** -0.222 *** -0.263 *** 
  0.011   0.019   0.014   
Other  -0.081 *** 0.017   -0.134 *** 
  0.020   0.038   0.024   
Education 
         
Completed primary  0.069 *** 0.046   0.086 *** 
  0.014   0.034   0.015   
Incomplete secondary 
(technical) 0.151 *** 0.111 *** 0.185 *** 
  0.014   0.035   0.016   
Completed secondary 
(technical) 0.149 *** 0.110 *** 0.177 *** 
  0.014   0.036   0.015   
Incomplete secondary 
(uniprep) 0.126 *** 0.186 *** 0.121 *** 
  0.014   0.036   0.016   
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Table 4.6: Satisfaction equations with two way fixed effects 
  
(1): Whole 
sample 
 
(2): 
Transition 
countries 
 
(3): Non-
transition 
countries   
Completed secondary (uniprep) 0.148 *** 0.123 *** 0.163 *** 
  0.014   0.035   0.016   
University w/o degree 0.175 *** 0.178 *** 0.201 *** 
  0.015   0.037   0.016   
    University w/ degree  0.227 *** 0.279 *** 0.213 *** 
  0.014   0.035   0.015   
Marital status 
         
Live together -0.137 *** -0.175 *** -0.126 *** 
  0.015   0.039   0.017   
Divorced -0.233 *** -0.250 *** -0.227 *** 
  0.014   0.022   0.018   
Separated  -0.333 ** -0.309 *** -0.343   
  0.024   0.050   0.028   
Widowed -0.217 *** -0.196 *** -0.203 *** 
  0.013   0.021   0.018   
Single -0.164 *** -0.114 ** -0.171 *** 
  0.009   0.018   0.010   
Div, sep or wid -0.248 ** n/a   -0.307 *** 
  0.097   n/s   0.096   
Income group 
         
Middle income 0.203 *** 0.241 *** 0.186 *** 
  0.007   0.013   0.008   
Higher income 0.376 *** 0.513 *** 0.321 *** 
  0.008   0.016   0.009   
Age -0.031 *** -0.039 *** -0.027 *** 
  0.001   0.002   0.001   
Age squared (x103) 0.33 *** 0.38 *** 0.30 *** 
  0.01   0.03   0.02   
Male dummy -0.039 *** -0.003 
  
-0.061 *** 
  0.006   0.011   0.008   
Number of observations 140,245   41,802   98,443   
Pseudo-R2 0.055   0.044   0.039   
Minimum age 46.9   52.2   44.3   
Notes: See Table 4.3.  
Source: WVS (waves 2-4). 
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4.7 Conclusion 
This paper is one of the first to analyse life satisfaction in a range of transition 
countries. The paper documents the deep dissatisfaction felt by many people in the 
region, even after a decade of transition. For most countries in our sample, even after 
a decade of transition, the average reported happiness levels are observed to be 
lagging behind their early 1990s levels. However, the overall picture has positive 
aspects too. In countries for which several time periods of evidence are available, life 
satisfaction appears to be rising on average, after dipping to its lowest point in the 
mid-1990s. Although, most countries have not caught up with their initial happiness 
levels, a reversal of the downward trend is detected in the data. More importantly, the 
level of happiness across countries is closely correlated with the progress made in 
transition, as well as with overall GDP per capita. Given that the region appears to be 
on a sustained growth path, and good progress continues to be made in transition 
(both trends highlighted in EBRD, 2004), life satisfaction is likely to rise further in 
transition countries. Thus, the answer to the question posed by this paper’s title – 
does transition make you happy? – is a mixed one. Clearly, for many people in this 
region, transition has been a difficult and painful experience. But it is also clear that 
people are generally happier in countries that have made more progress in transition 
than in those where transition has lagged.  
The results related to inequality are also worth emphasising. The transition 
countries display a strong inequality aversion, unlike in the non-transition context. It 
must be noted that throughout the transition process, the inequality rose dramatically 
from very low initial levels. This factual increase, coupled with a strong dislike for 
inequality, might be one of the explanatory factors as to why the people in transition 
countries report systematically lower average happiness levels than the predictions of 
a simple quadratic regression.  
 Finally, the analysis in this paper does not lend itself to strong policy 
conclusions. Nevertheless, several points are suggested by the analysis above. Two 
aspects are worth emphasising. First, it is important to have a renewed effort to 
improve the well-being of vulnerable groups. These include older people, whose skills 
are often irrelevant for the new challenges, and those with limited education. Second, 
entrepreneurship can be a rewarding strategy in transition. The paper has provided 
some tentative evidence that in the context of transition such people are, on average, 
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happier even than those with full-time jobs. This highlights the importance of creating 
an enabling business environment where new enterprises can be set up easily, and 
the provision of commercially-oriented micro-finance is further encouraged. 
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Appendix 
Table A4.1 Description of the Data Used in the Study 
Variable name Source Definition Descriptive 
statistics-Wave 4 
Life satisfaction World Values Survey-European 
Values Survey, Waves 2 to 4. 
“All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a 
whole these days?”  1 (most dissatisfied) - 10 (satisfied) 
 
Mean= 6.43 
Standard 
deviation=2.56 
EBRD transition 
indicators 
EBRD rating from 1 (no reform) to 
4+ (standards typical of market 
economies). For the purposes of this 
paper all “-“ and “+” scores were 
converted into decimal points by 
subtracting or adding 0.33 points. 
EBRD Reform is the simple average of reform ratings for all the 
nine transition indicators: price liberalisation, trade liberalisation, 
small-scale privatisation, large-scale privatisation, corporate 
governance and enterprise reform, competition policy, banking 
reform and interest rate liberalisation, securities markets and non-
bank financial institutions, and infrastructure. EBRD1 (Initial Phase 
Reforms) is an average of price liberalisation, foreign exchange 
and trade liberalisation and small-scale privatisation. EBRD2 is an 
average of the remaining six indicators. For details, see Transition 
Report 2004.  
Mean=2.92 
Standard 
deviation=.52 
GDP per capita World Development Indicators 2004 GDP per capita, PPP (current international US$) Mean=11,744 
Standard 
deviation=9,337 
Unemployment World Development Indicators 2004 Unemployment, total (% of total labour force) Mean=-10.60 
Standard 
deviation=7.35 
Gini coefficient World Development Indicators 2004 GINI index, measures inequality on a 0 (perfect equality) to 1 
(perfect inequality) basis.  
 
Mean=36.97 
Standard 
deviation=7.72 
Inflation World Development Indicators 2004 Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) Mean=45.96 
Standard 
deviation=317.87 
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Employment status World Values Survey-European 
Values Survey,  Waves 2 to 4. 
“Are you employed now?” Reference category: full time 
employment 30 hours p.w. or more.  
Mean=-2.03 
Standard 
Deviation=8.30 
Marital status World Values Survey-European 
Values Survey, Waves 2 to 4. 
“Are you ……?” Reference category: Married Mean=2.73 
Standard 
deviation=2.22 
Income scale World Values Survey-European 
Values Survey, Waves 2 to 4. 
Self-assessment between lower, middle and higher income 
groups.  
Reference category: Lower Income  
Mean=1.97 
Standard 
deviation=.81 
Education World Values Survey-European 
Values Survey, Waves 2 to 4. 
Highest educational level attained. Reference category: 
Inadequately completed elementary education 
Mean=4.33 
Standard 
deviation=2.27 
Age World Values Survey-European 
Values Survey, Waves 2 to 4. 
Demographic variable for age  Mean=41.35 
Standard 
deviation=16.41 
Male  World Values Survey-European 
Values Survey, Waves 2 to 4. 
Dummy variable for males Mean=.48 
Standard 
deviation=.50 
Transition World Values Survey-European 
Values Survey, Waves 2 to 4. 
Dummy variable for transition countries Mean=.24 
Standard 
deviation=.42 
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Table A 4.2: (All sub-samples-WVS Wave 4) with country fixed effects 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   
Employment status       
                  
Part-time  -0.038 *** -0.066 *** -0.013   0.037   0.067   0.019   -0.057 *** -0.093 *** -0.019   
  0.015   0.024   0.019   0.033   0.052   0.043   0.016   0.027   0.022   
Self-employed -0.023 * -0.030 * -0.005   0.075 ** 0.078 * 0.058   -0.045 *** -0.051 *** -0.030   
  0.014   0.017   0.025   0.035   0.044   0.062   0.015   0.018   0.027   
Retired  -0.035 ** -0.059 * -0.018   -0.031   -0.098 ** 0.014   0.025   -0.005   0.051   
  0.016   0.023   0.023   0.029   0.045   0.039   0.020   0.027   0.031   
Housewife  0.037 *** -0.103   0.044 *** 0.024   -0.277   0.050   0.019   -0.067   0.028   
  0.014   0.078   0.017   0.036   0.189   0.038   0.016   0.086   0.019   
Student  -0.015   -0.001   0.006   0.077 * 0.005   0.139 ** -0.035 * 0.002   -0.021   
  0.017   0.024   0.024   0.040   0.058   0.054   0.018   0.027   0.026   
Unemployed  -0.264 *** -0.318 *** -0.199 *** -0.266 *** -0.311 *** -0.232 *** -0.266 *** -0.324 *** -0.184 *** 
  0.015   0.020   0.022   0.027   0.038   0.038   0.018   0.024   0.027   
Other  -0.076 *** -0.181 *** 0.018   0.033   -0.097   0.117   -0.117 *** -0.207 *** -0.032   
  0.027   0.039   0.038   0.065   0.108   0.081   0.029   0.041   0.043   
Education       
                  
Completed primary  0.041 *** -0.013   0.080 *** 0.021   0.008   0.021   0.061 *** -0.002   0.109 *** 
  0.016   0.024   0.021   0.041   0.069   0.051   0.017   0.026   0.023   
Incomplete secondary (technical) 0.082 *** 0.057 ** 0.096 *** 0.090 ** 0.100   0.073   0.108 *** 0.085 *** 0.121 *** 
  0.018   0.026   0.025   0.045   0.070   0.059   0.020   0.029   0.028   
Completed secondary (technical) 0.075 *** 0.048 ** 0.096 *** 0.116 *** 0.140 ** 0.091   0.091 *** 0.059 ** 0.119 *** 
  0.016   0.024   0.023   0.042   0.068   0.055   0.018   0.027   0.025   
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Table A 4.2: (All sub-samples-WVS Wave 4) with country fixed effects 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   
Incomplete secondary (uniprep) 0.040 ** 0.031   0.043 * 0.071   0.072   0.061   0.062 *** 0.055 * 0.061 ** 
  0.018   0.027   0.025   0.046   0.075   0.059   0.020   0.029   0.027   
Completed secondary (uniprep) 0.100 *** 0.051 ** 0.136 *** 0.157 *** 0.129 * 0.167 *** 0.094 *** 0.053 ** 0.127 *** 
  0.016   0.024   0.022   0.041   0.067   0.053   0.018   0.027   0.026   
University w/o degree 0.132 *** 0.115 *** 0.135 *** 0.272 *** 0.302 *** 0.246 *** 0.127 *** 0.109 *** 0.129 *** 
  0.019   0.028   0.026   0.053   0.084   0.068   0.020   0.029   0.029   
    University w/ degree  0.157 *** 0.111 *** 0.195 *** 0.321 *** 0.338 *** 0.300 *** 0.116 *** 0.071 *** 0.155 *** 
  0.017   0.025   0.024   0.043   0.069   0.057   0.019   0.027   0.027   
Marital status       
                  
Live together -0.082 *** -0.060 * -0.101 *** -0.152   -0.059   -0.249   -0.082 *** -0.067 * -0.097 *** 
  0.025   0.035   0.036   0.125   0.188   0.166   0.026   0.035   0.037   
Divorced -0.234 *** -0.219 *** -0.235 *** -0.261 *** -0.205 *** -0.275 *** -0.216 *** -0.231 *** -0.210 *** 
  0.018   0.030   0.023   0.030   0.052   0.036   0.024   0.037   0.031   
Separated  -0.320 *** -0.436 *** -0.247 *** -0.274 *** -0.336 *** -0.232 ** -0.330 *** -0.453 *** -0.255 *** 
  0.033   0.055   0.042   0.079   0.129   0.100   0.037   0.060   0.046   
Widowed -0.227 *** -0.290 *** -0.182 *** -0.200 *** -0.249 *** -0.172 *** -0.213 *** -0.286 *** -0.176 *** 
  0.018   0.037   0.022   0.029   0.061   0.034   0.023   0.047   0.028   
Single -0.148 *** -0.149 *** -0.145 *** -0.129 *** -0.129 *** -0.120 *** -0.147 *** -0.146 *** -0.155 *** 
  0.012   0.017   0.017   0.026   0.038   0.036   0.013   0.018   0.019   
Div, sep or wid -0.264 *** -0.356 ** -0.202 * na   na   na   -0.316 *** -0.403 ** -0.258 ** 
  0.098   0.177   0.119   na   na   na   0.098   0.178   0.118   
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Table A 4.2: (All sub-samples-WVS Wave 4) with country fixed effects 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   
Income group 
 
Middle income 0.199 *** 0.183 *** 0.208 *** 0.191 *** 0.159 *** 0.213 *** 0.199 *** 0.188 *** 0.205 *** 
  0.009   0.014   0.013   0.019   0.029   0.026   0.011   0.015   0.015   
Higher income 0.395 *** 0.376 *** 0.411 *** 0.455 *** 0.420 *** 0.484 *** 0.367 *** 0.353 *** 0.378 *** 
  0.010   0.015   0.014   0.021   0.032   0.029   0.012   0.017   0.017   
Age -0.030 *** -0.034 *** -0.025 *** -0.040 *** -0.050 *** -0.033 *** -0.026 *** -0.030 *** -0.022 *** 
  0.002   0.002   0.002   0.003   0.005   0.004   0.002   0.003   0.003   
Age –squared (x103) 0.317 *** 0.377 *** 0.260 *** 0.385 *** 0.499 *** 0.301 *** 0.289 *** 0.338 *** 0.241 *** 
  0.018   0.026   0.024   0.036   0.057   0.047   0.020   0.029   0.028   
Male dummy -0.058 *** -   -   -0.028   -   -   -0.077 *** -   -   
  0.008   -   -   0.015   -   -   0.010   -   -   
Number of observations 80677   39167   41510   20256   9199   11057   60421   29968   30453   
Pseudo-R2 0.055   0.057   0.054   0.042   0.039   0.046   0.051   0.057   0.046   
Minimum age 46.9   45.8   48.1   52.2 
  
50.2 
  
54.4 
  
44.8 
  
43.8 
  
45.6 
  
Notes: Ordered probit regressions with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. This table corresponds to the table 4.2 in the main text, presenting the same 
material in sub-samples of males and females.  Columns are ordered as follows: (1): the whole sample, (2) the whole sample restricted to males only, (3) the 
whole sample restricted to females, (4) the transition countries sample, (5) the transition countries sample restricted to males, (6) the transition countries 
sample restricted to females, (7) the non-transition countries sample, (8) the non-transition countries sample restricted to males, (9) the non-transition sample 
restricted to females. Reference category for the country fixed effects: Germany for 1-3 & 7-9, Russia for 4-6.  
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Table A 4.3: (All sub-samples of WVS Wave 4) without country fixed effects 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   
Gdpcap (x103) 0.038 *** 0.038 *** 0.038 *** 0.089 *** 0.084 *** 0.094 *** 0.029 *** 0.030 *** 0.027 *** 
  0.005   0.004   0.005   0.013   0.011   0.014   0.005   0.005   0.005   
Unemployment -0.003   -0.003   -0.004   0.001   0.003   0.000   -0.003   -0.004   -0.002   
  0.006   0.006   0.007   0.004   0.004   0.004   0.006   0.006   0.006   
Inflation (x103) -0.011   0.009   -0.025   0.052 *** 0.074 *** 0.034 * -3.286 *** -5.534 *** -0.979   
  0.027   0.026   0.029   0.017   0.016   0.019   1.263   1.201   1.309   
Gini coefficient 0.018 *** 0.020 *** 0.017 ** -0.012 ** -0.008 ** -0.015 ** 0.023 *** 0.024 *** 0.022 *** 
  0.007   0.006   0.008   0.005   0.004   0.006   0.006   0.007   0.006   
Employment status 
                           
Part-time  -0.055 * -0.096 ** -0.022   0.019   0.045   0.003   -0.076 * -0.118 *** -0.031   
  0.033   0.040   0.036   0.045   0.068   0.049   0.032   0.045   0.034   
Self-employed 0.025   -0.019   0.119 *** 0.067   0.050   0.084   -0.054 ** -0.059 *** -0.014   
  0.052   0.048   0.076   0.044   0.054   0.055   0.024   0.019   0.058   
Retired  -0.133 *** -0.166 *** -0.105 ** -0.062 ** -0.121 ** -0.018   -0.014 ** -0.073 * 0.060   
  0.039   0.041   0.048   0.028   0.055   0.040   0.035   0.039   0.043   
Housewife  0.028   -0.190 ** 0.055   0.082   -0.209   0.120 ** -0.075   -0.163   -0.085   
  0.063   0.112   0.066   0.055   0.146   0.057   0.064   0.154   0.057   
Student  0.006   -0.012   0.028   0.126 *** 0.039   0.198 *** -0.050   -0.051   -0.037   
  0.043   0.047   0.047   0.043   0.072   0.038   0.037   0.048   0.042   
Unemployed  -0.273 *** -0.368 *** -0.162 *** -0.276 *** -0.365 *** -0.198 *** -0.287 *** -0.345 *** -0.199 *** 
  0.053   0.051   0.060   0.049   0.061   0.047   0.059   0.057   0.069   
Other  -0.049   -0.089   0.001   -0.042   -0.148 * 0.024   -0.160 ** -0.196 ** -0.115   
  0.056   0.063   0.072   0.091   0.133   0.093   0.069   0.079   0.094   
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Table A 4.3: (All sub-samples of WVS Wave 4) without country fixed effects 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   
Education 
                           
Completed primary  0.052   0.009   0.087 * 0.022   0.035   0.006   0.111 ** 0.088   0.135 ** 
  0.044   0.069   0.047   0.062   0.094   0.090   0.054   0.069   0.057   
Incomplete secondary (technical) 0.055   0.055   0.053   0.015   0.048   -0.007   0.167 *** 0.171 *** 0.172 ** 
  0.065   0.066   0.073   0.099   0.083   0.143   0.062   0.066   0.068   
Completed secondary (technical) -0.016   0.017   -0.049   0.081   0.141 * 0.033   0.101 ** 0.104 * 0.109 * 
  0.071   0.063   0.082   0.081   0.077   0.097   0.051   0.058   0.056   
Incomplete Secondary (uniprep) -0.005   0.024   -0.030   -0.019   0.007   -0.035   0.168 ** 0.197 ** 0.154 ** 
  0.093   0.101   0.092   0.101   0.104   0.125   0.073   0.094   0.065   
Complete secondary (uniprep) 0.003   -0.006   0.009   0.069   0.059   0.076   0.102 * 0.115 * 0.102 * 
  0.066   0.075   0.065   0.087   0.093   0.103   0.057   0.069   0.053   
University w/o degree 0.135 ** 0.154 ** 0.122 * 0.238 ** 0.258 *** 0.230 * 0.182 * 0.202 *** 0.175 *** 
  0.061   0.069   0.066   0.104   0.101   0.136   0.063   0.078   0.061   
    University w/ degree  0.054   0.036   0.076   0.260 *** 0.275 *** 0.256 ** 0.112 * 0.088   0.152 *** 
  0.062   0.082   0.057   0.081   0.098   0.099   0.060   0.087   0.047   
 
Marital status 
                           
Live together 0.280 * 0.311 ** 0.247   0.144 *** 0.249 *** 0.029   0.172   0.190 *** 0.148   
  0.166   0.157   0.175   0.053   0.082   0.127   0.141   0.129   0.152   
Divorced -0.262 *** -0.200 *** -0.282 *** -0.271 *** -0.214 *** -0.281 *** -0.119 *** -0.102 * -0.135 *** 
  0.054   0.056   0.054   0.034   0.050   0.037   0.045   0.061   0.049   
Separated  -0.215 *** -0.297 *** -0.161 ** -0.265 * -0.284   -0.234   -0.222 * -0.310 ** -0.175 ** 
  0.061   0.082   0.076   0.155   0.205   0.149   0.059   0.099   0.070   
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Table A 4.3: (All sub-samples of WVS Wave 4) without country fixed effects 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   
Widowed -0.237 *** -0.322 *** -0.180 *** -0.222 *** -0.318 *** -0.175 *** -0.144 *** -0.261 *** -0.111 ** 
  0.044   0.055   0.044   0.037   0.074   0.045   0.045   0.070   0.044   
Single -0.104 *** -0.087 ** -0.109 *** -0.091 *** -0.080 * -0.085 ** -0.139 *** -0.131 *** -0.165 *** 
  0.033   0.040   0.041   0.026   0.044   0.029   0.037   0.040   0.042   
Income group 
                           
Middle income 0.201 *** 0.181 *** 0.211 *** 0.194 *** 0.147 ** 0.221 *** 0.189 *** 0.186 *** 0.181 *** 
  0.028   0.030   0.034   0.053   0.065   0.054   0.035   0.035   0.041   
Higher income 0.376 *** 0.347 *** 0.395 *** 0.423 *** 0.369 *** 0.463 *** 0.333 *** 0.322 *** 0.332   
  0.057   0.061   0.056   0.078   0.086   0.077   0.075   0.076   0.076   
Age -0.027 *** -0.033 *** -0.022 *** -0.037 *** -0.044 *** -0.032 *** -0.025 *** -0.034 *** -0.018   
  0.004   0.004   0.005   0.005   0.007   0.008   0.005   0.006   0.005   
Age –squared (x103) 0.294 *** 0.374 *** 0.225 *** 0.346 *** 0.427 *** 0.283 *** 0.306 *** 0.415 *** 0.216   
  0.045   0.050   0.055   0.057   0.072   0.097   0.057   0.074   0.050   
Male dummy -0.041   -   -   -0.018   -   -   -0.101 ** -   -   
  0.032   -   -   0.030   -   -   0.019   -   -   
Number of observations 47936   22801   25135   14394   6379   8015   33542   16422   17120   
Pseudo-R2 0.034   0.035   0.034   0.036   0.032   0.040   0.03   0.04   0.03   
Minimum age 45.7   43.6   48.6   53.8   51.5   56.0   41.1   41.1   41.0   
Notes: Ordered probit regressions with robust standard errors, corrected for clustering on country. This table corresponds to the Table 4.3 in the main text, 
presenting the same material in sub-samples of males and females. Columns are ordered as follows: (1): the whole sample, (2) the whole sample restricted to 
males only, (3) the whole sample restricted to females, (4) the transition countries sample, (5) the transition countries sample restricted to males, (6) the 
transition countries sample restricted to females, (7) the non-transition countries sample, (8) the non-transition countries sample restricted to males, (9) the 
non-transition sample restricted to females.  
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